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ABSTRACT 
Studies of intemational joint ventures (IJVs) in China continue to accumulate. Many 
were originally informed fTom various historical, economic, political , sociological, and 
geographical perspectives. More recently, international management theory and research 
has made some progress. Attention may likewise switch from the initial foundin g ofTJVs 
towards their subsequent operation and management and eventual maturation. In 
addition, it will become more possible to compare different intemational approaches and 
perspectives upon such. For that reason, this study seeks to explore and explain why 
conflicting interests arise in Japanese Affiliated Enterprises (JAEs) in China and how 
Chinese and Japanese perspectives differ. 
It therefore applies a theoretical model of IJV founding and development derived from 
the works of Harrigan, Parkhe and others to a sample of eighty-one JAEs and four short 
case studies. It concentrates upon the variables of founding motives, partner selection, 
control and conflict, performance, and investment environment and places their 
development into an overall context. A range of historical, economic, political, cultural , 
and personality factors are identified in the process and future developmental/research 
possibilities specified. 
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Chapter One 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
1. Background 
The complex relationship between China and Japan goes well beyond their original common 
cultural heritage. Amid continuing mutual differences, and some suspicion and mistrust, their 
relationship has passed through different stages, each with its own emphasis. More recently that 
emphasis has turned towards growing economic engagement and complementarity in general. 
Not only is this based upon greater trade, which already has a long history, it also seeks greater 
direct investment from Japan, albeit with supporting aid and assistance. In the short period since 
China officially "opened up", Japanese direct investment has gone through a number of different 
cycles. Despite that, Sino-Japanese joint ventures in particular have together raised expectations 
about greater mutual collaboration, learning, and material benefit than either could realise alone, 
always assuming such ventures are suitably managed towards that end. As events unfold, the 
management of all Japanese Affiliated Enterprises in China (JAEs) therefore assumes more 
significance, not just for these enterprises themselves, but also for the complex expectations and 
relationships sunounding them. 
This presents some difficult challenges for International Management Theory and Research. 
With its "Western" roots, this has not usually dealt with such "Eastern" problems before, despite 
dealing with transactions between the West and East, and vice versa, as in the case of debating 
"Japanisation" for example. Its application to the study of JAEs in China may therefore produce 
fresh insights into both these ventures and International Management Theory and Research itself. 
The scale of this problem has increased during the time of this research . JDI to China had a 
utili zed value of US $1.07 billion in 1992; it then rose to US $2.57 billion in 1994, and US $4. 15 
bil lion in 1995 1 • By the end of August 2000, it had a total contracted va lue of US $37.27 billion. 
with an effecti ve utilization value of $26.77 billion 2 . There were then a recorded 19,7 16 JAEs. 
includin g equity joint ventures, co-operative joint ventures . and Japanese wholl y O\\ned 
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ventures, which together accounted for 5.5 % of all Foreign-Affiliated Enterprises (FAEs) in 
China3 . A closer examination of this and associated trends follows in Chapter Two. Firstly, it is 
necessary to define certain basic terms. 
2. Definition of Key Words 
As the title indicates this study focuses upon how the Japanese and Chinese manage joint 
ventures. The phrase joint venture has been defined by many scholars as an independent 
economic organisational entity formed by more than one parent organisation to create new 
competitive advantages (Beamish and Banks 1986; Contractor 1985; Dunning 1988; Harrigan 
1985; Lynch 1989, Wille 1988). Normally, such joint ventures include equity and contractual 
joint ventures. However, in this study wholly foreign-owned operations are also included in the 
category of joint venture. This follows other studies of JV s such as Fan (1996), Kaiser (1997), 
and Zhu (1998). Secondly, the Chinese government normally categorises equity JV s, contractual 
JV s and wholly owned operations together as "San Zi Qi Ye" (meaning three types of capital 
enterprise). Thirdly, when China began importing FDI, wholly foreign-owned operations were 
negligible in number, and even now with recent rapid increases, they still represent a minority. 
Hence, according to Chinese government statistics for 1979 to 1996, equity JV s account for 61 
% of the total, contractual JV s 15 % and wholly owned 24%. Equity and contractual JV s still 
constitute a majority of all JVs. A further term, JAE (Japanese Affiliated Enterprise), is used to 
denote Sino-Japanese JV enterprises. JAE denotes any of the three types of capital enterprises 
involving Japanese investment. 
3. The Research Problem 
Until recently, there was a wave of international interest in, and even enthusiasm for, the idea of 
Japanese economic success in general, and management capability in particular. Some attributed 
this to economic and political factors first, while others considered Japanese organisational and 
managerial distinctiveness more important. This trend even occurred within China, which did not 
officially follow the "open door to the outside world" policy until 1978, and then asked why 
neighbouring Japan, with its common Confucian and linguistic heritage, had pursued economic 
10 
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development so quickly and successfully by comparison. In some respects, then, mutual joint 
ventures were one possible vehicle for both China and Japan to learn more about each other, and 
complement each other's economic development. However, during the process of operating joint 
ventures, in order to share knowledge, there have arisen certain conflicting interests between the 
two countries. It is the focus of this research thesis to study these conflicting interests and to 
determine the reasons behind them. Important questions, and also reservations, about how the 
Chinese and the Japanese would approach these ventures, and then jointly manage them, will 
surface. For that reason this research will subsequently focus upon the differentiation of rationale 
behind: 
Why Japanese and Chinese sought to venture together, and how partners chose each other. 
How respective managers then controlled the resulting JAEs. 
How managers judged JAEs' performance along a number of different dimensions. 
How the surrounding investment environment impacted upon such JAEs' progress. 
In addition, the study will put such ventures into an overall context, and explain the findings 
from both Japanese and Chinese perspectives to emphasise their contrast. 
4. The study outline 
This is a study of the characteristics of JAEs management, and the overall pattern of 
development thus far, conducted in, and with particular reference to, China. The study will seek 
to increase understanding of their present position and development from a managerial viewpoint 
while also indicating how, if at all, this may develop in future. At present some outside 
viewpoints assume China and Japan to be similar, especially because they both stem from the 
same cultural beliefs and are both Asian countries. However, it is the aim of this study to show 
that contrasts between these two countries are startling. Other viewpoints simply accept that 
China and Japan are different. It is the aim of this study to show how these issues arise. It is 
theoretically based upon a model derived from the works of Harrigan and Parkhe, to be reviewed 
in Chapter Three later. As well as helping Western observers. this should interest other Asians 
too, not least because China might increasingly compete with them for foreign direct investment 
11 
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(FDI) generally, knowing that Japan has a particular relationship with China which could well 
affect them all. 
5. Research Methodology 
As will be described in Chapter Four, having first put .101 into an overall Chinese context, 
questionnaire data was then gathered from the sample of eighty-one JAEs which responded, 
along with a series of short case studies, based upon both personal interviews and other 
documentary evidence. However, even with the researcher's unusual personal background, being 
a Chinese who has studied in Japan, as well as the United Kingdom, special consideration was 
given to the research process itself. Not only did this entail identifying an appropriate population 
sample, both the questionnaire and interview process also needed customising to a Chinese field 
situation. This process nevertheless produced some valuable senior Chinese and, to a lesser 
extent, Japanese management responses to the questions posed, enabling further questions to be 
tested. 
6. Thesis Structure 
The rest of the thesis consists of the following chapters: 
Chapter Two reviews the history, evolution, and current situation and development of JDI in 
China as the overall context for this research, and outlines particular cultural differences, 
historical antagonism and economic interdependence issues. 
Chapter Three reviews the literature devoted to IJVs in China, especially Japanese ventures in 
China, relevant to the tive issues: founding motives, partner selection, control and conflict. 
assessment of performance and investment environment. A framework applied in this research 
and thirteen questions are produced for further testing. 
12 
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Chapter Four considers the most appropriate research methods for their further investigation, and 
argues that a combination of mailed questionnaire survey, and individual case studies fits the 
purposes of this study, given the further considerations then outlined. 
Chapter Five gives a general description of the overall sample characteristics and research 
results. 
Chapter Six then analyses the questionnaire data further against the framework and questions 
described before, from a Chinese perspective. 
Chapter Seven applies the same scheme of analysis from a Japanese perspective. 
Chapter Eight discusses the questionnaire findings with respect to how the Japanese and Chinese 
compare. 
Chapter Nine analyses the case studies data to illuminate the issues identified in the literature 
review and the questionnaire survey. 
Chapter Ten offers overall conclusions, which indicate the implications for the conflict 
management of JAEs in China, and also suggest further lines of development for both JAEs 
themselves and future research. 
Notes 
1. Resource: the Statistics ofMinistry ofFinance, Japan, 1998, Home page: http://www.mof.go.jp 
2. Resource: The Statistics of Japanese Direct Investment in China, The Economic & Commercial 
Counsellor's Office of the Embassy of PRC in Japan, Home page: http://www.moftec.or.jp. 
3. Ibid. 
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Chapter Two 
History, Culture and Economics between 
China and Japan 
1. Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to put this study into a broad historical context in order to 
determine the long-term developmental trends between China and Japan. The relationship of the 
two countries extend to over 2000 years, but official Sino-Japanese contacts developed fo llowing 
the resumption of diplomatic relationships in September 1972. This chapter will draw out the 
historical antagonism, cultural differences and economic interdependence between China and 
Japan, and it particularly reviews literature on the past and present situation of Japanese direct 
investment (JDI) as the context for the present study. 
2. Historical Antagonism 
Chinese culture and production technology began to be transferred to Japan around 2000 years 
ago . Cultural communication developed between China and Japan gradually from 200 BC to AD 
600. From 600 to 1000 AD was a golden age of ancient Sino-Japanese cultural communication . 
During these centuries the Japanese government sent delegations and students to China on 
l . I twenty-t 1ree occasiOns . They learned about Chinese politics, law, m1s, Confucian studies. 
building technology and tradi tional social customs. hom the I Oth century to the 19th century. 
Sino-Japanese cul tural communication continued uninterrupted, including not only cul ture, arts 
and Confucian thought, but also Chinese-style management ideology. For example, a Chinese 
military strategist Sun Tzu (spelled Sun Zi under the piny in version currently used in China) who 
lived about 2,500 years ago, wrote hi s book The Art ol War. In 734 AD. a Japanese student took 
it back to Japa n. and since, then over 170 pieces of research concerning The Art ol War have 
been publi shed in .l apan2. Much of Sun Tzu's strateg ic management thought has been used in 
14 
Chapter Two 
modern Japanese-style management practice. Even the word "management", in Chinese is 
"guanli"; "guan", to manage and control, a meaning used by Chinese scholars in the Han 
Dynasty (206 BC - AD 220i, In Japanese, "management" is termed "kanri"; the word's 
meaning, pronunciation and concept were all transferred from China to Japan over a thousand 
years ago. 
China and Japan have had a long history of both cultural and economic exchange and military 
dispute and conflict lasting over 2000 years4. From a Chinese perspective, at the turn of the 
century their relationship was marked by Japanese aggression, before the Second World War 
marked the darkest point. Since the end of the 19th century, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 
was fought over the control of Korea, nominally a tributary state of China at the time. China lost 
all battles on land and at sea. Major battles were the sea battle of the Yellow Sea, the siege of 
Pyongyang in Korea, and the siege of Weihaiwei. By the Treaty of Shimonoseki signed at Chun 
fan lou (Shunpanro in Japanese) in April 1895, China had to recognise the "independence" of 
Korea, cede Taiwan and neighbouring islands to Japan, and pay an indemnity of 0.23 billion 
taels of silver5. The war was the first stage of Japan's continental policy of expansion. 
In 1931, the Japanese military forces first invaded North-eastern China, also known as the 
Manchuria Region, then escalated the aggression to other Asian nations. Fifteen years of violent 
Japanese rampage in China and elsewhere caused the loss of the lives of more than thirty million 
Chinese, the overwhelming majority of them civilians, and hundreds of billions of dollars of 
property. It should be noted that the damage to China and the rest of Asia continue to have ripple 
effects even today, including the deadly poison gas leaked from the chemical and biological 
weaponry labs buried in many parts of China by retreating Japanese soldiers and scientists6. The 
cold war allied China to the Soviet Union, and Japan to the United States. And whilst China 
entered the central-planning command economy, Japan operated a market economy, maintaining 
a strong link with the government. 1972 saw the restoration of diplomatic relations, officially 
ending relations with the Taiwan Nationalists. Sino-Japanese trading improved with this 
decision. 
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3. Cultural Differences 
Although both Chinese and Japanese cultures originated from Confilcianism and are essentially 
very similar, they still differ in some respects. So-called Confi<cianism is not so much a religion 
as it is an ethical code for social conduct. The basic tenets can be summarised as obedience to 
and respect for superiors and parents, duty to family, loyalty to friends, humility, sincerity, and 
courtes/. 
Confucian thought, including the five basic human relationships presented above, has to different 
degrees influenced China, Japan and all Eastern Asia countries over two thousand years. 
However, since the event called the May 4th Movement in 1919, criticism and repudiation of 
Confucianism started in China. The reason behind it was a political protest over the awarding of 
the then German colony of Qingdao (in Shandong Province) to Japan, by the Versailles Peace 
Conference at the end of WW I8. There was national soul probing to discover why China had 
fallen so low and become so weak. Could it be Chinese culture was to blame? Some Chinese, 
understandably enough, wanted to reject Confucianism, and thought everything about Confucius 
was wrong and evil. Thus traditional Chinese culture was damaged and the Chinese started to 
adopt Western culture, including Marxism, through Russia. 
After the CPC established the People's Republic of China in 1949 China started to form a new 
culture, which was anti-traditional -- tradition was equated with feudalism, and anti-western -
the west belonged to capitalism. The new culture was a political culture. Chinese people were 
only allowed to obey the CPC9. Especially during the Great Culture Revolution from 1966-76, 
there was the character assassination of Confucius. "He" (Harmony) was a divorcee and a 
murderer! Confucius was ridiculed as never before in Chinese history 10• Also Western culture, 
except for Jvfarxism, was denigrated, as if rotten to the core and declining. As a result, some basic 
tenets of Conji1cianism such as respect for superiors and parents, loyalty to friends, humility, 
sincerity, and courtesy were all damaged. Chinese people lost a basic belief in each other, and 
relationships between them were limited to the "class struggle". Also, Chinese workers' 
motivation suffered, as re1lected by poor attitudes, non-observance of rules and regulations. low 
productivity and failure to report problems and defects 11 • 
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After the cultural revolution, when China started their Open Door policy in I 979, the Chinese 
had a chance to know gradually what happened outside. They realised that capitalism and 
Western culture is not decadent and declining as they had thought. This culture allows Western 
countries to achieve an advanced level. Also they found that Confucianism may not be simply 
taken as feudalism, but supported Japan and the "Four Tigers" -- South Korea, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong and Singapore - to progress their national development. The Chinese, however, started to 
review their traditional culture and began rethinking Western culture. Therefore, in recent years, 
political culture itself has greatly declined. Some traditional culture has returned. Similarly, 
some Western culture has been accepted into this reformed culture. However, in China there 
exists a transitional culture. Mainstream culture has not taken final shape 12. 
Since 1868, following Meiji Restoration, Japan was the first Asian country to adopt Western 
cultures and technology from Holland, Britain, France, Germany and United States 13 . With 
nearly one and a half centuries of industrialisation, Japan used Western knowledge to overtake 
most of these countries, and is well ahead of its Asian neighbours in technology, capitalist 
business techniques and modern management know-how. During this Japan not only adopted 
technology from the West, but also adopted Western political, economic systems, culture, and 
even customs 14 . This caused Japanese culture to evolve around a westernised enterprise system. 
For example, in Meiji the Japanese State played a major role in enterprise, even though in later 
decades it sold off industrial concerns to private interests to support the development of a 
capitalist economy. 
As mentioned earlier, Japanese culture has been, at different stages, influenced by several 
countries, and that has contributed to its unique characteristics. We can see from a saying that a 
Japanese may be given Shinto (a Japanese traditional religion) rites at birth, a Christian 
ceremony at his marriage, and a Buddhist funeral at his death 15 . However, it is also observed that 
even though the Japanese borrowed three ancient doctrines (Confucianism, Taoism and 
Buddhism) from China in the Sixth Century, it borrowed modern knowledge of democratic 
system, market mechanism, social customs and technology from Western countries since 1868. 
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4. Economic Interdependence 
China's economic relationship with Japan is an important foreign policy consideration, since 
Japan has long been its biggest trade partner, accounting for about 20% of all foreign trade 16. At 
the same time, China has become more important to Japan, trade rising since 1993 to second 
place in the Japanese statistics 17 • With trade increasing, there has- been some shift from a so-
called "vertical relationship", in which China exports to Japan primary products and imports 
manufactured goods, to a more "horizontal relationship", in which China exports to Japan not 
only primary products but also manufactured goods. Another clear trend is the influx of Japanese 
direct investment into China. For some time Japan was officially criticised for its reluctance to 
invest in China. However, until the Asian crisis, Japanese Direct Investment (JDI) in China was 
increasing in both scope and size. 
Nevertheless, after 1994 as all FDI (including JDI) in China has grown, it has attracted its critics, 
some of whom consider it an economic invasion, undermining China's national industry. 
Although opinion in China generally remains in favour there have been policy changes. In recent 
years, Chinese scholars such as Hu (1995), have criticised the state for attracting FDI by 
transferring some state enterprises and land to foreigners at unduly low prices, thereby 
prejudicing national interests. Li (1995) has canvassed selected economists and has noted three 
essential conditions for importing FDI: 
i) It should pose no threat to the independence of the national industry. 
ii) It should pose no threat to the leading role of the national economy. 
iii) The development speed ofFDI should be geared to national capacity. 
Shi ( 1996) indicated that, in 1994, the proportion of actual FDI in China's GDP was 8.8%. In 
1995 the rate of increase of FDI exceeded that of GDP, and both were over the international 
safety guideline of 4-6% suggested by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 
News reports have asked Chinese people to pay more attention to the effects of FDI. For 
example "The crisis of China's national industry" 1x talked about the national drinks industrv 
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losing its trademarks and domestic market. Another article under the headline ".TV home 
appliance industry tidal wave in 1996" 19 reported that the markets of most of China's well-
known home appliance manufacturers had been taken over by foreign rivals. However, amid this 
resurgent "economic nationalism" there are many unanswered questions about the reality of .TDI. 
4.1. The History of Japanese Direct Investment in China 
It is possible to argue that JDI in China has a hundred years of history. The resulting traditions 
have greatly influenced JDI in recent years. As Ritchie ( 1997) indicated, historical changes in 
Japanese approaches to trade and business with China have carried major consequences, not just 
within China but also outside, and potentially they will do so again in the future. Therefore, 
understanding the history may propel us to a better understanding of the present and the future. 
4.1.1. Pre-1949 
Foreign capital entering China virtually started with the British East India Company establishing 
an agency in Guangzhou in 1715.20 Since 1840 much foreign capital invested in China was 
mostly intended to facilitate trade. Even though over a hundred factories had been established in 
China before 1895, all were officially illegal, because no foreigner had the right to establish a 
factorl 1• After China and Japan signed the Shimonoseki Treaty in 1895, following China's 
defeat in the 1894-95 war, foreign capital, including Japanese capital, could legally be invested 
in China22 • In the beginning Japanese investment developed slower than European investment, 
but by the end of the Japanese-Russian war (in 1905) it accelerated. Table 2-1 shows how China 
calculates the history of foreign capital investment over the 1902-1948 period. 
Table 2- 1 Foreign capital* investment in China 1902-48 (Unit: 1,000 US dollars) 
Nation 1902 1914 1930 1936 1941 1948 
Total I ,509,309 2,255,657 3,487,559 4,285,372 9,161,758 3,098,906 
UK 344,058 664,589 I ,047,004 1.045.921 1,095,337 I ,033,674 
USA 79,353 99,121 285,715 340,515 482,377 1,393,301 
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France 211,640 282,482 304,844 311,913 285,097 297,247 
Germany 300,715 385,683 174,592 136,420 136,956 ---
.Japan 53,601 290,893 1,411 ,61 1 2,096,437 6,828,067 ---
Italy 42,738 32,525 79,080 92,070 18,370 6,211 
Russia 450,320 440,155 --- --- --- ---
Belgium 18,003 28,491 89,381 77,165 126,834 139,948 
Holland! 1,203 915 29,569 49,570 28,135 25,757 
Swaziland --- --- --- 9,256 7,997 14,537 
Denmark 620 1,625 942 4,257 2,098 2,242 
Others 7,058 29,178 64,821 121,848 149,090 185,989 
Source: Made by the researcher and data from Wu, C., Imperialism's fllvestmellt in Chilla before 
1949, Chapter One, Beijing: The People's Press, 1955 
*: Including enterprise property, real estate, loans and reparations. 
According to the Department of Trade at Japan's Foreign Affairs Ministry in 1928, there were 
2,3 72 J AEs in China, with a total investment amounting to ¥710,119,000 (old Japanese Y en)23 . 
Its geographical distribution in China can be seen in Figure 2-1. Most JAEs were concentrated in 
the Northeast of China because this area, also called Manchuria, was not only close to Japan and 
near to its colony Korea, but was also a traditional Japanese trading area. Manchuria in effect 
became a colony of Japan in 1931, and there was considerable penetration by Japanese business 
groups into the rest of China. More controversially, some have viewed Manchuria's development 
as a Sino-Japanese joint venture on a grand scale, in which Japan supplied capital and 
management, while China supplied labour and natural resources (Brown, 1986). JAEs were 
established in many important cities in China, such as Dalian, Shanghai, Tianjin, Qingdao and 
Beijing. Railway and other transport industries took up to 46 % of the total Japanese investment, 
trade companies about 30 %, while manufacturing, building, agriculture, forestry and small-scale 
industry made up the remainder24 . 
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Figure 2-1: Distribution of JAes in China (1928) 
Distribution of JAEs in China 
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Source: Made by the researcher with data from The Politics and Economy of Modern China, 
Tokyo: Diplomacy Times Press, 1931, pp 429-430 
During the 1902-1914 period, foreign investment grew from a total of US $503 million to US 
$1.06 billion, and reached a peak of US $2.68 billion in 1936. Japan and Britain continued as the 
largest investors throughout, with an estimated 50 and 35 %25 respectively. However, the Sino-
Japanese War (1937-45) and the Civil War (1946-49) so demoralised both the domestic and 
Sino-Japanese sectors of the economy, that the latter encountered official hostility and lost its 
preferential status. Japanese industry, teclmology and commerce entered China via the treaty 
ports, and, benefiting from the unequal treaties, were officially considered detrimental to the 
development of China's economy. In China it is considered debateable whether foreigners really 
aided its development before 1949; most critics believe they stifled and exploited it instead. 
Some indication of the overwhelming influence of this foreign investment can be gained from 
looking at the figures available for certain basic industries. For example, in 1928, Shanghai's 
industrial investment totalled 300 million Chinese Yuan, of which foreign investmen t amounted 
to 200 million. In the case of the Chinese coa l industry, in 1933 , Japanese investors took 29% of 
the output, Britain 23% and Germany I%. These figures exc lude the Northeast of China where 
Japanese investors took 84% of the output. For iron ore output, 60% came from Northeast China, 
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much of which virtually belonged to the Japanese, with a further 36% under their control. 
Chinese annual pig iron output was 0.4 million tons, of which 95% was taken by the Japanese26 . 
4.1.2. Post-1949 
In 1949, the People's Republic of China was established, bringing a new era of relative 
international peace, and an emphasis on the nation's economic development. One major effect 
was the progressive exclusion of foreign investment from China, including Japanese investment. 
The historical Sino-foreign economic co-operation, which had characterized the treaty ports, was 
soon brought to an end. By adhering to Mao Tse Tsung's "lean-to-one-side" policy, China 
sought substantial co-operation with the Soviet Union, but this also ended unsatisfactorily in the 
late 1950s (Perkins, 1975). Finally, during the Cultural Revolution, even remaining economic 
ties with overseas Chinese were officially broken. 
From the conclusion of the first official Sino-Japanese joint venture in March 1979 to the end of 
August 2000, total contract value of investment came to $37.27 billion, with an effective 
utilization value of $26.77 billion 27 . There were then a recorded 19,716 JAEs, which together 
accounted for 5.5 % of all Foreign-Affiliated Enterprises (FAEs) in China28 . At the initial stage, 
capital for iron & steel, petrochemical works and machinery was exported from Japan on an 
unprecedented large scale, as were consumer products including electrical appliances and 
automobiles. Between 1985-1988 Japan started to expand its direct investment in China and, 
according to statistics issued by Japan's Ministry of Finance, there were only 25 investment 
projects totalling US $73 million by the end of March 1984. However, by the 1986 fiscal year 
the number had increased to 85 projects with an investment value of US $226 million29 . The 
majority of investment projects took the form of new joint ventures. In keeping with changes in 
China's policies, aimed at attracting foreign direct investment, the number of exclusively JAEs 
increased, although they only account for a small proportion of the total. Japanese firms altered 
their management strategy following the appreciation of the Japanese yen after 1987, and their 
investment in manuf~1cturing grew (Chen, 1992). 
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In August 1988, during Japanese Prime Minister Takeshita's visit to China, the Chinese-Japanese 
Investment Protection Agreement was signed. This agreement proposed that Sino-Japanese joint 
ventures would enjoy legal and related rights similar to Chinese enterprises. In 1989, the leaders 
of both China and Japan suggested the establishment of an official investment protection 
organisation. In 1990, a Chinese-Japanese Investment Promotion Association was established, 
similar to its counterpart in Japan. In 1991, both governments promised to exchange documents 
on revenue and other topics. (Li, 1992). All of these measures were intended to increase the 
confidence of Japanese firms investing in China. From 1979 to the end of 1991, China absorbed 
US $79.63 billion of foreign capital, including US $23 billion of direct investment. More than 
40,000 F AEs were set up, of which about 20,000 went into operation30 . These figures show that 
China had made progress in attracting foreign investment, although the work was still at an 
initial developmental stage. 
Some of the factors which restrict foreign capital investment may be traced to foreign investors 
themselves. Many problems appear internal to China itself. These are associated with the 
unrealised limitations of the Chinese market, the government-designated fields permitting 
foreign investment, and systems for investment administration. Ideological resistance is also 
believed to be a decisive factor in China. For instance in China some still reject the very idea of 
F AEs because they consider them to be alien and capitalistic. As a result, foreign investment has 
often been excluded from certain fields of industry, or only given deliberately restricted access. 
The new wave of reform and opening up has obviously cleared away some ofthese obstacles and 
the zeal with which various parts of China have officially welcomed foreign investment appears 
almost unprecedented. Local state I provincial governments regularly advance new measures to 
attract more FDI. These measures include decentralising powers of approval, selecting a special 
number of large and medium-sized state-owned enterprises for co-operation with foreign 
investors, and establishing new development zones. Changes also now allow more foreign 
businesses to invest in tertiary industries (tourist hotels excluded), originally barred to foreign 
investment. In short, the Chinese authorities, as well as foreign investors, have together '·learnt'' 
to improve the overall investment environment over time, and changes continue still. 
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In 1994, the state announced that foreign businesses would be particularly encouraged to invest 
in inland infrastructure. This gave a detailed account of the preferential terms accorded to foreign 
investment in intl·astructure and basic industries. China has also introduced more laws and 
regulations to attract and facilitate investment. During the last 20 years China claims to have 
promulgated more than 200 items of national economic legislation, over 50 of which were 
concerned with foreign direct investment (e.g. the Law on Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures, the La\\ 
on Foreign Funded Enterprises, Foreign Economic Contractual Law, etc.). Furthermore, China 
has not only introduced patent laws, a trade mark act, copyright laws etc., but has also joined the 
World Intellectual Property Organisation, and signed the World Copyright Treaty. All these 
measures may be considered to encourage Japanese investment, facilitating a new wave of JAEs. 
4.2. The characteristics of JDI in China 
As a result of China's improved investment environment, all foreign investment, including 
Japanese investment continued to grow. However, after 1995, FDI and JDI in China have been 
reduced, and JDI declined in 1998. The following sections examine the characteristics of JDI in 
China. 
4.2. 1. JDI Statistics 
Annual JDI in China was relatively limited between 1979 and 1983. The first rush of JDI in 
China was in the period 1984-1987. By 1985, there were 118 projects, four times the 1979 to 
1983 number. The second rush was from 1988 to the spring of 1989, and the third rush lasted 
from the summer of 1991 until 1995. JDI in China showed particularly fast growth from 1992. 
In 1995, JDI in the USA was US $21.004 billion, accounting for 44 % of the total, and JDI in 
China was US $4.152 billion, only 20 % of the USA total. Nevertheless, China was Japan's 
second largest investment partner in the world. After 1996, and the recent economic slowdown in 
East Asia generally, .JDI in China has been reduced. The development of JDI in China is shown 
in Figure 2-2. 
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Source: Made by the researcher according to reference stat istics from the Mini stry of Finance, 
Japan. See home page http://www.mof.go.jp . 
The intervening troughs are particularly associated with politics (for example when Hu Yaobang 
was relieved of hi s post and the Tiananmen Square incident) . Japanese funds are 
characteristically sensitive to the Chinese political situation. Based on Figure 2-2, the changes in 
the number of investment projects and the amount invested in US$ value falls into four di stinct 
stages. These are hi ghlighted in Table 2-2 below. 
Table 2 - 2: Proposed developmental stages for JDI in China 
Stage Period Total Projects Value in US$ m. 
Initi al stage 1979- 83 25 73 
Second stage 1984- 88 540 1,962 
Third stage 1989 - 93 1,728 4,825 
rourth stage 1994- 98 2, 14 1 13,022 
After 1992. JDI entered a fast growth stage. In 1994-98 the total number of investm ent projech 
was 86 times greater, and the total investment amount 178 times greater. than in 1979-83. From 
I SJl)4 to 1998. the yea rl y ave rage number or projects was 428, with an average va lue of US 
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$2,604 million. This compares with the initial stage between 1979 and 1983, when there was an 
average of only 5 projects and a value of US $14.6 million . Thus the most recent stage of .TO! 
represents a considerable increase. In 1995 projects numbered 770 and were worth US $4,152 
million, 1.2 and 1.6 times their value in 1994, creating a new record in the history of all .JDI in 
China. The average value of each project increased from US $2.92 million during the initial 
stage to US $6.08 million during the fourth stage, and the most recent figure of US $10.06 
million for 1998. 
If these figures and findings are compared with those for the development of the total FDI in 
China, there are certain interesting features as shown in Figure 2-3. 
Figure 2-3: Development of FDI in China 
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Beijing; 1995-98 based on: "Statistics Data", China Ministry of Foreign Trade & 
Economic Co-operation, home page: http://www.moftcc.cn/. 
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After 1993 , total FDI in China gradual ly reduced . Yet, at this time, JDI continued to increase 
until 1995 . It is clear that much direct investment comes from small and medium sized Japanese 
firms . In the 1980s, there were only 6 of the top 20 large Japanese firms significantly investing in 
China : Hitachi , Matsushita, Canon, Nippon Kokan , Sanyo and Isuzu . ln terms or scale only 
Sanyo and Matsushita can be considered to have made relatively large investments. By the end 
of 1995, 11 of the 14 remaining firms had also invested in China31 , whi le Matsushita, Hitachi, 
Sanyo and Isuzu had increased their investment in China considerably. Matsushita alone has 
established 36 enterprises in China, with total investment of over US $500 million. while Sanyo, 
1-Jitachi and NEC have interests in 24, 16 and 10 enterprises respectively in China32 . Although 
the idea of the individual firm , in Japan as elsewhere, was considered subordinate to that of the 
entire "business group" this is nevertheless an important development. 
4.2. 2. Types of JAEs 
In general, Foreign Affiliated Enterprises (FAEs) in China take one of three forms - joint 
ventures, co-operative ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprises. The main difference 
between co-operative and joint ventures is that co-operative ventures do not necessarily calculate 
their shares on the basis of the funds invested and allocate the profits proportionally to the 
shares. They distribute profits based on agreements over investment forms and allocation 
proportions (Zhu and Yu, 1991 ). There have been three stages in the development of funding for 
FAEs, including Japanese Affiliated Enterprises (JAEs). 
In the first half of the 1980s, most F AEs were co-operative ventures. Joint ventures accounted 
for most of the remainder, followed by wholly forei gn-owned enterprises. From 1979 to 1985 . 
F AEs in China totalled 6,316, with co-operative ventures making up 59%, joint ventures 29%. 
and wholly foreign -owned enterprises only 2% of the total. Similarly, co-operative ventures 
accounted for 62.8% of the total actual investment (US $ 2,962 million), with joint ventures 
forming 34%, and wholly foreign-owned enterprises 4%33 . During the second stage, from 1986 
to 1990, the situation changed. In I 986, joint ventures constituted 67% of FAEs, and 50% of the 
total actual utilised investment. Co-operative ventures accounted tor 39% of FAEs, and 49% or 
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total actual utilised investment, whilst wholl y fore ign-owned enterpri ses accounted for only I% 
of both total FAEs and actual utili sed investment34 . 
The last stage dates from 199 1 to the present. After 1988 , wholl y foreign-owned enterpri ses in 
China increased more rapidly, wi th the proporti on of wholl y foreign-owned enterprises 
surpassing that of co-operative venture enterprises in 1991. In that year, joint ventures accounted 
fo r 65% of the total FAEs and 53. 1% of actual utili sed investment, co-operative ventures were 
4% and 2 1.1 % respectively, and wholly foreign-owned enterprises were 27.1% and 23.8%. FAEs 
have therefore progressed to a situation where joint ventures rank top, wholly foreign-owned 
enterpri ses second and co-operative ventures third. A similar trend has occurred in the 
development JFEs in China, as shown in Figure 2-4. 
Figure 2-4: Development of JAEs in China 
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28 
Chapter Two 
Between 1979 and 1987, there were 420 JAEs recorded as set up in China, including 326 joint 
ventures, 89 co-operative ventures and only 5 wholly Japanese-owned enterprises. After 1987. 
the situation changed. From 1988 to 1990, there were 872 JAEs in China, of which 631 were 
joint ventures, 108 were co-operative ventures and 133 were wholly Japanese-owned enterprises . 
4.2.3. Geographical distribution of JAEs 
Because of the varying conditions in different sectors and locations, J AEs in China have not been 
equally distributed. In numerical terms, most JAEs are to be found in the eastern part of China, 
especially in the cities of Dalian, Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin and Shenzhen. Even within these 
areas, their distribution varies, in that the number of JAEs in the Dalian Special Economic Zone. 
for example, is greater than elsewhere. 
The Japanese publication "List of Foreign Affiliated Enterprises in China, 1994 Edition" listed 
2425 Japanese and 1344 USA funded enterprises. Their overall distribution is shown in Figure 2-
5 below. This chart shows that many Japanese and USA affiliated enterprises are concentrated in 
Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin and other coastal areas, with 32 % of total JAEs, and 28% of the total 
USA affiliated enterprises in those three cities alone. Liaoning, Guangdong, Jiangsu and the 
remaining 6 Coastal provinces accounted for 59% and 58% of all Japanese and USA affiliated 
enterprises respectively. Other inland areas only accounted for 9% of JAEs, and 11% of USA 
affiliated enterprises. Japan and the USA have both paid attention to Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin 
and the coastal areas, with Japan showing more interest in Liaoning (29%) than the USA, and the 
USA showing more interest in Guangdong (26%) than Japan. Both showed less interest in inland 
areas, although the USA' s was slightly greater ( 11% to Japan's 9% ), which could suggest more 
USA started to realise the strategic significance of the inland areas well before Japan. In 
particular, USA affiliated enterprises are more numerous in important inland provinces like 
Sichuan, Hubei, Hunan, Anhui and Henan. Only in Northeast China, in Heilongjiang and Jilin. 
are .I AEs more numerous than USA affiliated enterprises, suggesting this continues to be an 
important traditional preference for Japanese business interests . 
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After 1992 the distribution of .IA Es in China changed. Firstl y, .101 graduall y moved its matn 
focus hom trad itional business areas in the Northeast to Central and Southeast China. Fo llowing 
this, some Japanese firm s demonstrated interest in Central and Western areas. Over time, JAEs 
concentrated wi th in the Eco nomic & Technologica l Zo nes and the Bonded Areas of the 
provi nces and cities . Figure 2-6 shows the trends as be low. 
Figur·e 2-5: Location trends of JDI in China 
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Unlike certain other major countries, Japan initia lly invested more in tertiary sectors, such as 
hote ls and leasing, compared to manufacturing industry. Fo r example, fro m 1979 to 1988, tota l 
inves tment in non-manufacturing was US $ 1,624 million, and in manufacturing was US $349 
million35. Even w ithin the non-manu fac turing sector, the in ves tment im petus was a lways more 
towa rds services and rea l estate than agri culture. fo restry, fi shery and banking. and insurance. In 
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manufacturing, many JAEs were to be found in food, fibres, electrical and other machinery and 
chemicals, mainly in labour-intensive and processing enterprises. The proportion of .IAEs found 
in capital-intensive and technology-intensive. particularly hi-tech intensive, enterprises was 
relatively low, and a subject of continuing criticism by the Chinese State authorities. 
Table 2- 3: Japanese investment by industry in China (in million US $) 
1979-88 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Manufacturing 
Foodstuffs 38 13 9 19 29 67 130 
Textiles 23 11 21 70 120 232 332 
Lumber & pulp 8 1 2 1 3 43 10 
Chemical 31 11 12 11 19 96 100 
Iron & steel 
non-ferrous metal 24 6 14 11 29 80 158 
Machinery 20 42 50 29 50 229 131 
Electric/electronic 154 80 22 123 189 332 492 
Transport equipment 6 1 1 9 33 83 224 
Others 45 40 30 35 177 216 276 
Subtotal 349 206 161 308 650 1377 1853 
Non manufacturing 
Agriculture I forestry 6 0 2 2 5 4 3 
Fisheries 36 6 4 3 12 6 7 
Mining 6 4 20 1 2 0 
Construction 3 4 7 1 7 6 80 
Commerce 43 9 3 6 24 55 148 
Banking & insurance 1 10 2 11 0 10 I 
Services 417 174 136 189 219 120 207 
Transportation 8 15 0 2 26 25 22 
Real estate 96 8 9 16 65 43 141 
Other 1015 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Branches 54 1 3 40 --- --- 104 
Subtotal 1624 231 186 271 361 269 608 
Total 2036 438 349 579 1070 1691 2566 
Source: Made by the researcher from data collected from the International Capttal Section of 
International Financial Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Finance, 1997. 
1995 
144 
471 
71 
141 
360 
479 
926 
386 
503 
3481 
18 
11 
8 
89 
261 
181 
49 
275 
0 
103 
890 
4473 
Table 2-3 shows the changes observed in the distribution of JAEs by industry in China since 
1992. Consistent with Chinese policy allowing foreign firms to make more investment in ne\\ 
industrial fields, Japanese investment increased not only in traditional industries such as textiles. 
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machinery, electric and electronic industries, but also in transport equipment and commerce. 
Since 1994 changes in Chinese FDI policy have led to more investment in the banking and 
insurance fields, although the reported rate of investment apparent by 1995 suggested major 
growth all round. 
5. Development of JAEs in China 
The establishment of JAEs in China has grown rapidly since early 1992 when the country 
accelerated its pace of reform, and increased the scope for foreign investment. A variety of 
incentives might have attracted Japanese investment to China, including abundant labour, cheap 
costs, rich natural resources, easy access to raw materials, and a large market. The most 
important reason, according to one Japanese commentator, was that China has promoted a 
positive policy of international co-operation (lto, 1994). Against this background, how does one 
evaluate the role and problems of JAEs in China? 
5.1. The role of JAEs in China 
There are now a number of views about role that JAEs play in China, summarised below. 
5.1.1. Development through capital realisation 
According to figures from the China Statistical Bureau, actual utilised FDI made up 2.8 % of all 
Chinese annual fixed capital investment during the 1980s, but in 1991 it increased to 4.5 %, 8 % 
in 1992, and 13 % in 1993. Foreign affiliated enterprises have thus played an increasingly 
important role in the Chinese economy, where the value of gross output ofF AEs accounts for 11 
% of the national gross value of all industrial output. In Shenzhen, Xiamen, Shantou and Zhuhai 
(four Special Economic Zone cities) this proportion rose to 64% in 1993. JAEs account for 11 % 
of the total number of FAEs in China, and have played a similar role in the Chinese economy. 
Actual utilised investment by Japanese firms· amounts to 58 % of contracted investment. This 
compares with an overall actual utilised foreign investment rate of 27 % by the foreign 
companies. This is the highest rate of actual utilised foreign direct investment by any ofthe more 
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than 150 countries and areas with an interest in China36, which also suggesting the Chinese still 
hope more investment to come. 
5.1.2. Transfer of technology and management skills 
JAEs have made limited transfer of some advanced technology to China, such as fibre-optic 
networks, communications equipment, colour televisions, automated instruments and meters, and 
pharmaceutical products. Fuzhou Television Plant and Hitachi Electronics Ltd created a JV 
company called "Fu-Hi Television Co., Ltd", and Beijing Electronic Tube Plant and Matsushita 
Electric Industrial Co., Ltd created a JV company "Beijing-Matsushita Colour CRT Co., Ltd, 
both of which transferred some advanced television technology (Lin, 1990). Other advanced 
1990s' level technology transferred to China has included video recorder mechanisms 
(Matsushita-Hualu Co. Ltd), ripple control tubes (Shanghai-Matsushita Electronic Co. Ltd) and 
the largest absorb stage refrigeration machine (Dalian-Sanyo Refrigeration Co. Ltd) and so on 
(Wang, 1996). However, the scale of advanced technology transfer is, as we shall see later, still 
the subject of some criticism. 
Japanese-style management ideas and skills have also been transferred to China, including 
aspects of total quality control, financial management, human resource management, and 
marketing management. Japanese firms have set up training courses to transfer management 
methods to China. For example, Matsushita has provided technical and management training in 
Japan for 5,000 Chinese over the last ten years. Matsushita has also established a training centre 
in China, which has organised courses such as "Operational concepts", "Human resource 
management", "Total quality control" etc. (Wang, 1996). Japanese development aid and 
assistance has played an important role in facilitating educational exchange likewise. However, 
there are still important questions about how often, and well, such transfers actually take place 
and who benefits as a result. 
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5.1.3. Promoting an export-oriented economy 
r AEs have given an impetus to Chinese foreign trade. For example, from 1992 to 1994, the total 
value of imports and exports was US $198.42 billion, accounting for 33 % of the total value of 
imports and exports (US $597.96 billion). In both 1993 and 1994, FAEs' exports of industrial 
products accounted for 93% of all FAEs' exports37 . Japanese affiliated enterprises in foodstuffs, 
fishery and aquatic products, fibre and fashion industries make up 50 % of the total of JAEs. 
Most are export-oriented enterprises and over 70 % of their products go back to the Japanese 
domestic market. Many JAEs may be considered to have performed well. In 1993, of the top I 00 
Chinese export enterprises for machinery and electrical appliances, 41 were F AEs and 9 were 
JAEs. Huaqiang-Sanyo, Canon-Dalian, Mabuchi-Dalian and Dalian-Sida were four JAEs who 
were among the top ten exporters38. 
5.1.4. Increasing tax revenue and employment 
F AEs have become an important source of Chinese national tax revenue, accounting for RMB 
10.7 billion in 1992,2.6% ofthe total national tax revenue. Tax revenues realised from FAEs' 
amounted to RMB 20.6 billion in 1993, increasing to RMB 35 billion in 199439 . By the end of 
1992, the total number ofF AE employees was 6 million or I % of China's total workforce. This 
figure had increased by 1994, to a total of 14 million4° FAE employees. There are no separate 
figures for JAEs, but they will have made a proportional contribution. 
5.2. Issues for further development 
Without a doubt, JAEs have given some impetus to China's economic reform and development. 
However, several prominent reviews of JAEs in China, both Chinese and Japanese, ha\·e 
highlighted problems. 
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5.2.1. Prcfcr·ential mismatches and tensions 
The marked increase in JDI in secondary industry has lately outstripped that in tertiary industry. 
Three quarters of such JAEs were concentrated in electronics, machinery, light industries and 
textiles, and pharmaceuticals, with light industry, electronics and machinery as the major 
downstream industries. Japanese investment has clearly been limited in officially upstream 
industries like metallurgy, power generation, chemicals, petroleum and building materials. For 
such industries, not only did the investment involved represent a small percentage of the totaL 
but also most projects produced only intermediate products. For instance, in the metallurgical 
industry, Japanese funded projects were mostly on the steel casting, forging and rolling side, 
with very few turning out raw products. By comparison with European investment projects, 
Japanese projects involving high technical level products considered to make an important 
contribution to China's economic development, are very few. For example, there have been few 
projects in the automobile industry, and in industrial automated control equipment both sectors 
are subject to sensitive negotiations. This reflects the different strategies pursued by Japan and 
China. Given a main objective to gain steady and increasing benefits, most JAEs have been 
established in tertiary and manufacturing industries such as real estate, machinery, and textiles. 
However, the Chinese strategy is to make up deficiencies in energy, transport, infrastructure and 
hi-tech industry as quickly as possible. Although JDI in China has developed rapidly, it has not 
played the role the Chinese State sought in this regard, and there preferential mismatches still 
cause important tensions. 
5.2.2. Unequal geographical distribution of JAEs 
As indicated above, 91 % of all JAEs are concentrated in the East Coast area of China (see 
Figure 2-5), few being established in inland areas. Some provinces like Xizang (Tibet), Gansu, 
Qinghai and Ninxia have only a few JAEs. There are several reasons for limited Japanese 
investment in inland areas, especially the micl-west areas. Although transport links and 
infrastructure are poor, and the industrial base is likewise poorly developed, one key factor is 
policy differences between coastal and inland areas. Therefore, changes in central government 
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policy could effect the distribution of JAEs. Though changes in local conditions and 
infrastructure can only be achieved gradually, policy changes may take effect quicker. 
5.2.3. Limited management know-how and technology transfer 
Many Japanese enterprises are exporters interested in China's cheap labour and materials (Chen 
1993 ). Key aspects of the importation of parts, export of products, and the management of the 
enterprise could be managed by the Japanese. The impression of continuing Japanese 
conservatism over technology transfer is so strong that some critics believe this intends 
maintaining a 15 year technical gap between the two countries (Huang, 1994). The Japanese 
were reportedly particularly concerned about the lack of protection for intellectual property 
rights, fearing the Chinese may eventually cut into their export markets using their own Japanese 
technology (Campbell, 1987). As a result, the transfer of advanced technology to China appears 
cautious and conservative, with the Japanese preferring the direct export of standard equipment, 
rather than the full transfer of advanced technology, despite the examples quoted before. Some 
Japanese would argue that technology transfer must be matched to local conditions (Kojima, 
1977), but still fear that, once transferred, the spread of technology will go beyond their control. 
5.2.4. Unsatisfactory legal and regulatory regimes 
Chinese marketing may be considered poor with particular deficiencies in laws and regulations 
that deliberately restrict foreign access to the Chinese market. In addition, Chinese state 
management of foreign investment has demonstrated deficiencies, such as multilateral control, 
and disparaties in the systems for administering incoming investment. There are also other more 
complex issues, whose solution will depend on improvements in Chinese foreign-related 
economic legislation, and standardisation of operations in relation to taxation, finances, 
accounting and so on. A mature and well-regulated investment regime that conforms with 
international norms is clearly needed. Critics also believe this has been achieved by local state 
governments at the expense of state enterprises, which favour purely national interests, and this 
belief has been reinforced by surges in Chinese nationalism generally. 
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5.2.5. Disputed equipment and property valuations 
Until now China has lacked an authoritative system for precise valuation of technical equipment 
and technologies. As a result, some Japanese businesses are suspected of over-valuing equipment 
investment, importing used or substandard equipment under the guise of new plant, to the 
detriment of their Chinese partners. On the other hand, the Japanese have complained about their 
Chinese partners over-valuing site rents and housing as part of their investment. Projects may 
have faltered because of the Chinese over-valuing their site rents and property (lto, 1994). 
5.2.6. Chinese labour and public service quality 
Certain Chinese partners have tended to adopt the management methods of former state 
enterprises, methods which pose problems for Japanese. Some Chinese managers may lack the 
necessary skills and many Chinese partners do not yet understand international business customs 
and law. On the other hand, the shortage of skilled Chinese managers, technical engineers, 
accountants and interpreters has created competition for talented people between state and 
foreign funded enterprises. Given the condition of the Chinese transport system, 
telecommunications, ports, electricity, roads, and water, infrastructure can be poor and service 
support not sufficiently high by international standards. 
6. Summary 
We may now understand Chinese concerns over foreign capital. Many still have memories of the 
"foreign economic invasion" of China before 1949, especially by the Japanese. Between 1931 
and 1945 the Japanese are considered to have appropriated over US $200 billion41 of resources 
from China so, up to 1949, the Chinese periodically boycotted Japanese products. Such historical 
factors are still influential today. They easily remember past humiliations when foreign products. 
particularly Japanese products, dominated China's market. This is a common feeling across 
China. Academic specialists too have expressed concern over national economic security with 
the amount of FDI now entering China. Some scholars (e.g. Xi a 1996 and, Gao 1996) have 
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suggested three tests to gauge the economic security of FDI entering China: 1) rate of market 
possession; 2) rate of localisation; 3) dependency on foreign capital. 
Chinese capital flows have changed dramatically: national and foreign funds have gone from 
both being in deficit to surplus. For example, in the case of national funds in 1994, the total 
savings were then reportedly over RMB 2000 billion, with savings increasing more rapidly than 
loans. For all banks this amounted to virtually RMB 405.3 billion, of which national banks made 
up RMB 222.3 billion. In 1995, the amount in national banks rose to RMB 268.4 billion. 
Looking at foreign funds, the 1994 national foreign exchange reserve was US $51.6 billion, for 
1995 it was US $73.5 billion, and in 1996 rose to US $110 billion42 . The reported doubling of the 
surplus in national and foreign funds encouraged arguments against more foreign funds. Now it 
appears that the FDI level has fallen, another set of questions has arisen. Does China really have 
so much capital that it does not need greater foreign funds? The answer is clearly negative. The 
current finances of many state enterprises are in serious difficulty, with many not able to manage 
normal production, or replace equipment. All are very much in need of finance to continue to 
support their operations. Why is this the case? One main reason is the lack of co-ordination 
between national and foreign capital priorities. 
During the 2000-year relationship between China and Japan, few conflicts have occurred but in 
recent centuries, diplomatic turmoil disrupted the otherwise relatively peaceful relationship. JDI 
situations past and present have been compared and contrasted to highlight particular differences 
and show the level of economic interdependence that exists between China and Japan. 
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This chapter will propose another theoretical framework, which extends the Harrigan and Parkhe 
models, by giving more attention to the later development of the JV, and also the resulting 
evaluation stage. It will then review the literature on both international and Japanese joint 
venture management in China, and assess the implications for further research. The theoretical 
framework adopted is divided into five main overarching issues: (1) motives; (2) partner 
selection; (3) control and conflict; (4) performance, and (5) investment environment, generating 
thirteen questions for further research. 
2. Choice of Theoretical Framework 
Harrigan (1986) proposed the so-called "Child" model, an integrated joint venture framework, 
based upon three main forms of relationship dynamics: partner-to-partner, owner-venture, and 
competitive venture environment. These relationship dynamics are tests for "the viability of joint 
venture strategies for its owners". This was expounded in three separate chapters, which 1) 
elaborate on partners agreeing to form a JV, 2) addresses subsequent owner-venture 
relationships, and 3) relates the venture to its external competitive environment, in the manner of 
a strategic triangle where "the motivations and fears of potential partners as well as their 
strengths and shortfalls must be considered when evaluating them". However, it is not just 
necessary to consider how JV's were first founded, but also how the venture will then 
subsequently operate, and what further operational development problems will arise. Indeed, the 
full nature and validity of the founding strategy may not become apparent until some time after 
operations begin, and its organizational character matures. 
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Parkhe ( 1993) further suggested that the development of IJV theory should use the core concepts 
of trust, reciprocity, opportunism, and forbearance to provide the necessary additional theoretical 
underpinning. Furthermore, these concepts go to the heart of inter-firm co-operation, and link 
effectively with each of the dimensions identified in Figure 3-2. As Daft and Lewin (1990) 
suggested, to develop understanding, new dimensions of a concept need to be fully explored. 
before further dissecting and analysing similarities within already established variables. Parkhe 
therefore focuses upon "motives for IJV formation", "partner selection I characteristics", 
"control I conflict" and "IJV stability I performance" as the four stages to be used to explore IJV 
founding and development. 
3. The Further Theoretical Model Developed 
As illustrated in Figure 3-1, this holds that five variables influence JAEs founding and 
development in China: 
1) the investment motives of Chinese and Japanese parent companies; 
2) mutual partner selection and objectives; 
3) control and conflict in the founding and development process; 
4) the considered performance of the JAE itself; 
5) interactions with the competitive investment environment. 
As indicated above, Harrigan's framework is thus a first basic model, which this study seeks to 
develop further, not least regarding Parkhe's four stages for further IJV research. These have 
here been summarised as "motives", "partner selection", "control and conflict" and 
"performance", and reintroduced into Harrigan's framework. Both Harrigan and Parkhe models 
have then been synthesised into another hybrid model, based on Harrigan's "Child" framework. 
supported by Parkhe's further developmental stages. The key factors in this new hybrid model 
will now be explained in more detail. 
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o Motive factor: this applies to the Chinese and Japanese parent companies. If for example, a 
.Japanese firm possesses finance, technology and management know-how, and through a 
Chinese firm can access local market, low cost labour and materials, it can then exchange 
intermediate products in an internal market, and thus avoid certain corresponding risks in the 
external market, giving it very particular set of motives for joint venturing. 
o Trust factor: trust applies to the original process of partner selection. According to 
Transaction Cost Theory, where two or more types of knowledge are held by the Japanese 
and Chinese firms, and they could not access each other's knowledge at low cost, they could 
then specifically combine together to form a joint venture. Therefore, the process of partner 
selection includes the cost of negotiating whatever arrangements joint ventures rest upon. 
e Opportunism factor (control and conflict): this exerts direct influence upon a "Child", that is, 
the JAE co produced by Japanese and Chinese parents. In the process of seeking and exacting 
control, further possible conflicts could arise, and change the balance of any benefits which 
might result. 
" Performance factor: this includes profitability, growth, competitiveness and overall 
satisfaction. These may occur directly in the JAE and also indirectly within Japanese and 
Chinese parent companies. As we know, after the JV is founded, and parent firms transfer 
intermediate input to it, performance will partly reflect the efficiency of this transfer, as well 
as any advantages of such internalisation. 
o Environmental factor: these are fundamentally those economic, political, social, cultural and 
technological factors special to JAEs located in China. These operate under the conditions set 
by Japanese and Chinese, but mostly within China. Such factors could influence both JAE 
performance, and the nature of control exerted upon it. 
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Figure 3-1: Proposed Model 
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The "Child" (JAE) has been used as an indication of the effectiveness of the Japanese and 
Chinese in approaching the founding and operation of joint ventures. 
4. Definition of Variables 
"Competitive environment" refers to that external environment described by Harrigan (1984), 
which influences both the initial configuration and later stability of a JV. Beamish (1988) 
pointed out that "the external environment is considered to include such things as industry 
structure, competitive behaviour, technology and government policies." Specifically in this 
research, the "external environment" is of a competitive character that includes: politics (linked 
with government policies), economics (from industry structure), technology, society and culture 
(from competitive behaviour) . 
"Parent companies" are part of the internal environment suggested by Harrigan ( 1986) who 
suggests that owners wi ll face fewer co-operative strategy options 111 some competitive 
environments than in others, and that spec ific industry traits impact upon chances of joint 
4-f 
Chapter Three 
venture success. Four further features have been selected for the investigation of parent 
companies: origin, background, motives, and objectives. 
"The performance of the JAE" according to Dunning ( 1995): "Through (multinational 
enterprises) impact on such variables as government policy, the pattern and quality of consumer 
demand, the creation of itmovator capacity and the upgrading of human skills, entrepreneurship 
and the work ethic, they may quite dramatically affect the market structures in which they 
compete, and the performance and business practices of indigenous firms." Aspects for further 
study encompass: profitability, growth, competitiveness and overall venture satisfaction. 
"The Child-- JAE" As Harrigan (1986) pointed out: "many conflicts within ventures arise from 
the simple fact that there is more than one owner. Each owner wants to co-ordinate the venture's 
activities with its own, and owners often have not created adequate mechanisms to resolve day-
to-day deadlocks in decision making." The opportunism ofthe "Child" JAE in China is therefore 
included for investigation in terms of control and conflict. 
5. The Study of International Joint Ventures in China 
Management research in China has grown since 1978. When the first articles on China were 
published in Western management journals during the early 1980s, specialists advocated a new 
arena for management research (Shenkar, 1994). In the beginning many Western scholars 
produced case studies and/or questioned the universality of Western theories in a Chinese 
context. Later studies became progressively more specific regarding motivation, work values. 
leadership, compensation, human resource training and development (e.g., Tung, 1981, Warner. 
1986, Shenkar and Ronen, 1987, Henley and Nyaw, 1987, Shenkar and Chow, 1989). Some used 
primarily Western constructs and instruments on Chinese subjects (e.g., Adler, Campbell and 
Laurent, 1989), a few involved experimental design (e.g., Earley, 1989), while others employed 
qualitative approaches (e.g., Boisot and Child, 1988). Many more books and edited volumes on 
management in China have since been published, including Tung ( 1982), Brown ( 1986). 
Laaksonen (1987), Warner (1988), Shenkar (1990), Lee (1991), Pcarson (1991), Grub and Lin. 
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1991, Child (1994), Roehrig (1994), Rowley and Lewis, (1996) Qu and Green (1997), Pearson 
( 1997), Strange ( 1997), Lang (1998), Kelley and Luo (1999) among others. 
However, in certain respects, the literature on IJVs in China is still limited, especially regarding 
in-depth qualitative studies, while others concentrate upon the problems of doing business in 
China for a Western management audience. Studies of foreign affiliated enterprises in China, in 
particular JV research, can be divided into the following types using Shenkar's categories. 1) 
Descriptive accounts of joint venture activities classified by investor country (e.g., Beamish and 
Wang, 1989; Ho, 1990; Pearson, 1991; Roehrig, 1994). 2) Small-sample studies dealing with 
foreign parent motivation and political risk (e.g., Daniels, Krug and Nigh, 1986; Davidson, 1987: 
Kueh, 1992) and related management problems (e.g., Henley and Nyaw, 1987; Pearson, 1992). 
3) Large-scale studies on mainly macro strategic issues (e.g., Campbell and Adlington, 1988: 
National Council for US-China Trade, 1987,1990; Pomfret, 1988, 1991; Shapiro et al., 1991; Bi, 
1994). 4) Business journalistic accounts of joint venture cases (e.g., Goldenberger, 1989; Mann, 
1990; Casson and Zheng, 1992; Breslin, 1996). The scope of the main studies in the field of IJV s 
in China can be summarised in Table 3-1 as below. 
Table 3-1: Classification of the Main studies of IJVs in China 
Author and Research Sample Heading Partner 
publication date method size nationalLty 
Chen (1986) Questionnaire 931 Performance Various 
Daniels, Krug & Nigh ( 1986) Interview 11 Motives us 
Davidson ( 1987) Questionnaire 47 Partner selection us 
National Council (1987) Questionnaire 155 Control & conflict us 
Camp bell ( 1987) Interview 38 Motives Various 
Goldenberg ( 1988) Case study I Ns strategy US, UK 
Beamish & Wang (1989) Desk data 840 Motives Various 
Camp bell ( 1989) Interview 30 Ns Strategy Various 
Child, Li and Watts (1990) Interview 79 Control Various 
Shenkar (1990) Case study 3 Management US,HK,UK 
Mayer, Han & Lirn ( 1990) Case study 6 Performance Various 
Aiello (1991) Case study 1 Performance us 
Pearson ( 1991 ) Interview 28 Control & conflict us 
Casson & Zheng ( 1992) Questionnaire 79 Motives Various 
& desk data 2136 
Chen, J. ( 1992) Questionnaire 100 Control & conflict Japan 
Federation or HK Industries Questionnaire 1596 JVs strategy HK 
( 1992)1 & Interview 
-16 
Stelzer et al ( 1992) 
Beamish (1993) 
Bruijn & Jia (1993) 
Glaiser & Wang ( 1993) 
Pan, Vanhonacker, Pitts ( 1993) 
Au & Enderwick ( 1994) 
Barn owe, Y ager & W u ( 1994) 
Bruijn & Jia (1994) 
Bulcke & Zgang (1994) 
China State Statistics Bureau 
( 1994, in Chinese) 
Japan Small Business 
Financial Council ( 1994 )4 
Japan Empire Data Base ( 1994 )5 
Kim (1996) 
Lu & Wan (1996, in Chinese) 
Pan (1996) 
Ham i 11 & Pam bos ( 1 996) 
Questionnaire 
Interview 
Case study 
Questionnaire 
Interview 
Questionnaire 
Interview 
Questionnaire 
& case study 
Questionnaire 
Questionnaire 
Questionnaire 
Questionnaire 
Case study 
Case study 
Dataset 
Case study 
Dong, Buckley & Mirza ( 1997) Questionnaire 
Huang, Han & Xu ( 1997, 111 Case study 
Chinese) 
Lin (1997, in Chinese) 
Ma (1998) 
Luo (1998) 
Sergeant & Frenkel (1998) 
Huang ( 1998) 
Groot & Merehant (2000) 
Questionnaire 
Interview 
Questionnaire 
Interview 
Interview 
Case study 
Note: theme categones are approxtmat10ns only. 
306 
22 
4 
41 
73 
13 
30 
27 
6 
4 
1066 
61 
106 
3 
67 
4223 
3 
114 
2 
40 
20 
116 
27 
14 
3 
Performance 
JV s strategy 
Performance 
Motivation & partner 
selection 
Control & conflict 
JVs strategy 
Control & conflict 
JV s strategy 
Motives 
Performance 
Investment 
Environment 
Motives 
JV strategy 
Control & conflict 
Control & conflict 
Partner selection 
& control 
Control & conflict 
Performance 
Motives 
Performance 
JV Strategy 
Control & conflict 
Control & conflict 
Control & conflict 
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Various 
Various 
Various 
UK 
Various 
New 
Zealand 
Various 
Various 
Belgium 
Various 
Japan 
Japan 
HK 
Various 
Various 
UK 
Various 
us 
Various 
Various 
Various 
Various 
Overseas 
Chinese 
Various 
These studies have as their common theme the process of founding and establishing JV s m 
China. They differ in terms of their purpose, research methods employed, and in particular, their 
original perspective. As Stewart (1994) pointed out, there have been variable effects on Chinese 
management theory and practice, including state policy towards IJVs generally. Early studies 
such as Daniels et a! (1986), Davidson (1987), and Campbell (1987) conducted small-sample 
studies of foreign parent motives and political risk. However, although these might appear basic, 
they are still useful. Chen ( 1986) and National Council ( 1987) likewise produced studies based 
on large samples and described the general situation in more depth. 
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Shenkar ( 1990) categorised different types of case studies and their implications for 
management. He assessed these problems in terms of their uniqueness or recurrence in various 
other countries, suggesting many were more the result of the structural complexity of JV s than 
cultural and political differences between foreign and Chinese parents. Mayer et al ( 1990) 
examined the performance of six JV enterprises in Tianjin, seeing JV s as one form of technology 
transfer that has attracted many MNEs to China. They indicated that firstly, the Chinese market 
itself might not prove as attractive as the foreign partner initially expected; secondly, the Chinese 
partner could gain more from the JV than the foreign partner; thirdly, MNEs apply different 
performance criteria to their Chinese JV s than those used elsewhere. Child et al ( 1990) compared 
the management styles among different JVs in terms of four indexes: decision making, 
formalisation, communication and codification, and personnel policy and training. The 
influences on management style of other factors such as industry, size, origin of investors and so 
on was also examined. Such studies were nevertheless based upon small samples, which may not 
necessarily lead towards wider generalizations about anywhere as vast and complex as China. 
Aiello ( 1991) presented a "platform theory" to explain the problems of IJV s through a case study 
of the Beijing Jeep Corporation. The main argument was that this Sino-US JV enterprise was not 
a typical Western business entity, but a temporary platform built by both parties. Aiello made 
two points as a result: ( 1) the maximisation of dividend income from the venture was not a top 
priority for either party, and (2) short to medium-term interests prevail. Beamish (1993) 
reviewed twelve characteristics of IJV s in China and contrasted them with other developing 
countries. The hypothesis was that each of the twelve characteristics would be similar in both 
planned and market economy developing countries. In actuality seven particular characteristics 
were found notably similar. As a result Beamish argued for a contingency approach to IJV s that 
did not assume IJV s within developing countries were necessarily similar. Casson and Zheng 
(1992) found that the liberalisation of IJVs in China had progressively addressed Western 
investors' concerns regarding the protection of technology and the implementation of quality 
control. 
Barnowe, Yager and Wu ( 1994) consider the management experience of 30 F AEs in Guangdong. 
Perceived cost advantage ranked higher than market access as a motive for founding an FAE. 
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Thus, their findings differ from Bulcke and Zhang (1994) regarding the motives of four Belgian 
funded enterprises. Their respondents emphasised the difficulty experienced by managers in 
China· s transitional economy. Bruijn and Jia (1994) unusually researched product selection and 
localisation of content in Sino-western JVs. They observed continuing price, quality, and supply 
issues. They maintain that many foreign partners first leave localisation to the Chinese, but real 
successes only arose where the foreign partner gave this top priority and took the initiative. The 
data set of 4223 IJVs in China analysed by Pan (1996), examined the determinants of foreign 
equity ownership in JVs in China. Eleven variables that impact on foreign ownership preferences 
and concessions were examined. This study showed that the key determinants of equity 
ownership found in studies of JVs in the West continue to shape preferred ownership strategies 
in IJV s in China too. A limitation of this study was its reliance upon US data sets, which may not 
entirely reflect those found elsewhere. Kim ( 1996) made an analysis of IJV strategic issues 
through three Hong Kong based case studies. This study presents a typology which can be used 
for evaluating IJVs in developing countries. The typology uses JV partner status and JV content 
to identify four types of IJV and four patterns of IJV development. It argues that the success of 
an IJV depends on two factors: long-term oriented motivation and fair operational relationships 
reflecting .TV partner status. Three Sino-British cases studied by Hamill et al (1996) examined 
the problems encountered when planning, negotiating and managing Sino-Foreign partnerships. 
They noted that the importance of understanding Chinese culture and cultivating good 
relationships with the authorities and Chinese partners, as well as careful venture planning and 
management. 
Summarising previous research, Fan (1996) made four points: (1) the majority of English 
language studies were based on cases involving American companies; (2) there were few 
longitudinal studies; (3) most studies were more descriptive and normative than analytical and 
predictive; ( 4) there were also a considerable number of studies of JV s by Chinese authors 
written in Chinese, but these were scattered over a number of different sources, with only one 
formally published work, along with one published for internal reference. More studies based on 
cases involving non-American companies, particularly on Sino-.Japanese JVs, will be reviewed 
later. However, most studies based on non-American companies carried out both in .Japan and 
China were not presented in English, which has limited their impact on Western countries. 
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especially in the English-speaking world. In short most published studies have been like snap-
shots, with limited historical and long-term connection, expressed in the language of an outside 
audience. Other limitations to the above research are that Western researchers may not have the 
essential understanding of the Chinese culture or fully appreciate its history. This results in a lack 
of in-depth analysis, which a better understanding would give. Add to that the difference in 
methods of analysis and data collection between Western and Chinese researchers, and the 
resulting conclusions may well differ likewise. 
6. Research Studies of Japanese IJVs in China 
Early studies of Japanese overseas operations raised the issue of the transferability of their 
management practices. Y amazaki et al (1977) discerned a distinctive Japanese approach, but 
argued that the difference was only transitional and that Japanese and Western-type 
multinationals could increasingly converge. Y oshihara (1977) formed a similar conclusion, 
arguing that the transferability of Japanese-style management was limited because it was 
designed to handle a culturally homogeneous workforce. 
A separate line of research on Japanese influence in China involves IJVs. These studies can be 
divided into several groups: 1) Descriptive accounts of investment activities in China (e.g., 
Whiting, 1989, 1992; Zhao, 1990; Chen, 1992; Lincoln, 1993; Campbell, 1994; Huang, 1994; 
Kojima, 1995; Imai, Katou, 1996). 2) Japanese business strategy in China (e.g., Campbell, 1987; 
Gao, 1992; Taylor, 1993; Tung, 1994; Tejima, 1996; Ritchie, 1997). 3) Comparisons between 
Japanese and other joint venture working in China (e.g., Grow, 1991; Imai, 1995; Dong, Buckley 
and Mirza, 1997). 4) Studies of management research involved in leadership and human 
resources in Japanese affiliated enterprises (e.g., Wang and Satow, 1994; Fukuda, 1995), or 
Japanese technology and management methods transfer (e.g., 1-Iarris, 1991; Grow, 1991; Taylor, 
1994; Chan, 1995) and so on. 5) Management case studies carried out in Japanese affiliated 
enterprises in China (e.g., Grub and Lin, 1991; Ling, 1994; Seki, 1994; 1-Ianaoka, et al, 1996). 6) 
Literature about how Japanese models may be applied to Chinese economic reform in terms of 
enterprise reform (e.g., Taylor, 1994; Chan, 1995; Ritchie, 1997). A number of books and edited 
volumes on Japanese business in China have been published. including Whiting, (1989). Taylor 
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( 1996), Lang (1998). The main body of published studies of Japanese ventures in China is listed 
in Table 3-2 below. 
Table 3-2: Classification of the main studies of Japanese JVs in China 
Autho1· and Research Sample Heading Partne1· 
Publication date Method size nationality 
Camp bell ( 1987) Questionnaire 115 Business strategy Japan,US,EC 
Grow ( 1991) Interview 325 Technology transfer Japan, US 
Grub & Lin ( 1991) Case study 3 Motives & Partner Japan, US 
selection 
Chen ( 1992) Questionnaire 100 Motives Japan 
Zhang ( 1993) Questionnaire 10,000 Motives & Environment Japan 
Abo (1994) Case study 2 Control & conflict Japan 
Inagaki ( 1994, in Japanese) Data base 3800 Performance Japan, US 
Kobayashi (1994) Case study I Motives Japan 
Seki ( 1994) Case study 5 JV strategy Japan 
Sonoda (1994) Interview 35 Control & conflict Japan 
Masuda ( 1994) Case study 2 Motives & Performance Japan, HK, 
Taiwan, US 
Wang & Satow (1994) Questionnaire 37 Control & conflict Japan 
Wang & Satow (1994) Case study 10 Performance Japan 
Fukuda ( 1995) Case study 3 Performance Japan 
Ling (1995, in Japanese) Case study 37 Control & conflict Japan 
Hanaoka, Ito, Ishizaki, Tsuji, Case study 8 Performance Japan 
Ha tan aka ( 1996, in Japanese) 
Taylor ( 1996) Case study 5 Control & conflict Japan 
Wan ( 1996, in Chinese) Interview 260 Environment Japan, 
Germany 
Wang (1996, in Chinese) Case study 5 Performance Japan 
Li (1997, in Chinese) Questionnaire 210 Control & conflict Japan 
Pan (1997) Data base 1026 Motives Japan, US 
Lang (1998) Case study 3 Control & conflict Japan 
Taylor( 1999) Case study 3 Control & conflict Japan 
JETRO (2000) Questionnaire Performance Ja_l)_an 
Note: theme categones are approximation only. 
Further research will be divided into five predetermined sections as follows: (1) Motives; (2) 
Partner selection; (3) Control and conflict; ( 4) Performance, and (5) Environment. 
6.1. Motives 
One may ask: how, when, and why do firms look abroad for business opportunities, and how do 
they make these decision? Studies have discussed selected motives of Japanese ventures in 
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China, such as Chen (1992), Grub and Lin (1991), Masuda (1994), Zhang (1993) and Kobayashi 
(1994). Through analysis of I 00 JAE's, Chen has summarised eight points describing the key 
motivating factors of .Japanese ventures in China, including: (1) China's potential market; (2) 
invitations from Chinese enterprises or authorities; (3) inexpensive Chinese labour; (4) 
enhancing the image of the enterprise; (5) abundant cheap material in China; (6) policies adopted 
by Chinese authorities to protect foreign-funded enterprises favouring local production; (7) 
imitation: following suit when other firms do; and (8) favourable concessionaire taxation rates. 
Chen also pointed out the following major motives for China in seeking I accepting the Japanese: 
(1) access to Japanese technology; (2) access to Japanese capital; (3) meeting the needs of the 
domestic market; (4) making use of .Japanese export channels; (5) helping re-export products to 
Japan; and (6) access to components from Japan. In Grub and Lin's (1991) case, the Japanese 
investment motive was to gain a foothold in the Chinese market. 
However, Zhang (1993) indicated that a survey of 10,000 Japanese companies contacted by the 
Japan-China Association on Economy and Trade in 1990 reported that the single biggest 
motivating factor was low labour costs. In short companies considered that Chinese labour was 
"abundant, cheap and relatively good in quality". However, Zhang and Yuan (1997) identified 
high investment returns as a key direct motivation. Kobayashi (1994) noted three points why 
Kanebo favoured the JV approach. Otherwise many studies have found that the Japanese partner 
specifically focused on the marketing, low labour costs and rich natural resources. By 
comparison the Chinese partner focused on Japan's technology, capital and management know-
how. Chen's study distilled the views of many other studies, but we still need to test the 
conclusion that the invitation from Chinese enterprises or authorities is so important. It is also 
necessary to discover whether access to China's market or low labour costs is quite so important 
for Japanese firms, and whether technology or capital is relatively more important for Chinese 
firms. 
6.2. Partner selection 
Grub and Lin (1991) found that the .Japanese did not make a firm decision on venture format 
until after the choice of partners was finalised. They had several advantages in dealing with the 
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Xiyuan Hotel and the Bank of China. Its experienced personnel were expected to be useful. The 
Bank of China also helped resolve deadlocks, while the existence of two Chinese partners could 
reduce direct conflict with the Japanese. Both Chinese partners had strong ties with the Beijing 
municipal government, which could smooth the way for the project. The choice of the Chinese 
partner was based on their international business experience and relationship with the 
government. The reason for Kanebo, a Japanese textile firm, choosing a particular Chinese 
partner was partly historical. Kobayashi (1994) noted that the partner in the venture was 
Kanebo's old Shanghai Cotton Fabric Factory. Lu and Wang (1996) pointed out that choice of a 
good partner was vital to later JV success along with economic and technological factors, and 
good relationships with state authorities. Moreover, three other points were important: (1) the 
material needs of each partner; (2) full commitment by both to the JV; (3) enough trust to enable 
the main operations to be controlled by one side where appropriate. Masuda (1994) concluded 
that preferred partners provide capital, assist in dealing with original government formalities, and 
otherwise sustain the organization. Partner mis-selection, on the other hand, can prove very 
costly, and difficult to rectify, as can outbreaks of mistrust between respective partners later. 
How can one side gain enough trust to allow the other to exert such control over operations? 
Perhaps there are some that are trustful enough to have complete belief in the other partner, but 
how representative are they? It is evident now that investors may increasingly choose wholly 
foreign-owned formats in China due to the lack of trust, but what causes this lack of trust in the 
first place? 
6.3. Control and Conflict 
The Grub and Lin ( 1991) study noted that the Chinese partners initially demanded that there be 
four Chinese and three Japanese directors in order to secure control, but both sides finally settled 
on four directors each. The first President was a Japanese for the five years followed by a 
Chinese for five years. The reverse applied to the Vice-President. In another case, they noted that 
management decisions were generally made at a weekly management meeting attended by the 
top departmental managers. Prior notification was given regarding matters to be discussed, and 
minutes kept so that decisions reached could not be reversed at will. Hanaoka et al (1996) 
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described the control system in another case where personnel and finance decisions were 
increasingly transferred to lower level management. Satow and Wang (1994) gave an example 
where the venture had developed a Japanese type of managerial responsibility system, the head 
of the management department had full authority to manage the unit, Japanese nationals 
managed technical management and quality control, and their Chinese counterparts personnel 
and production management. Taylor ( 1999) pointed out that while production appeared highly 
"Japanized", personnel management was not. 
The above studies illuminate the role of control in the management decision making process, but 
there is need to pursue this further. For example, they cannot explain how such differences first 
arose or which Japanese nationals managed technical and quality control when Chinese managed 
personnel and production, and what further effects such limited localization might have in future. 
Grub and Lin (1991) observed differences and conflicts between the Japanese and Chinese. They 
noted that the Chinese side (a hotel) was less enthusiastic about a local government project, and 
concerned about competition from a new JV similar to their own, while hotel workers were 
treated differently from others. Japanese managers observed a tendency to avoid responsibility, 
and an inability to distinguish between private and public workplace prerogatives, and limited 
company loyalty. Fukuda (1995) indicated that one case study company's confrontational 
approach to conflict resolution was not typical of Japanese practice however. He offered two 
examples, one in 1992, a labour strike against Japanese-run factories, which spread rapidly in 
Shenzhen, and lasted several weeks. At Miyakawa, industrial action lasted only three hours, 
when the management unilaterally decided to dismiss immediately anyone who refused to work. 
All but three returned, and they received heavy penalties, including half of the monthly bonus 
awarded for a perfect attendance record. There was also evidence of an attempt to introduce a 
more group-oriented ideology to its factory in China. For example, production targets were not 
clearly spelled out for each individual worker. Instead, a select group of workers was simply 
informed. If the group failed to meet the target set, all its members were required to stay on the 
job after normal working hours with no extra pay. Fukuda argued that there are two major prior 
questions to be raised in determining the transferability of Japanese-style 1-IRM overseas: 
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whether a company wants to transfer its home country practices, and whether it actually can 
transfer them. 
Chen ( 1992) pointed out that certain Chinese joint venture partners have questioned whether 
China either sets up JVs to use Japanese capital or else allows Japanese firms to better use 
Chinese resources. Zhang ( 1993) cited that a 1990 survey by a national investment organisation, 
where 36% of respondents had a negative impression of Chinese managers. For example, 
Chinese managers "do not fully understand the Japanese side", "the personnel the Chinese select 
are unsatisfactory", "the Chinese managers stubbornly adhere to their own positions and do not 
show an understanding attitude" and "mutual communication is deteriorating". Yang (1997) 
indicated that intercultural conflicts were first reflected in differing values regarding personality 
orientation, marketability, and organizational structure. 
6.4. Performance 
Sa tow and Wang (1994) analysed 10 J AEs in China. They identified successful outcomes in 
three aspects: advanced technology, after-sales service, and co-operation between the two 
partners, especially management. They also indicated that the performance of employees was 
evaluated using both quality and quantity criteria, with 50% based on group outcomes, and 
another 50% on individual performance. Wang and Satow (1994) emphasised seven components 
to organisational performance: (1) market share; (2) profitability; (3) competitiveness; (4) task 
accomplishment; (5) turnover; (6) job satisfaction of staff; (7) scale of investment. They found 
that JV relationships had an important influence on organisational performance. The results 
demonstrated significant differences between partnering companies with respect to performance 
indicators such as market share, profitability, task accomplishment, and overall job satisfaction. 
According to JETRO (2000), profitability for Japanese companies in China was around 60% but 
20% solely relied on exporting, and companies were more intent upon expansion. Beamish's 
( 1988) definition of JV performance depends upon mutual agreement between the partners 
regarding their overall satisfaction. Using the above definition of JV performance as a guide to 
the cases reviewed, it appears that the methods by which performance is assessed are all I imited 
in some way. In some cases, only the overall satisfaction of one partner was attained, in others 
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only aspects of it, leaving problems as to how it should be assessed. Kobayashi considers that 
Chinese and Japanese possess different standards to which they measure the level of 
performance, and Beamish indicated that in some cases only one partner felt overall satisfaction, 
another only aspects, with still many problems to overcome. 
6.5. Investment Environment 
The Sino-Japanese Investment Promotional Organisation appraisal of the business environment 
as seen by Japanese businessmen, as quoted by Zhu (1996), found 97 companies considered this 
was improving (including the areas of inflation, domestic markets, laws and regulations). 
However, 201 firms indicated that changes were for the worse, not better. The main reported 
problems were inflation, laws and regulations. Japanese views on investment environment listed 
by Zhang (1997) included: ( 1) unexpected changes in government policy; (2) product exports 
(the Japanese prefer most of their products to be sold on the Chinese market, but Chinese prefer 
them exported) and exchange balance; (3) imbalance between state and JV enterprise (the 
Japanese feel that if Chinese government cancels some advantageous policies, they should also 
cancel some limitations on JV enterprises); ( 4) procedures for establishing Ns were improved 
but yet many problems remained unsolved. Wong, Maher, Jenner, Appell and Hebert (1999) 
identified problems concerning: the cost of hiring expatriates; the expense of provision of full 
benefits to local workers; low educational level of workers; lack of hands-on experience with 
machinery, lack of conscientiousness over equipment maintenance; and "Guanxi" among the 
Chinese which foreign partners are obliged to respect regarding good bureaucratic relations. 
What do Chinese partners themselves think about those problems? Which particular conflicts are 
faced by both Chinese and foreigners, in this case, the Japanese, in regard to the investment 
environment? That environment is considered to have two distinctive features. One concerns 
"hard" factors such as infrastructure, transport, communication and so on; "soft" factors are 
relevant policies, laws, regulations and so on. In some respects it is the soft factors which appear 
most problematic (i.e. government policies, laws and regulations), but both merit further 
consideration. 
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7. Further· Questions Posed 
In terms of the overall model outlined before the main questions for this further research appear 
thus: 
7.1. Motives 
Previous research specifically highlighted how highly the Japanese ranked market entry, low 
labour cost, and resource related factors, but their relative importance (and that of others), may 
yet change, as may corresponding Chinese preferences concerning Japanese technology, capital, 
and management know-how. Both the Eclectic and Transaction Cost approaches predict 
respective preferences, but other factors particular to Sino-Japanese relationships - including 
their differing economic development levels and respective state policies - may change their 
overall balance. The three main questions are therefore: 
Ql: Is the expected importance of market entry, labour, and material factors to the Japanese, 
and technology, capital, and management know-how to the Chinese, still justified m 
terms of these further findings, and how are respective preferences ordered? 
Q2: Are the distinguishing motives of the Japanese and Chinese in any way consistent with 
their different national development levels? 
Q3: Do these distinguishing motives themselves create any particular scope for further 
differences and conflict, and why? 
7.2. Partner selection 
Previous research highlighted multiple reasons behind particular partner selections, but some 
especially emphasized the impm1ance of good relationships, not least with Chinese state bodies. 
as a means of reducing potential transaction costs. The questions are thus: 
Q4: What particular economic, technological, cultural-historic, and related factors direct!\ 
influence Sino-Japanese partner selection processes? 
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QS: To what extent is good relationship building found more/equally/less important in the 
partner selection process? 
7.3. Control and conflict 
Previous research considered that higher performing ventures are specifically controlled in ways 
that better manage actual/potential conflict situations of the type that readily disturb Sino-
Japanese relationships at large. Certain Chinese are so sensitive towards this that they will refer 
to conflict "situation analysis" in terms of methodical control systems/mechanisms, conflict 
background analysis, conflict deep reason analysis, and so on. Other research like Grub and Lin 
(1991), Satow and Wang (1994), Fukuda (1995), and Hanaoka et al (1996) has observed how the 
partial transfer of control over particular enterprise activities to only one venture partner soon 
raises questions about any power imbalances, which might then result. In principle, they exert 
most potential control, but that may then create fmther scope for conflict later. The main 
questions are therefore: 
Q6: What is the prevailing balance of control between respective partners, and how do 
particular issues of trust/mistrust arise? 
Q7: Does control vary across such different forms of ownership as WJVs and CJVs? 
Q8: Which conflicts in JAEs are caused by economic, political and business system 
differences between China and Japan? 
Q9: Do Confucian type values/characteristics exert any particular influence over conflict 
management in JAEs generally? 
7.4. Performance 
Previous research profiles this in terms of profttability, turnover, competitiveness, and overall 
management satisfaction, albeit using a variety of different measures and indices. Wang and 
Satow ( 1994) likewise emphasize market share, profitability, competitiveness, task 
accomplishment, turnover, staff job satisfaction, and future investment plans and predictions. 
Their respective distribution over different partners also deserves further consideration in this 
respect. The further questions are therefore: 
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QlO: What proportion of ventures are actually/potentially profitable and growing, compared 
with others that are not? 
Q 11: What are the overall management satisfaction levels with ventures thus far, and what 
particular factors constrain satisfaction? 
Q12: To what extent was the venture sampled considered likely to survive and/or expand and 
grow further in future? 
7.5. Investment Environment 
Previous research considered higher performing IJV s in general highly adaptive in this respect, 
but more specifically China related research suggested that the quality of this environment might 
well pose problems for certain Japanese partners. The question is therefore 
Q13: What is the relative importance of "hard" and "soft" investment environment factors to 
respective venture partners, and how, if at all, are they considered to effect overall 
performance? 
8. Summary 
A hybrid theoretical model has been expressly developed for further research using defined 
variables that specifically focus upon: 1) motives, 2) partner selection, 3) control and conflict, 4) 
performance, 5) "hard" and "soft" investment environment factors. Thirteen questions for further 
investigation were then derived based upon the exploratory research methodology now 
described. 
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Chapter Four 
Research Design and Methodology 
1. Introduction 
This chapter considers the aims, design, and methodology for further research into the questions 
previously outlined. It classifies the particular approach adopted, after considering standard 
research design, and how it was variously customized to a Sino-Japanese field situation, very 
different from others elsewhere. 
2. Research Aims 
In order to understand why conflicting interests arise, and why the perspectives of Chinese & 
Japanese differ in regard to general management practices, thirteen leading questions translate 
into the following specific research aims: 
• to investigate respective motives for forming JAEs; 
• to identify those factors which most shaped partner selection from respective perspectives; 
• to discover what pattern of possible control and conflict could then possibly result; 
• to identify the major factors then affecting JAEs own perceived performance; 
• to understand how JAEs perceived their external investment environment. 
Given JAEs are far from homogeneous, and variously distributed across China, there were 
important resource constrants upon their further investigation. For that reason, this research is 
limited to manufacturing sector locations in Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Dalian, and Chengdu, as 
wi ll be explained . 
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3. Research Classifications 
Phillips & Pugh ( 1992) proposed the standard classification of exploratory (i.e. forging new 
ground), testing-out (i.e. assessing and developing established theory) and problem solving_ 
(seeking particular answers to specified problems) type research. Others differentiate guantitati,·e 
and qualitative methods likewise (Bryman 1988, Miles, 1984, Strauss, 1987, Morse, 1994. 
Richards 1994). For the purposes of this research, a combination of different methods appeared 
appropriate however, following Kirby (1992) thus: 
"It is not a case of using one technique or set of techniques in preference to 
another. Rather projects should be perceived as multi-staged, frequently 
involving, within one project, the use of both qualitative and quantitative 
approaches. Whichever approach is adopted, it is essential to ensure that the 
technique is applied rigorously, correctly and appropriately." 
As an expressly exploratory research study, the particular sequential combination of methods 
used involved preliminary contextual research to substantiate these further, and then qualitative 
research to highlight how such issues occurred within particular JAE themselves. This particular 
combination was chosen in recognition that, for some time, China has been like an "enormous 
real-life management experiment" which obliges researchers to try to capture ongoing changes in 
the field, rather than in a laboratory type, controlled situation (Shenkar, 1994). 
4. Standard Research Design 
Few Western research methods texts were ever evolved with China in mind. They nevertheless 
detail issues about research design which can be considered standard considerations which 
international management research of this type then adapts accordingly. 
Zikmund ( 1984) emphasized differing considerations about the choice of research design and 
method. One standard classification for these purposes distinguishes experimentaL surve:. 
qualitative, case study, and action research approaches (Bryman, 1989), whereas others base 
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their classifications upon fieldwork, survey research, experimentation, and non-reactive research 
instead (Brewer and Hunter, 1989). Whatever the particular classification employed, the actual 
choice made should relate to the purpose of the research, in particular whether it is intended to be 
exploratory or explanatory. To the extent that it is exploratory, this research should promote 
original Chinese, Japanese, and Western mutual understanding of .TAEs in China. If it were 
explanatory, it would instead fill the gaps created by a "lack of previously developed 
knowledge" m this respect instead. Language difficulties alone mean that most Western 
researchers cannot necessarily fully access available materials about JAEs, while Shenkar and 
others note that these researchers cannot directly participate in the field in China as they can in 
the West, and even non-participant observation encounters problems over "face", quanxi, and the 
interpretation of Chinese sentiments and emotional expression generally. It was therefore 
through a particular combination of survey and case study research that this research intended 
overcoming some of these invisible barriers to the mutual understanding of JAEs in action, on a 
significant scale, in a range of different Chinese locations and field situations themselves. 
Having previously recognized their wider historical, political, and cultural context, this research 
will now focus upon micro-level studies of JAEs themselves, either as a group where survey 
research data are concerned, or as individual case studies themselves. 
5. Xnternationan Management Research 
This can therefore be defined as exploratory study which, by combining different research 
methods, aims to increase mutual understanding of JAEs in action, in a way of particular interest 
to international management researchers. Since international management research is itself 
relatively new, and still building its own knowledge base, it may still require more exploratory 
research investigations like this (Redding, 1994). Although a number of studies of JAEs in China 
were detailed before, it can be argued that these studies should now be linked closer together, 
and then extended further forward into post-entry development and performance evaluation 
phases as well. International management researchers could then compare these with other 
international joint ventures elsewhere, for which reason some element of standard research 
design and methodology would appear necessary. 
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The scope for such standardization neve11heless remains limited by the difficulty inherent in 
applying basically Western management constructs in an Eastern field setting which requires 
researchers to appreciate both Chinese and Japanese perspectives however. Researchers are 
advised stay alert to how these particular perspectives might differ (Iriye 1980:3): 
"Being geographically so close and yet psychologically quite remote despite their 
common cultural roots, the two peoples have developed a sense of commonality and 
disparity, interdependence and autonomy, mutual respect and suspicion, attraction 
and repulsion, and admiration and condescension toward one another. They have 
talked of their shared heritage and their identity as Asians, but they have not 
hesitated to seek outside assistance to fight against one another ... There are China 
specialists and Japan specialists, but few, if any, China-and Japan specialists." 
Although these differences could well influence how JAEs in China actually work, it is 
nevertheless essential that, to remain impartial, researchers bridge any Sino-Japanese divide, as 
any truly joint venture might itself have to do. To some extent any further research should 
therefore sample both "extant" (that is, more tangibly measured and/or reported) and "process" 
(that is, relationship based) variables together. It would then extend beyond existing investment 
led, business entry mode type studies primarily concerned with economic inputs and outputs, and 
would therefore include intervening organizational and management variables as well. As a 
Chinese who had also studied in Japan, this researcher was particularly alert towards native 
perspectives upon these latter variables, but aware of the difficulty of appearing too partisan, and 
the need to maintain an independent (neither pro Chinese nor Japanese) stance towards any 
resulting findings. 
In sum, the design of this study aims to achieve a related balance between the following four 
different forces in related international management research thus: 
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So, while there are studies about international joint venture entry modes, and associated founding 
characteristics, the maturation of such ventures later raises other performance type issues as well. 
Similarly, while many studies emphasize "extant" variables which are more easily classified, 
counted, and reported, others could place increasing emphasis upon how organizational and 
management relationships of a less tangible nature develop as well. In the case of JAEs, an 
existing emphasis upon entry mode/ founding characteristics needs to be balanced with clearer 
understanding about how well (or otherwise) they perform later, and what factors constrain their 
performance, including their Chinese external investment environment. Equally, the existing 
emphasis upon how respective partners first select each other needs to be balanced with clearer 
understanding about how any resulting relationship subsequently matures, and what problems of 
control and conflict such maturity later gives rise to, which may not have been expected when 
ventures were first founded, and pilot operations first began. For further research purposes, the 
theoretical model outlined before, and the questionnaire intended to operationalize it, both strike 
a balance between the four different forces Figure 4-1 outlines. They therefore encompass all 
four quadrants thus identified, with their respective emphases upon founding motives, partner 
selection, control, conflict, performance, and external investment environment. In addition, this 
has further implications for both selection and data collections methods, which should iclealh· 
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encompass both recently founded and mature JAEs, along with both incoming and experienced 
managerial respondents therein, who might together supply both "extant" and process related 
data for these purposes, given that suitable questions are posed. 
6. Si~rno-Japanese Research hsUJies 
By its very nature international management studies may take standard research into what are 
rapidly evolving field situations in their own right. At this stage in their development such 
studies should nevertheless seek some balance between the four different forces identified 
before, because it is a relatively new management discipline studying rising international 
developments at large (Redding, op cit). Sino-Japanese trade may have long historical roots, but 
more recent business investment developments suggest it has reached an important breakpoint, 
which could itself bring fresh strategic considerations to bear (Ritchie, op cit) 
As Chapter Two before made clear, Sino-Japanese ventures are variously distributed across 
China, and can only be selectively sampled at any one point in time. A first basis for that 
selection is therefore their very location itself, not least because their spatial distribution may 
reflect differing overall strategic priorities. For these purposes JAEs in sites in Beijing, Shanghai, 
Tianjin, Dalian and Chengdu were selected. As well as having long term relationships with Japan 
these were all areas where JAEs were most highly clustered. In addition, such areas display 
differing features of China itself, so that the capital Beijing is most politically and culturally 
conscious; Shanghai, Tianjin, and Dalian all have particular long term relationships with Japan; 
while Chengdu in the interior is nominally less "open", and likely to be considered more 
exclusively Chinese in cultural terms at least. 
Other methodological considerations exert some bearing upon further research here. All 
international management research presently faces the problem of developing measuring 
instruments, which have similar meaning even across different national cultures. Although 
surveys and interviews are elsewhere considered relatively standard methods they do not 
necessarily fit all cultural situations equally well. For example, while some freely pursue 
telephone based methods elsewhere, certain developing countries not only lack the technology. 
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but actively resist the faceless interaction this implies, particularly when rmsmg sensitive 
questions. Indeed, any questioning of authority in general, and also the government, or 
associated political affiliations, can be either offensive or embarrassing under certain cultures, 
and induce other fears and anxieties accordingly (Harpaz, 1996). Even interviews can present 
difficulties for Chinese and Japanese respondents who may appear courteous when simply giving 
replies according to what they believe their interviewer wants and expects (Drenth and 
Groendijk, 1984). A "reticent-loquacious" bias further arises where cultures place different value 
upon being quiet and reserved, compared with appearing more outgoing, and enjoying open talk 
instead. Brislin, Lonner and Thorndike (1973) further identified potential individual versus group 
bias problems, especially among those cultures which place little value upon purely individual 
responses, as a result of which these may appear very different from overall group responses 
instead. Indeed, to be labelled "individual" has sometimes meant being criticized and deplored 
by others in China, in comparison to the West outside. 
For the purposes of this research, a combination of mail questionnaires, face-to-face and 
telephone interviews was selected for providing the best access to a good range of well-placed 
managers and officials, and enabling suitable comparisons to be drawn. A particular advantage 
of the questionnaire instrument, once suitably translated, was achieving the standardization 
required for such comparisons, in terms of pre-existing categories, which the case studies could 
complement with more qualitative insights. While official documents and state statistics also 
provided useful secondary data for these purposes their use was subject to important limitations. 
Long term Chinese traditions, and the problems arising from its transitional economy status, 
mean that the availability of valid statistics still poses important problems. Thus Shenkar ( 1994 ), 
Teagarden and Von Glinow (1988), and Clarke (1988), for example all found such data sources 
both variable and inconsistent, the whole nature of national statistical accounting and reporting 
having been relatively underdeveloped before, and subject to some deliberate manipulation as 
well. No one uniform agreed definition and calculation of FDI thus prevails, and even the value 
of any equity can itself vary across different sources. However, differing datasets and bases of 
calculation can also produce variations among Japanese sources as well, while the particular 
value placed upon technology and "capability transfer" also complicates investment data 
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(Matsuoka and Rose, 1994). So far as was possible both Chinese and Japanese official statistical 
sources were therefore used for this research. 
7. Identifying the Survey Population 
Table 4-1 is taken from the Japanese source "List of Foreign Enterprises in China, /994 
Edition", between 1987-1993 when there were an estimated 2452 Japanese and 1314 US 
affiliated enterprises in China. Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin sites accounted for 32.04 % of all 
JAEs, Liaoning 28.95 %, mostly in Dalian, in East Liaoning. Since 1984, Dalian has been a 
Coastal Open City, and up to the end of 1994, there were 4187 foreign investment projects. 
Before 1993 much of its foreign investment was Japanese, but from 1993 Hong Kong property 
and service investment suddenly increased, making Hong Kong sources the leader in money 
value terms, although the origins of those sources may be subject to further questions. 
Table 4-1: Foreign Enterprises in China 
Reglon: ', · 'Area · ; .JA_~•AN. .!> . ;; ·. u s ''f)A~;"> ·. 
~ > ' -.r . ~ ·I' . . \ J;; ..z,,, ,":~ ·. . project~;~; ; % ~·,vi:~; 1~~oject · ··:. " .• !()~·?,"'(' I 
Municipality Beijing 257 10.60% 148 11.01% 
directly under Shanghai 404 16.66% 172 12.80% 
the central Tianjin 116 4.78% 61 4.54% 
government Total 777 32.04% 381 28.35% 
Hebei 26 1.07% 37 2.75% 
Coastal Liaoning 702 28.95% 130 9.67% 
areas Jiangsu 158 6.52% 114 8.48% 
Zhejiang 54 2.23% 31 2.31% 
Fujian 73 3.01% 34 2.53% 
Shandong 83 3.42% 71 5.28% 
Guangdong 306 12.62% 349 25.97% 
Guangxi 5 0.21% 6 0.45% 
Hainan 16 0.66% 7 0.52% 
Total 1423 58.68% 779 57.96% 
Shanxi 6 0.25% 7 0.52% 
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Inland Nei Mongol 6 0.25% 3 0.22% 
Jilin 53 2.19% 10 0.74% 
Heilongjiang 69 2.85% 16 1.19% 
Anhui 4 0.16% 15 1.12% 
Jiangxi 5 0.21% 8 0.60% 
Hen an 11 0.45% 14 1.04% 
Hubei 11 0.45% 15 1.12% 
Hunan 6 0.25% 12 0.89% 
Sichuan 19 0.78% 25 1.86% 
Guizhou 2 0.08% 2 0.15% 
Yunnan 4 0.16% 5 0.37% 
Xizang 1 0.04% 1 0.07% 
Shaanxi 18 0.74% 12 0.89% 
Gansu 2 0.08% 2 0.15% 
Qinghai --- --- 1 0.07% 
Ninxia --- --- 2 0.15% 
Xinjiang 8 0.33% 4 0.30% 
Total 225 9.28% 154 11.46% 
TOTAL 2425 100.00% 13344 100.00% 
Source: List of Foreign Funded Enterprises in China, 1994 Edition, Sousousha Press, Tokyo, Japan. 
One Chinese source, "A Compilation of Foreign Affiliated Enterprises in China", (Jinghua Press, 
Beijing, 1994), listed details of over 30,000 FAEs across China (the total of listed FAEs in China 
was approximately 320,000 at the end of 1998). However, most JAEs were concentrated in 
Shanghai, Beijing, Dalian and Tianjin. There were 3,163 F AEs in those four cities, of which 
2,251 were manufacturers, from which the researcher selected 300 JAEs. Of the questionnaires 
then distributed, 11 were not delivered because of address errors, and only 3 responses were 
unusable. The researcher received 81 completed responses, a response rate of approximately 
27%. For in-depth cases the researcher chose five JAEs in Beijing, Tianjin and Chengdu. This 
choice was based on the assumption that Beijing and Tianjin are the most open cities in China 
and most receptive to outsiders, while Chengdu is an interior city in the Southwest of China 
which is likely to be more conservative. The individual companies used as Case Studies were 
short-listed upon recommendation of local authorities and approached accordingly. 
68 
Chapter Four 
8. Sampling Processes 
The purpose of such sampling is to economize the time and funding that would be required if the 
entire population was studied, but yet still produce a meaningful representative study. It is 
important to draw a clear difference between the entire and sample unit population. The focus 
will be restricted to the selection of units for interview or self-administered questionnaire survey 
in the following discussion. Burton and Cherry ( 1970) argued there were no "correct" or "best" 
methods of sampling per se, and then differentiated the simple random sample, stratified random 
sample, multi-stage cluster sample, convenience sample, and purposive sample. Zikmund (1984) 
defined two major sampling methods as non-probability and probability according to the degree 
of randomness. The probability sampling method seeks a representative sample, and the samples 
most frequently used are termed simple random, systematic, stratified and cluster sampling. Non-
probability sampling includes convenience, quota, snowball and purposive san1pling. Non-
probability sampling is convenient, but makes it difficult to measure the sampling error, while 
with probability techniques sampling error can be more accurately assessed. This research uses 
purposive sampling (a broad-based convenience sample), which belongs to the non-probability 
sampling category. 
9. Questionnaire Design 
Questionnaire design is a critical stage in the survey research process. Bryman (1989) suggested 
that questions, should be clear, unambiguous, simple and short, avoiding double meanings, and 
leading questions generally. 
Shenkar (1994) identified problems applying questionnaire used in the West for non-western 
societies, particularly in China. He maintained that: 
''First, most Western instruments do not measure the constraints within which 
Chinese employees operate... Second, Western questionnaires arc not easily 
translated into Chinese ... Third, the meaning attached to a question may also vary 
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from one culture to another. .. Fourth, Chinese are not accustomed to completing a 
detailed questionnaire in a multiple-choice format." 
Even though Shenkar observed the above disadvantages of a multiple-choice style questionnaire. 
the benefits may sufficiently out-weigh the objections. Firstly questions can be answered with 
minimum interruption to respondents' ongoing schedule, allowing the respondent to time their 
response. fn terms of time, it is therefore an efficient method; more questions can be answered in 
similar time, thus ultimately giving more data. It also allows the researcher to standardise all 
responses to provide a basis for comparison and cross-reference. In this case, the researcher 
conducted a pilot study prior to developing the questionnaire, which showed that respondents 
were not averse to completing a questionnaire in multiple-choice format. The Japanese 
respondents who completed the questionnaire could have been more accustomed to this multiple-
choice format. While Shenkar commented on the Chinese in general, those who responded to this 
questionnaire were located in regions with the highest exposure to such Western customs as 
specific questions in multiple-choice fom1at, making them atypical of the general Chinese 
population. In addition, working in a JV enterprise often implies becoming more open to foreign 
customs, and being more flexible in absorbing and adapting to them; those who had undergone 
training in Japan could well have more familiarization in this respect. 
There are three mam stages m questionnaire design indicated by Alreck and Settle ( 1985): 
concerned coverage, the communication instrument, and the layout and presentation. As regards 
the type of data being sought, this questionnaire is based on research questions, divided into six 
sections: 
1. General background information concerning the JV and parent enterprises under study and 
the respondents involved. 
2. Investment motives applicable to each enterprise, including attitudes towards both Japanese 
and Chinese parties. These are linked with questions Q I to Q3. 
3. Partner selection in each enterprise, including mutual contacts and investigation. Questions 4 
and 5 are connected to this. 
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4. Control and conflict as applied to each enterprise. This includes decision making, key 
management positions, and mutual co-operation, questions 6 to 9 are connected to this. 
5. Performance in each enterprise, including operational practice, production growth, and 
satisfaction. Questions 10 to 12 are connected to this. 
6. Investment environment for each enterprise. This includes problems and limitations arising 
from the overall Chinese field situation. Question 13 is connected with this. 
The second stage concerned the questionnaire as an instrument in terms of selecting the relevant 
sample, and posing relevant questions. Closed questions (plus a few open questions) and 
multiple choice questions were used because better educated managerial respondents occupied 
with day-to-day operations were considered likely to find these types of question easier to 
answer. The last stage in questionnaire design concerned layout and presentation, where general 
background questions come first, operational process questions in the middle, with problem 
related questions at the end. 
10. Semi-structured Interview Design 
A semi-structured interview approach was adopted and used in the case study. Corey (1990) 
explained different types of interview. A structured interview follows a predetermined set of 
questions. Tightly structured interviews come close to becoming questionnaire surveys 
administered in person. They may be useful if the interviewer has a clear sense of precisely what 
the issues are and what data are needed beforehand. The narrower the issue, and the more sharply 
focused the data search, the more useful structured interviews can become. Unstructured, that is, 
non-directive interviews, allow for flexibility in discussion, relying on the interviewee to 
volunteer relevant data, with broad guidance from the interviewer. The semi-structured interview 
approach appeared the most suitable means of allowing the researcher to gain insight into the 
other person's perspectives, given that his Chinese background would enable him to grasp more 
of what respondents' meant in their own cultural terms. This conforms with Lincoln and Guba 
(1985) in that the choice of a structured or unstructured interview approach firstly depends on 
whether the researcher already knows what he/she is looking for, before entering the field 
situation itself. 
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Wragg ( 1984) points out that, if the area under investigation requires profound deliberation, and 
the questions are deeply thought provoking, a semi-structured interview can be the best choice, 
since it allows respondents to express themselves at some length, but offers enough structure to 
channel this appropriately. As Shenkar indicated, many Chinese tend to reserve the most 
important points to the end, rather than the beginning of a conversation. This researcher's 
experience suggest that the semi-structured interview approach can allow managers to tell their 
stories in their own terms and help achieve closer proximity to the actual terms they themselves 
use, through which they experience this world, and give it meaning. At the same time the 
approach allowed the researcher to exercise some control over how interviewee's perspectives 
and experience were later expressed. 
This research uses four JAEs from Beijing, Tianjin and Chengdu as "case studies" based on face 
to face semi-stmctured interviews. This choice followed the parameters of case study research 
outlined by Bryman (1988): 
1) First, classic studies often take the site, such as an organisation or a 
department within an organisation, as constituting 'the case'. 
2) Second, 'case study' seems to imply the study of one case, but can focus 
upon more. 
3) Third, case studies can and do exhibit mixed methods of data collection. 
4) Fourth, case studies usually comprise a number of emphases, which help 
distinguish them from purely quantitative research in particular. 
In selecting the interview questions, special consideration was given to whether they should be in 
the form of a general interview guide or a set of issues to be explored with each respondent, 
serving as a checklist to ensure that all relevant topics were covered. The interview guide 
consisted of a set of carefully worded questions which were intended to be taken through the 
interview in order to reduce the possibility of different responses resulting in diverging 
interpretations. The following items were given priority: 
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I) Motivation and background of investment 
2) Prior survey and feasibility studies 
3) Reasons for choosing partners and negotiation history 
4) Main points of co-operation (including: composition ofthe board of directors; 
management structure; profit sharing; duration of the co-operation; other stipulations) 
5) Production and marketing 
6) Funds procurement 
7) Labour and training 
8) Operation, decision and performance 
9) Relationships with local government 
1 0) Conflicts arising from cultural and organisational differences 
11) Prospects for the future. 
11. The Pilot Studies 
Gill and J ohnson (1991) outline the importance of such studies thus: 
"In essence, pilot research is a trial run-through to test a research design with a 
subsumable of respondents who have characteristics similar to those 
identifiable in the main sample to be surveyed. Piloting is necessary, as it is 
very difficult to predict how respondents will interpret and react to the 
questions. Conducting a pilot before the main survey allows any potential 
problems in the pro forma of the questionnaire to be identified and conected." 
Good pilot studies are essential for the successful questionnaires. Burton and Cheny (1970) 
explained that in the first stages, they were likely to be exploratory, consisting of unstructured 
interviews and talks. The value of pilot studies lies in helping to devise the best actual wording 
of questions, designing the introductory letter and finding methods of reducing levels of non-
response. According to Erdos and Morgon ( 1970), it is necessary to check the mailing list. 
percentage returned, decide upon follow-up effort, correct potential areas of bias, ensure 
questions are properly understood, and so on. 
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The pilot study should investigate both the feasibility of collecting the data, and effectiveness of 
the methods for doing so, in this instance covering both the questionnaire and case studies. 
To carry out these checking functions, two pilot studies were conducted before the mam 
fieldwork began. One was between August and September 1993, when the researcher visited 
departments of central government and key enterprises in Beijing and Chengdu, to collect basic 
background data and establish working relationships with key actors. The trip lasted six weeks. 
including four weeks in Beijing, and two weeks in Chengdu, when the researcher also visited the 
China Ministry of Foreign Economics & Trade, China Council for the Promotion oflnternational 
Trade and the China Association of Foreign Affiliated Enterprises etc. In addition, he also visited 
Beijing-Matsushita Colour CRT Corporation Limited, and Guangming Materials Plant of China 
to interview their key Chinese and Japanese managers. After outlining the objectives of the 
research and general administrative problems, in September 1994 the researcher visited China 
again, to test the revised questionnaire sent to a sample of eight managers of JAEs in Beijing and 
Tianjin, and two staff at Renmin University of China in Beijing, before finalising the 
questionnaire actually used. 
12. Fieldwork 
A four-month field study was undertaken in China from September 1994 to January 1995. The 
postal questionnaire survey and personal interview were both carried out in the same time period 
as the mainsheet, which was followed by a postal or telephone reminder. Use was made of two 
personal contacts in Beijing, an editor working for the Marketing Daily as head of the News 
Section in Beijing, and a scholar who was also Managing Director of a small Sino-Japanese joint 
venture company in Beijing, who also offered office space at his company. 
In the first stage in Beijing, the researcher distributed the pilot samples to the eight JAEs and t\\.l' 
scholars asking them to answer the questionnaire. After obtaining responses, the researcher 
collected comments, and made improvements to the questionnaire and interview questions. the 
formal questionnaire was printed by the Marketing Daily printing plant. 
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At the second stage, 302 questionnaires were sent to JAEs in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and 
Dalian, while the researcher spent two weeks in Chengdu conducting personal interviews. With 
Japanese investment motivation and the feasibility study process in mind, the researcher visited 
two companies located in Chengdu, both introduced by its local government, in order to 
interview top managers. To gain firsthand experience the researcher also visited factories to 
observe managers and workers in both companies. Other secondary data collected about them 
included the Company Guide, the Annual Report and the Feasibility Report, all of which were 
made available in due course. 
The third stage began in Beijing, where two companies were visited and nine top managers 
interviewed, including three Japanese (two Managing Directors and a Director of the factory) 
and six Chinese (two Deputy Directors, two Heads of General Affairs Office, an Assistant 
Director of the factory and a Sales Manager from the company's shop). The researcher visited 
these companies on eight occasions, four to the main offices; two to the factory for interviews; 
once on a workshop tour, observing and talking to various managers and workers; and once to 
the fashion shop for another tour while also observing and talking to managers and sales-people. 
Other documents assessed included Annual Reports, Company Guides, rules about labour and 
wages, and plans and reports of management skills training and marketing. 
The last stage was spent between Beijing and Tianjin where the researcher received 81 valid 
responses following the mailshot and the postal or telephone reminders. At the same time, the 
researcher studied TJNEC in Tianjin, where he visited the top and middle level managers who 
were interviewed about the strategy of Japanese control over affiliated enterprises and their 
marketing. A final two weeks was spent checking all the questionnaire forms for errors and 
sorting out the interview data before returning to the UK. 
13. Data Analysis 
Generally, raw data has little practical value as it stands, and Nichols ( 1991) advocated four 
further stages of processing and analysis: 
75 
Chapter Four 
* Checking through the forms and correcting errors. 
*Coding. 
* Preparing data tables. 
* Making sense of the data, through preparing summary measures, 
and using them to test ideas about the target population. 
Given the small size of the current questionnaire survey, hand tabulation was used first, followed 
by "Excel" software to carry out in-depth analysis. The analysis of the interview data for this 
research employs a "progressive data analysis" (i.e. data analysis during the data collection) and 
"final data analysis" (i.e. data analysis after the completion of the data collection). As 
McCracken ( 1988) pointed out: 
"The objective of analysis is to determine the categories, relationships, and 
assumptions that infom1 the respondent's view of the world in general and the 
topic in particular." 
The data analysis of this research is, therefore, a process of making sense of findings, 
discovering relationships in the data that elaborate upon given hypotheses and theories, and 
establishing their overall meaning and significance, using a constant comparative method 
described by Glaser and Strauss (1967). 
14. Summary 
The research had a series of aims and employed a sequence of different methods to achieve its 
objectives. Although recognising the usefulness and value of more standard- and often Western 
derived - research methods, these needed adapting to the unique features of a Sino-Japanese 
field situation. Any such field situation is difficult for "outsiders" to either access or understand 
in the way most native Chinese and Japanese are themselves accustomed to. In this instance the 
researcher enjoyed some "privileged access" with respect to his background, but still strove to 
maintain impartiality with respect to the difTerent interests involved by adhering to a theoretical 
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model, and assessing where both parties stood with regard to certain set criteria. At this stage of 
its development international management research still has some methodological problems to 
overcome (Redding, op cit), but here it was intended that a combination of methods- contextual, 
questionnaire, and case study based- would suit the exploratory nature of the study, and enable 
further comparisons to be drawn. 
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Chapter Five 
Findings 1: A General Description 
1. Introduction 
The last chapter explores appropriate research methods for investigating these questions. This 
chapter gives general descriptions of the cunent questionnaire survey and case studies, including 
overall sample characteristics, original information on J AEs in China from the current 
investigation, and some research approaches in the cunent case studies. An in-depth analysis of 
the data in this investigation will be analysed, discussed and evaluated in Chapters Six, Seven, 
Eight and Nine. 
2. Survey Sample Characteristics 
The first part of this questionnaire has been designed to provide general background information 
about the respondents. The respondents were questioned on the following four items: position, 
nationality, number of years working in the enterprise and working years in this position. The 
researcher decided to request more general infom1ation from the respondents as an additional 
source, to ensure the validity and reliability of the data. Tables 1 to 2 show the results from 
analysing the first prui of this questionnaire, which is discussed in more detail as follows. 
There were 10 Japanese and 71 Chinese respondents in the questionnaire survey. Table 5-l 
shows their status. "Others" included Assistant General manager ( 4 ), Secretary ( 5), Interpreter 
(3), Head of Department (7) , Comptroller (1) and Staff (2) . General managers and Vice General 
managers accounted for 68 % of the total. These results suggest that the questionnaire survey 
received serious attention from responding firms, which therefo re encourages confidence in the 
reli abi lity of responses. Table 5-2 shows the type of enterpri ses responding. 
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Table 5-1: Status of respondents 
Chinese Japanese C&J 
Position No. 1Yo No. o;o No. o;o 
General manager 21 30 8 80 29 36 
Vice general manager 26 37 --- --- 26 32 
Other 20 28 2 20 22 27 
Not specified 4 6 --- --- 4 5 
Total 71 100 10 100 81 100 
Table 5-2: Type of Enterprise 
Respondent JV o/o WJ % CV o;o Total o;o 
Chinese 55 68 10 12 6 7 71 88 
Japanese 5 6 4 5 1 1 10 12 
C&J 60 74 14 17 7 8 81 100 
JV: Joint venture, WJ: Wholly Japanese-owned, CV: Co-operative venture 
A total of 60 responses came from JV enterprises, 14 from WJ enterprises and only 7 from CV 
enterprises. These mirror the relative proportions of all JAEs in China in 1995, though recently 
WJ enterprises have been increasing (see Chapter Two for more details). Most Japanese 
respondents came from JV and WJ enterprises, and a large majority of Chinese respondents 
came from JV enterprises. 10 Chinese respondents came from WJ enterprises; their positions 
included two general managers, three vice general managers, three interpreters, one head of 
secretariat and one manager. It is very interesting to note that the two general managers were 
both Chairmen of the Board and General Manager at the same time. This indicates that those 
enterprises were under the direct control of the Chinese and that the Japanese were only in 
indirect control of them. 
3. Original Information 
The respondents were requested to offer general information about their parent compames. 
Eleven items were selected in this section: name, type, number of both Chinese and Japanese 
parents companies; numbers of other enterprises with Japanese investment; the importance of 
Japanese investment in China; reasons for Chinese choosing Japanese partners; how did the 
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parent company establish initial contact and how do the Japanese monitor and analyse the China 
market (see Questionnaire in Appendix I for more details). 
3.1. Type of Company 
Respondents were allocated to five categories of Chinese company and four types of Japanese 
company, as shown in Tables 5-3 and 5-4 below. The State Company with 59 %was the main 
Chinese parent company, followed by a Collective Company with 15 %, and a Township 
Company with 7 %. This appears to suggest the Japanese prefer JVs with state companies rather 
than other types of Chinese companies. This is because the Japanese trust state companies more 
than the others. They think that 1) with a state company the government brings influence to bear 
over any problems which may arise; 2) if there is any trouble the government will support the 
state company, thereby reducing the investment risk. Table 5-4 reveals that 74 % of Japanese 
parents are mainly manufacturing companies, and most manufacturing companies were in 
employment terms, often relatively small. It is surprising to find that there is only one bank 
among the Japanese parent company respondents here cited. 
Table 5-3: Type of Chinese Parent Company 
Respondent => Chinese Japanese c & J 
Type No. 0/o No. 0/o No. 0/o 
State company 42 59 6 60 48 59 
Collective company 12 17 --- --- 12 15 
Township company 6 8 --- --- 6 7 
Other 2 3 --- --- 2 2 
Not known 9 13 4 40 13 16 
Total 71 100 10 100 81 100 
Table 5-4: Type of Japanese Parent Company 
Resl!_ondent => Chinese Japanese c & J 
Type No. 0/o No. 0/o No. Ofo 
Trading house 23 32 5 50 28 35 
Bank I 1 --- --- 1 1 
Manufacturing 53 75 7 70 60 74 
Other 6 8 I 10 7 9 
Note: Some respondents were Involved 111 more than one category. 
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3.2. Number of Par·ent Company Employees 
In this section of the questionnaire there are five categories of employee level for Chinese and 
Japanese companies. Tables 5-5 and 5-6 give the details below. There are three points that need 
mentioning: I) The size of the Chinese parent companies is quite large, with 3 7 % of the total 
having over I ,000 employees. 2) There were no Japanese respondents working in small-medium 
size companies. 3) Quite a number of responses fall into "Not known", counting for 22 %. Why 
is it that they do not know their companies' employment figures? Three possible reasons are: I) 
where there is more than one parent company, the respondent did not know how to answer; 2) 
the respondent really was unaware of their parent company employment level; 3) the respondent 
is not willing to express a view. The characteristics of the Japanese parent companies show that 
I) larger and smaller companies were very alike, occupied similar positions; together they took 
63 (30 + 33) % of the total; 2) the "Not known" response was lower than in the case of Chinese 
parent companies, but was still a substantial 17 %. 
Table 5-5: Number of Chinese Parent Company employees 
Res_Q_ondent ~ Chinese Japanese c & J 
Type No. % No. o;o No. % 
001-250 11 15 --- --- 11 14 
251-500 14 20 --- --- 14 17 
501-1000 6 8 2 20 8 10 
Over 1000 27 38 3 30 30 37 
Not known 13 18 5 50 18 22 
Total 71 100 10 100 81 100 
Table 5-6: Number of Japanese Parent Company employees 
Respondent ~ Chinese Japanese c & J 
Type No. o;o No. o;o No. o;o 
001-250 23 32 1 IO 24 30 
25I-500 5 7 -, 30 8 10 _) 
501-1000 9 13 --- --- 9 11 
Over 1000 22 31 4 40 26 32 
Not known 12 17 2 20 14 17 
Total 71 100 10 100 81 100 
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3.3. Number of Japanese Parent Company investments in China 
There were five categories for the Chinese and Japanese responses, and Table 5-7 below shows 
the results. The category of one investment in China made up 42 %, and 2 - 5 was 47 %, together 
amounting to 89 %. Only one Japanese company Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd had 
invested in over 10 different enterprises in China. Why has Matsushita invested in China by 
establishing so many different enterprises, and why are there not more Japanese firms like 
Matsushita making large investments in China? Detailed analysis will be offered in Chapter 
Seven. 
Table 5-7: Number of Enterprises the Japanese Parent Company has Invested in 
Respondent => Chinese Japanese c & J 
Type No. 0/o No. % No. 0/o 
Only one 30 42 4 40 34 42 
2-5 34 48 4 40 38 47 
6- 10 5 7 2 20 7 9 
Over 10 1 1 --- --- 1 1 
Not known 1 1 --- --- 1 1 
Total 71 100 10 100 81 100 
3.4. Connection and Links 
How do the Chinese and Japanese establish initial business contacts? How do the Japanese 
analyse the Chinese market? The researcher designed seven channels for the first question, and 
nine channels for the second question, Tables 5-8 and 5-9 below show the results. 26 % of 
respondents chose the "embassy or trade liaison" and 1 7 % chose "delegation in China or Japan", 
as their initial contact. More, however, chose "other" (36 %) for their initial contact. What were 
these "other" channels? Some responses indicated "friends", "other company introductions" and 
so on. For the second question many respondents chose "consultants in China" (52 %) and 
"meeting officials & end-users" (44 %) to show that when Japanese companies monitor and 
analyse the Chinese market they like very much to use information gained from China. If we 
compare Chinese and Japanese responses, most Japanese choose "consultants in China" (80 %), 
which suggests that the Japanese are willing to analyse the market in China directly. This may 
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partly be because of their business experiences and personalities. Detailed analysis of this is 
offered in Chapter Nine. 
Table S-8: Initial Business Contact 
Respondent ~ Chinese Japanese c & J 
Ty.[l__e No. o;o No. o;o No. o;o 
Exhibition or technology fair 12 17 --- --- 12 15 
Hired consultant 3 4 1 10 4 5 
Embassy or trade liaison 18 25 3 30 21 26 
Chinese solicitation 6 8 2 20 8 10 
Delegation in China or Japan 14 20 --- --- 14 17 
Other 26 37 3 30 29 36 
Not known 6 8 2 20 8 10 
Table S-9: Japanese analysis of the China market 
Respondent ~ Chinese Japanese c & J 
Type No. o;o No. % No. o;o 
Consultants in Japan 15 21 _., 30 18 22 .) 
Consultants in Hong Kong 4 6 2 20 6 7 
Consultants in China 34 48 8 80 42 52 
Japanese publications 4 6 1 10 5 6 
Chinese publications 2 3 2 20 4 5 
Office in China 18 25 3 30 21 26 
Meeting officials & end users 32 45 4 40 36 44 
Other 11 15 1 10 12 15 
Not known 2 3 1 10 3 4 
Note: Some respondents in Tables 6-13 and 6-14 were included in more than one category. 
The researcher collected background information about Chinese and Japanese parent companies. 
The overall characteristics can be summarised thus: 1) The Japanese prefer joint ventures with 
state companies more than other Chinese companies. 2) Both Chinese and Japanese parent 
companies were major employers: 46 % of Chinese and 45 % of Japanese parent companies had 
over 500 employees. 3) Japanese appear to prefer direct talks with Chinese when conducting 
their business in China. For example, 52 % of the responses showed that the Japanese consulted 
directly with Chinese and 44 % made direct trips to China to meet officials and end-users. 
Furthermore, as case studies in the current investigation show, most Japanese prefer to go tc• 
China in person to contact feasibility studies (sec Case One in Chapter-9). 
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4. General Information on JAEs 
Respondents were asked to offer basic information about their own enterprises. Six factors were 
selected: "type of enterprise", "percentage of ownership", "length of co-operation", "form of 
investment", "number of employees" and "date of going into operation" (see Questionnaire in 
A 1dix I for more details). Four operational modes were designated: "manufacturing", pp et 
"proc essing", "repairing" and "other". Table 5-10 as below shows that most JAEs in this 
igation were manufacturing enterprises (90 %), while only 16 % and 5 % respectively of 
tal are processing and repairing enterprises. This means that the situation of JAEs in China 
ow improved, since in the initial stage many JAEs in China were just processing and 
ing enterprises. However, although most JAEs in the current investigation were 
facturing enterprises, their manufacturing levels were still relatively low. Those 
ndents, who chose the "other" mode, indicated they were involved in printing, product 
n, selling and so on. 
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Table 5-10: Enterprise's Operation mode 
Chinese Japanese c & J 
e No. % No. o/o No. % 
Man ufacturing 64 90 9 90 73 90 
Proc essmg 12 17 1 10 13 16 
Rep amng 4 6 4 5 
Othe r 7 10 10 8 10 
Note: Some respondents are included in more than one category. 
4.1. T ype of Enterprise 
There 
inCh 
ventu 
more 
were three types of enterprise offered to choose from as shown in Table 5-11. Most JAEs 
ina were joint ventures, Japanese wholly owned enterprises came second, and co-operative 
res third. These numbers are comparable with the totals for all JAEs (see Chapter Two for 
details). Table 6-16 also shows that 40% of Japanese respondents worked in wholly owned 
enteq )rtses. 
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Table 5-11: Type of enterprise 
Respondent ~ Chinese Japanese c & J 
Type No. o;o No. 'Yo No. o;o 
.Joint venture 55 77 5 50 60 74 
Co-operation venture 6 8 1 10 7 9 
.Japanese wholly owned 10 14 4 40 14 17 
Total 71 100 10 100 81 100 
4.2. Degree of ownership 
Five degrees of ownership were designated for Japanese companies, four types for Chinese 
companies and two types for other parties. Table 5-12 below shows these results. They indicate 
that most Japanese ownership was between 26 - 50% (46 %) and 51 - 75% (22%). Chinese 
ownership level is as similar to the Japanese situation: between 26 - 50% accounted for 54% and 
between 51 - 80% for 20%. A further another point of interest is that there were no Japanese 
respondents from enterprises where the Japanese ownership level was under 26%. 
Table 5-12: Percentage of Ownership 
Respondent ~ Chinese Japanese c & 
Type No. % No. o;o No. 
JAPANESE 
01-25% 8 11 --- --- 8 
26-50% 34 48 3 30 37 
51-75% 16 23 2 20 18 
76-100% 12 17 5 50 17 
Not known 1 1 --- --- 1 
Total 71 100 10 100 81 
CHINESE 
01-25% 4 6 --- --- 4 
26-50% 40 56 6 60 46 
51-80% 16 23 --- --- 16 
Not known 1 1 --- --- 1 
OTHER 
01-25% ... 4 3 _) --- ---
26-50% 2 3 --- --- 2 
Note: 14 responses were from Japanese wholly owned ventures, therefore the percentage of 
ownership by Chinese only relates to the remaining 67 responses. 
J 
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21 
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4.3. Length of co-operation agreement 
Four categories of agreement length were designated for respondents; Table 5-13 shows these 
results. Many respondents had chosen 11 - 20 years as their co-operation agreement length (62 
%), and a significant number of enterprises were in excess of 30 years. This result indicates that 
many JAEs were comparatively long-term investment ventures. One possible reason for this is 
that normally less than 10 years is too short to recoup the investment, but over 20 years may 
involve unexpected risks. In particular, the Japanese are concerned about changes in China's 
political situation and government policies. 
Table 5-13: Length of Co-operation Agreement 
Respondent => Chinese Japanese c & J 
Years No. 0/o No. 0/o No. 0/o 
01- 10 12 17 2 20 14 17 
11-20 45 63 5 50 50 62 
21-30 4 6 1 10 5 6 
Over 30 10 14 2 20 12 15 
Total 71 100 10 100 81 100 
4.4. Forms of Investment 
The questionnaire stipulated nine possible forms of investment for both Chinese and Japanese 
respondents. Table 5-14 gives the results. About 90% of the total stated that the Japanese had 
invested "cash" in the enterprises, and 44% and 31% invested "machinery & equipment" and 
"know-how" respectively (including some which had also made a "cash" investment). By 
contrast, about 57%, 44% and 30% ofthe Chinese side partners had invested "cash", "buildings" 
or "site-use rights". Both sides stipulated that cash was the best choice for investment. This is not 
only financially useful, but also enables the JV enterprise to use foreign currency to bm 
machinery, equipment, and materials and so on in the international market. 
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'fable 5-14: Investment JForms 
Respondent => Chinese Japanese c & J 
'fype No. o;o No. o;o No. o;o 
Cash 
Chinese 43 61 3 30 46 57 
Japanese 64 90 9 90 73 90 
Buildings 
Chinese 33 46 3 30 36 44 
Japanese 5 7 3 30 8 10 
Machinery & equipment 
Chinese 16 23 3 30 19 23 
Japanese 32 45 4 40 36 44 
Production materials 
Chinese 10 14 --- --- 10 12 
Japanese 10 14 2 20 12 15 
Labour 
Chinese 19 27 1 10 20 25 
Japanese 1 1 1 10 2 2 
Industrial property rights 
Chinese 4 6 --- --- 4 5 
Japanese 4 6 2 20 6 7 
Know-how 
Chinese 2 3 --- --- 2 2 
Japanese 21 30 4 40 25 31 
Site-use rights 
Chinese 24 34 --- --- 24 30 
Japanese 2 3 2 20 4 5 
Other 
Chinese --- --- --- --- --- ---
Japanese 1 1 1 10 2 2 
4.5. Number of Enterprise Employees 
Six categories were designated for the number of current enterprise employees, and five 
categories were designated for the number of Japanese staff in the current enterprise. Tables 5-15 
and 5-16 give the results as below. About 63 % of all enterprises had 200 and under employees. 
while only 14 % had over 500. JAEs in China are relatively small. Especially noteworthy is the 
fact that about 23 %of this sample have 50 and under employees. It appears that the Japanese are 
still very careful when making investments in China, and they do not move their main 
investment focus to China, although they know how important the Chinese market is for their 
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further development. Many enterprises (about 59%) have fewer than 6 Japanese staff, and 20% 
have no Japanese staff at all. The data also shows that this 20% are small enterprises, which may 
not need to have Japanese working there. 
1' bl 5 15 N b a e - : urn er o f t t curren en erprnse emp. oyces 
Respondent=> Chinese Japanese c & J 
ty(l_e No. 0/o No. (% No. 0/o 
01-50 17 24 2 20 19 23 
51-100 14 20 I 10 15 19 
101-200 14 20 3 30 17 21 
201-500 15 21 --- --- 15 19 
Over 500 8 11 3 30 11 14 
Not known 3 4 1 10 4 5 
Total 71 100 10 100 81 lOO 
l'able 5-16: Number of Japanese Staff in current enterprise 
Respondent => Chinese Japanese c & J 
type No. 0/o No. 0/o No. 0/o 
1-5 40 56 8 80 48 59 
6- 10 6 8 1 10 7 9 
Over 10 6 8 --- --- 6 7 
No Japanese 16 23 --- --- 16 20 
Not known 3 4 1 10 4 5 
Total 71 100 10 100 81 100 
4.6. Starting Operations 
Three categories were designated for respondents to answer the question "when did your 
enterprise go into operation?" Table 5-17 gives the results. Most respondents answered that they 
were already in operation (98 %), and only 2% gave a negative answer. This rate is high, and is 
further evidence to show that compared with other foreign investors Japanese .JVs in China have 
actually been implemented more quickly. 78 %had been in operation for less than 6 years, while 
just 20 % had operated for more than 6 years. All Japanese respondents inclicatecl that their 
enterprises were already in operation. 
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Table 5-17: Going Into Operation 
Respondent=> Chinese Japanese c & J 
Type No. o;o No. o;o No. 'Yo 
Yes, into operation 1-5 years 56 79 7 70 63 78 
Yes, into operation 6-1 0 years 13 18 "' 30 16 20 _) 
No 2 3 --- --- 2 2 
Total 71 100 10 100 81 100 
Overall, the main points for this section are 1) most enterprises in the current investigation are 
manufacturing joint ventures; 2) to recoup investments and reduce investment risks, many 
Japanese companies have signed an operation agreement for about 11 - 20 years in length; 3) 
cash is the preferred form for Japanese investment; 4) compared with the parent company, the 
size of JAEs in China was quite small; 5) comparing the ownership level of the partners the 
Japanese (89% hold from 26% to 100% ownership) were slightly higher than the Chinese side 
(77 % hold from 26% to 80% ownership). 
5. Sample Characteristics of the Case Studies 
These case studies relate to feasibility studies about investment, management skill transfer, 
marketing strategies and operational practices of JAEs in China. Each section will be discussed 
in greater depth describing the background, objective and operation of JAEs. The conclusions 
drawn from the data in this chapter will also be analysed and evaluated in Chapters Seven and 
Eight. The first part of these case studies has been designed to provide general background 
information about the respondents. The respondents were questioned on the following four 
items: position, nationality, background and JV programme information on the enterprise. The 
researcher decided to request more general information from the respondents as an additional 
source, to ensure the validity and reliability of the data. For details of the four cases please see 
Case Study in the Appendix II. Below are the results from analysing the first part of these case 
studies. 
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5.1. Case One: Sino-Japanese Sichuan Sanhai Plastics Co., Ltd (SSPC) 
Why did the partners choose this programme? What feasibility studies did they conduct? What 
was the content of those feasibility studies? The researcher interviewed four top managers from 
this company. Altogether, the researcher visited the company on four occasions: twice to the 
head office for interviews totalling about seven hours; twice to a company factory for interviews 
and tours for about two days. In addition, documents were examined, including the Annual 
Report, a Company Guide, a Feasibility Report and so on. 
5.1.2. Background 
From June 1992, China Mianyang Plastics Factory and Sichuan Plastics Industrial Company 
made contact with Japan Hi-Sheet Industrial Co., Ltd, Mitsui Petrochemical Industries Ltd and 
Mitsui & Co Ltd with a view to setting up a joint venture. After 2 years of negotiations, 
discussions and investigations, they signed a contract to invest in Mianyang National New Hi-
tech Development Zone and established a Sino-Japanese Joint Venture Company on the 11th of 
April 1994. The total amount of investment was equivalent to US $3.07m, and the registered 
capital was US $2.15m. Of the registered capital, the Chinese side invested US $0.86m cash, 
accounting for 40% of the total, and the Japanese side invested US $1.29 cash, accounting for 
60% of the total. The main business would be to produce plastic mats, PE plastic seal and other 
plastic products, and market plastic products for building materials and related raw materials 
both in China and outside. 
5.1.3. Reasons for Programme Choice 
For the Chinese this venture was intended to meet the developmental needs of the plastics 
industry in China, and to promote and strengthen international trade and technical exchange, and 
to speed up the development of the plastics industry in Sichuan. For the Japanese, their main 
reasons were to extend their market, especially into the inland areas of China. The JV plans to 
adopt advanced technology and management methods from the Japanese to make continuous 
production efficiency improvement and increase economic efficiency to enable the two parties to 
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obtain satisfactory profits. PE materials etc are a series of hi-tech products which, because of 
their excellent properties, are used over a wide range, especially in Japan; however, the 
production of these materials in China has just begun. Only a few factories have started 
production but their production equipment and techniques are outdated, and the product quality 
is low. The Hi-Sheet Co., Ltd has advanced technology and produces a high quality, so the JV 
company will transfer their technology and import their company's, and other Japanese 
management methods. 
5.1.4. Content of the programme 
The two Chinese companies and the three Japanese companies have agreed to use the cash to 
invest in Mianyang, and establish a JV company to produce and sell PE material and other 
plastic material products. The main market for the product is Sichuan and related Chinese 
domestic markets. The general manager carries out the various decisions of the board meetings 
and organises the daily operations and management work of the JV. The planned duration of the 
JV is 50 years. There were 7 members the JV Company board, including 3 members from the 
Chinese side and 4 members from the Japanese side. The JV company has a designed capacity of 
1 OOOT/year PE material and using this they produce 750T/year of flake. 
5.2. Case Two: Beijing Matsushita Colour CRT Company Ltd. (BMCC) 
BMCC is officially regarded as a model JV company in China. Six years after starting operations 
in 1995, its total profit was RMB 2.04 billion, which was 4 times the original investment. In 
1995, BMCC became one of the top twelve Chinese manufacturing enterprises, and number one 
in electronics. The researcher interviewed four BMCC top managers in Beijing. Altogether, the 
researcher visited the company on four occasions: twice to the head office for interviews 
totalling about four hours; twice to a company factory for interviews and tours lasting about two 
days. Some data was also collected from this company, including the Annual Report, a BMCC 
Guide, news reports about BMCC and so on. The details are as follows. 
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5.2.1. Background 
BMCC was established on 8th September 1987, and started operation on I'' July 1989. The type 
of joint venture was a limited company. The amount of capital was approximately RMB 500 
million, and the ratio was 50 % for the Beijing side and 50 % for Matsushita. The members of 
both sides were as follows: the Beijing side was Beijing Electronics Tube Factory, China 
National Electronics Import & Export Corporation Beijing Branch, The Commercial Bank of 
China-Beijing Branch and Beijing CRT Factory; the Matsushita side was Matsushita Electric 
Industrial Company Ltd and Matsushita Electronics Corporation. 
The number of employees was approximately 2450 in 1995, and the term of the JV was 20 years. 
They have two production lines. One produces the 21" FS tube for colour TV s, production of 
which started on 1st July 1989. The other line, which started production on 1st May 1990, 
produces 14", 19" and 21" FS tubes for colour TV s, and has a theoretical production capacity of 
1 million sets per year. However, it has been producing a new type of tube, a "GAOO 29" CR T 
Panel (SF), with twice the diagonal axis the conventional type. Total production capacity is 2.8 
million sets per year at present. In general, about 70% of its products are selling to the Chinese 
market, and another 30% were exported to foreign countries including Japan, Malaysia, Mexico 
and Indonesia. The main stated aim of exports is to balance its foreign currency costs. 
5.2.2. Reasons for Establishing Joint Venture in China 
Why did Beijing want a joint venture with Matsushita? How did Matsushita Electrical Industry 
Group enter into investing in China? The edited answers of the Chinese and Japanese managers 
from BMCC are as follows. 
"The basic reason for our group of companies to start entering into investments in 
China was that the founder of the Matsushita Company Mr. Matsushita, was very 
interested in China. He thought that China would have the largest influence on the 
development of Asia and the world. Also Mr. Matsushita has twice visited China, in 
1979 and I 980. He told many Chinese leaders that it was not enough only to import 
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equipment and technology from Matsushita, because management know-how would 
be more important than equipment. Based on this background, in 1985 the Director 
of Matsushita Electric Industrial Corporation, at that time Mr. Yamashita, discussed 
details with the Mayor of Beijing, Mr. Xitong Cheng. They reached agreement on a 
50 %: 50 %equal partnership for a joint venture. They signed a JV agreement on the 
22nd May 1987. At that time, all Chinese colour CRTs were imported from foreign 
countries using valuable foreign exchange. Production of CRTs is a very complex 
industry. It needs high technology and equipment to produce colour CRTs. 
Therefore, the Matsushita company has 140 projects in the form of technical 
assistance. BMCC was Matsushita Co.'s initial joint venture company, established on 
the gth of September 1987." (The answer from a Japanese) 
"The establishment of BMCC was jointly proposed by the leaders of Beijing 
Municipal Government and Matsushita Electric Company of Japan. They wished to 
set up such a joint venture enterprise to develop an advanced enterprise with a strong 
competitive capacity in the world market, so as to provide domestic and international 
markets with a large number of fine qualities CPTs, produced with first rate 
technology, and give a strong momentum to the development of China's TV 
industry. We think that to make a careful study of advanced technology we need the 
management of Matsushita Electric Company, and especially its experience in 
personnel training. With ten guiding principles, BMCC will try its best to produce an 
army of staff who are morally good and technically qualified. In today's world no 
nation can develop rapidly and fully unless it communicates and co-operates with 
other nations. The establishment of BMCC has provided a good opportunity for 
Chinese and Japanese to learn from each other. China and Japan have different 
national and social characteristics and a diverse historical and cultural background, 
but both share trust and understanding in the management of BMCC." (The answer 
from a Chinese) 
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5.3. Case Three: Tianjin NEC Electronics & Communications Co., Ltd (TJNEC) 
NEC supplied its first NEAX61 public switching system in China to Tianjin in 1985 and since 
then, has supplied its sophisticated switching systems, optical transmission systems and radio 
transmission systems throughout China. In 1992, NEC also established Tianjin NEC Electronics 
& Communications Industry Co., Ltd. (TJNEC), a manufacturing and marketing subsidiary for 
the switching systems. As a major supplier of telecommunications systems in Tianjin and other 
cities in China, NEC believes they have made a significant contribution to the construction of a 
solid telecommunications infrastructure in Tianjin. The researcher interviewed three from the top 
management level of TJNEC in Tianjin. Data was also collected from this company, including 
the Annual Report, a TJNEC Guide, and news reports about TJNEC. Further details are as 
follows. 
5.3.1. Background and Research Approach 
NEC, ranked forty-seventh in Fortune magazine's annual Global 500 survey, is Japan's fourth 
largest manufacturer by non-consolidated sales. Since 1972 NEC has established and developed 
its business in communications, computers and electron devices in China, and has seen annual 
sales grow to over 150 billion yen. The first NEC-China JV company was established in 1989. 
By 1997, every one of NEC's main products in China (semiconductors, digital switching 
systems, optical communications systems, mobile communications equipment, computers and 
software) was being produced domestically in China. As a result, NEC's overall investment in 
China stands at approximately 200 billion yen. The company employs 5,000 people with 14 JV 
compames, making it the largest Japanese corporation operating in China. In 1996, NEC 
established "NEC (China) Co., Ltd.", a holding company to manage all of NEC's Chinese 
business. NEC China is responsible for future investment in newly established subsidiaries in 
China. In TJNEC, with a capital of US $64 million, 35% is held by NEC, 10% is held by the 
Sumitomo Corporation, and the other 55% is held by the Tianjin Zhonghuan Computer 
corporation and the Tianjin Local Telephone Bureau. 
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The researcher visited the company on two occasions: once to the head office for interviews 
totalling about three hours; once to the factory for an interview of about three hours. The 
following issues were considered: 
1) Motivation and background to this investment 
2) Reasons for the choice of partners and details of negotiations 
3) Main points of co-operation: total investment capital; composition of the board of 
directors; management structure; duration of co-operation; management transfer; other 
stipulations. 
" 4) Production and marketing 
5) Labour and training 
6) Operation, decision and performance 
7) Interference by local government 
8) Conflicts arising from cultural and organisational differences 
5.3.2. An Illustrative Case Study 
Tianjin NEC Electronics & Communications Industry Co., Ltd (TJNEC) has more than 600 
employees. There are 18 Japanese staff working in managerial and technical positions. The Chair 
of the Board of Directors is Chinese and the President is Japanese. Production at TJNEC started 
on 1st January 1992. All employees have a high educational level. Most are graduates from 
professional colleges. Most of the management staff have a university degree or a degree from 
university level college. The main business of TJNEC is producing, selling, setting up, and 
maintaining NEAX61 digital switching apparatus, and at the same time, providing professional 
training and system development on the NEAX61. This product has been used in about ten 
provinces in Northern China, and has improved communications systems of this area. 
5.4. Case Four: Beijing Taka-Q Leimeng Fashion Co., Ltd (BTQLF) 
Japanese companies have been successful in Asia. One reason is the support of top management. 
Both Chinese and Japanese believe that using Japanese-style management is important to ensure 
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competitiveness. Both sides want Japanese-style management methods transferred to JAEs in 
China. Follow up questions includes: "What kind of Japanese-style management methods have 
been transferred to JAEs in China?" "How do .Japanese-style management methods transfer to 
China?" "Are there any contlicts under cross-cultural management in JAEs in China?" and 
"What are the problems that exist in the process of transferring Japanese-style management 
methods to JAEs in China?" The following case study offers some insights into the processes 
that actually take place. 
5.4.1. Research Approach 
Since a large amount of Japanese direct investment in China has been concentrated in the textile 
and fashion industries, the researcher chose a JAE in the fashion industry in Beijing for an in-
depth case study, including face to face interviews. Six from the top management level were 
interviewed, including two Japanese and four Chinese managers. Altogether, the researcher 
visited the company on five occasions, twice to the head office for interviews totalling about six 
hours; once to the factory for an interview of about three hours; once to the workshop for a tour 
while talking to various managers and workers; and once to the fashion shop for another tour 
while talking to managers and saleswomen. In addition, documents were consulted, including 
the Annual Report, a company guide, rules concerning labour and wages, and plans for and 
reports of management skills training. The following issues were also considered: 
1) Motivation and background to the investment 
2) Reasons for the choice of partners and details of negotiations 
3) Main points of co-operation: total investment capital; composition of the board of 
directors; management structure; duration of co-operation; management transfer; other 
stipulations. 
4) Production and marketing 
5) Labour and training 
6) Operation, decision and performance 
7) Interference by local government 
8) Conflicts arising from cultural and organisational differences 
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5.4.2. An Illustrative Case Study 
This Sino-Japanese Joint Venture fashion company was established in September 1992. Its total 
investment is Japanese Yen 1.3bn (equivalent to US $13m). The registered capital is Yen 0.7bn 
(US '$7m). The Chinese side invested 30%, and Japanese 70% of the total. There are 900 
employees, and an annual output of 510,000 garments of all kinds, with 65 % of the total 
production being exported. This company is an integrated business, which includes teclmology 
development, production, marketing and trading. It has a fashion factory and a retail shop. The 
aim of the company is, through Sino-Japanese economic and technical co-operation, to utilise 
advanced production technology and management know-how, including experience of 
marketing, to establish and develop a production base and marketing network, and thereby 
generate profits. At the same time, it intends to use high quality products, fair prices and good 
service to increase the competitiveness of the company in the world market, and expand overseas 
trade. 
The Chinese parent of this JV Company, established in 1961, is the largest clothing production 
company in the Beijing fashion industry, and comprises 176 factories with 48,000 employees. 
Not only does it lead in size, but it is also regarded as a leader in fashion design, production, 
research, education and marketing. Its annual output is about 40m garments of all kinds. The 
parent company is one of the best-known fashion companies in China. It has abundant 
experience in the fashion business and the high-class workmanship of its many factories over a 
long history means it enjoys a high reputation locally. There are a number of Japanese partners in 
the JV Company, including well-known companies such as ltoh Commerce Co., Ltd. The main 
parent company is a leading company in Japanese fashion industrial circles, one of the largest 
commercial groups holding many famous brands throughout the world. It has 500 factories and 
shops in Japan and many subsidiary companies overseas. 
The JV Company had already been in business for three years, employing Japanese-style 
management skills from the outset. These skills have been codified through the company's 
"Japanese-style Management Skills Training Programme", and the discussion, which 110\\ 
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follows, was derived from responses obtained from the Managing Director, Deputy Director and 
other managers in this company. 
6. Summary 
A general description of the current questionnaire and case studies is as gtven above. More 
details about the current investigation are in Appendix I and 11. The in-depth analysis will be 
provided in Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine. A summary of some main points in the current 
investigation is noted below. 
6.1. The parent companies are big employers but the JAEs are small 
In the current sample, 46% of Chinese parent companies employ more than 500 people, while 
31% have less than 500 employees; about 45% of the Japanese parent companies employ more 
than 500 employees, and 40% less than 500. Among these the largest companies of over 1,000 
employees account for 37% of Chinese parents and 33% of Japanese parents (see Tables 6-10 
and 6-11 above for more details). On the other hand, most of the current sample are small 
enterprises: 82 % of the total have under 500 employees, and only 14 % have over 500. 
Especially noteworthy is the fact that 23 % have fewer than 50 employees. 
Yamamoto carried out a questionnaire survey entitled "Training Plan for Technical and Local 
Employees in Japanese Overseas Subsidiaries" in April 1981 1, which was sent to Japanese 
subsidiaries in Taiwan, Indonesia and the Philippines. Comparing this with the current sample 
reveals (Table 5-16 above) that JAE employees in China are fewer than in Taiwan or Indonesia, 
and only slightly larger than in the Philippines. Figure 1 shows the details as follows. 
98 
Chapter Five 
Figure 5-1: Numbers of employees in Asian JAEs 
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6.2. Cash is the main type of Japanese investment in China 
About 90% of respondents in the current survey stated that the Japanese partner had invested 
cash in the enterprises. 44% and 31% stated that the Japanese had invested machinery & 
equipment and know-how respectively. This includes some respondents who indicated the use of 
cash and other means or investment. By contrast, 57%, 44% and 30% of the Chinese had used 
cash or buildings and site use rights as their investment modes (see Table 15 in Appendix I). 
Why did Japanese use cash as the main investment mode in China? It appears from the above 
that the main investment form in JAEs is cash, but in fact this cash has often been used to buy 
production equipment and to pay for technology transfer. For example, looking at Case One of 
the current case studies, it is indicated that: 
"After Chinese and Japanese collectively examined and discussed the equipment in 
China's domestic market, both sides considered that the technical performance and 
quality of Chinese-made machines was not good enough for the needs of this 
production programme. So the Japanese side suggested that the Chinese and 
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Japanese, after consultation and agreement, import the main production line and key 
machinery from Japan and South Korea." 
The cost of machinery, equipment and technology transfer took 52 % of the total budgetary 
investment in this case (see Case One in Chapter-9 for more details). So we may find that, 
although it is considered "cash", in fact equipment and technology are the real means of 
investment in China. 
Campbell (1987) has stated that the Japanese have always seen China as a long-term 
investment2. Of the Japanese companies covered in his survey, 66% were prepared to subsidise 
an office in China for over 11 years. Most American companies were prepared to wait between 4 
and 6 years only. Furthermore, in the current sample most Japanese (62% of the total) chose a 
co-operation agreement period of 11 -20 years. Over 30 years and under 10 years were 15% and 
17%, respectively while only 6% signed an agreement for 21 - 30 years. 
6.3. Structural Characteristics of JAEs 
The result of the questionnaire shows that the majority of the Chairmen of the Board in JAEs in 
China are Chinese (65 % of the total, see Table 20 in Appendix I). However, what does this 
imply for the remaining 35 %? If they are all Japanese, there is a problem, since, according to 
Chinese Joint Venture Law, the Chairman of a JV should be Chinese and 74 % of the current 
questionnaire survey are Sino-Japanese joint venture companies (see Table 12 in Appendix I). 
This means there are 9 % of JV companies with Chairmen who are not Chinese. This shows that 
not all JV companies have a Chinese Chairman of the Board as they are supposed to have. 
In JAEs, Chinese normally control departments such as personnel, general affairs and the 
secretariat office, while Japanese have paid most attention to the technology and equipment, 
manufacturing, marketing and finance departments. In the current case studies, in Sichuan 
Sanhai Plastics Co., Ltcl, there are only two Japanese, but they are both in important positions: 
one is the General Manager and another is Assistant General Manager (see Case One in Chapter-
9). For another example, in Case Two, the Chairman of the Board is Chinese, and the President 
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is Japanese. The Head of Personnel and General Affairs Departments are Chinese. Japanese 
head all other departments. A chart based on Case Two shows the structure of a .TV below. 
Figure 5-2: Structure of Case Two 
Director of Board 
Chairman & Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors 
Chinese & Japanese Sides Sharing the Position of 
12 Directors for the Board 
I 
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AND 
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Material & Supply Personnel General Affairs Marketing 
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Here we can see some characteristics of the JAE's structure. These is includes 1) more precise 
division of labour; 2) competitive planning; 3) Japanese control of production, technology and 
marketing, and Chinese control of personnel and general affairs; 4) most of the structures of 
JAEs have the stronger Japanese-style characteristics and are very different from Chinese 
enterprises. 
The following gtve a structure companson between three enterprises. One is China state 
enterprise (Lee, 1997), one is BMCC and another one is Japanese-owned enterprise (Lee, 1997): 
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Table 5-18: Structure Comparison between 3 Enterprises of Different Ownership3 
Chinese State Enterprise Sino-.Japanese JV Japanese-Owned 
Enterprise Enterprise 
Total employees 791 Total employees 2450 Total employees 245 
Enterprise leaders 5 Enterprise leaders 4 Enterprise leaders 2 
President' soffice 16 General affairs dept. 20 President's office 1 
Personnel section Personnel dept. 20 Personnel dept. 2 
Wages section 6 Planning & tinance dept 20 Finance dept. 16 
Financial section 11 Production dept. 50 Planning dept. 5 
Management section 11 Engineering dept. 45 General affairs dept. 13 
Technical section 10 Equipment & power dept. 75 Development dept. 9 
Quality section 10 Materials & supplies dept. 20 Computing dept. 110 
Security section 29 Marketing dept. 20 Electronic security 
Administrative section 27 Factory 2176 dept. 36 
Supply section 9 
Pensions office 3 
Labour section 6 
CPC, CCYL * and trade 
union offices 20 
7 branch companies 267 2 branch companies 51 
6 branch factories 311 
* CPC: Community Party of China. CCYL: China Community Youth League. 
After a comparison of the organisation and structure of these three enterprises, we found that the 
Chinese State enterprise has more sections and offices. They have 185 staff working there, 
accounting for 23 % of the total employees. The organisation and structure of the other two 
enterprises are simpler than the Chinese state enterprise, especially in the case of the Japanese-
owned enterprise. It's Computing and Electronic Security Departments are almost like a 
workshop. In fact, they only have six departments and offices, with 48 staff, 20 % of the total 
employees. 
Overall, companng JAEs to Chinese State Enterprises (CSEs), there are many differences, 
including: 
o The JAE main policy is determined by the Board of Directors; in CSEs it is the Director and 
the Enterprise Administration; 
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o The legal person in charge of enterprise in JAEs is the Chair of the Board of Directors; in 
CSEs it is the Director of the enterprise; 
o Managing Directors in JAEs run the enterprise according to the instructions of the Board of 
Directors; in CSEs they have the responsibility and right to control and operate the enterprise 
by themselves; 
o CSEs use a system of Enterprise Director responsibility, but JAEs use a system of Board of 
Directors responsibility. 
Notes 
1. Yamamoto, T ( 1985), "Training Plans for Technology and Local Staff of Overseas Subsidiaies", 
Special Research about Enterprise Internationalisation, Nagoya: Nagoya University Press, in 
Japanese. 
2. Campbell, N (1987), "Japanese Business Strategy in China", Long Range Planning, Vol.20, No. 5, 
pp69-73. 
3. This chart was made by the researcher, one case being from the researcher's investigations, and the 
other two from Li, P. (1997), "A Comparison Study for Work Attitude of Chinese and Japanese 
Employees in Enterprise" (Zhongri Qiye Zhigong Laodong Yishi de Bijiao Yanjiu), Management 
World (Guanli Shijie), Vol. 70, No. I, 1997, in Chinese. 
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Chapter Six 
Findings 11: The Chinese Perspective 
1. Introduction 
This chapter outlines the Chinese perspective upon these ventures from a number of different 
angles. It nevertheless employs the same theoretical comparisons further. In particular, because 
there were more Chinese respondents, and these ventures were China-based, it pursues the same 
issues in slightly more depth, and with greater elaboration, in order to accentuate their 
distinctively Chinese features. Of the 71 Chinese respondents to the questionnaire, 61 came from 
Sino-Japanese joint ventures and 10 came from wholly Japanese owned ventures; the ten 
Chinese managers in the case studies were all from Sino-Japanese joint ventures. 
2. Motives 
As Table 9 in Appendix I reveals, the main differences between CJV and WJV response rankings 
appeared thus: 
Table 6- 1: Rankings of importance for JDI in China (Chinese responses) 
Factors CJV WJV 
Technology and equipment 74% 20% 
Management skill 51% 0 
Marketing 46% 20% 
Strong reputation 39% 0 
Finance and economy 26% 0 
Patent rights and trade marks 16% 0 
Other 16% 0 
Access to key materials 5% 0 
Note : CJV : Chinese-Japanese Joint Ventures, WJV : Wholly Japa nese Owned Ventures . 
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Although the comparisons are limited it is useful to note the imp011ance assigned to "technology 
and equipment" and "marketing" from the Chinese perspective. The specific reasons for seeking 
Japanese investment appeared thus: 
Table 6- 2: Why did the Chinese seek Japanese partners? 
Factors CJV WJV 
Labour costs 84% 90% 
Market attraction 80% 70% 
State policy 64% 80% 
Raw material costs 49% 50% 
International strategy 51% 40% 
International competition 28% 20% 
Other 10% 10% 
A voidance of trade friction 3% 10% 
Thus, while both valued cheap labour highly, other differences were apparent, as with the WJV's 
high ranking of state policy, particularly regarding labour and tax rebates. The partisan nature of 
the responses puts its own slant upon such results, since Chinese staff may well have only 
limited jurisdiction over such matters, and may only reflect Chinese perceptions of what 
Japanese partners had sought. 
2.1. Economy and Finance 
Despite the limited range of responses this was important to some Chinese for the following 
reasons: 
Attracting funds: Funds shortages have been relatively common throughout China, 
particularly where technology upgrading is concerned, and the state had deliberately restricted 
the funding available for such purposes in Case Two for example, until the joint venture with 
Matsushita was formed. 
Preferential policy: Before 1995, JV enterprises could use the preferential policy, which not 
only offered to foreigners, but also to Chinese partners, benefits such as exemption from 
taxation. Even after 1995, when parts of the preferential policy were withdrawn from coastal 
areas, the inland area and other special industries still used this to attract joint ventures 1• 
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2.2. Technology 'fransfcr 
The second Chinese motive involved accessmg more advanced technologies, which can be 
considered in five particular respects: 
2.2.1. Chinese technology improvement 
All Chinese respondents believed Japanese technology was an improvement on the other 
alternatives then available. Not only was this apparent in both Case Two and Three which have 
imported comparatively advanced technology from Matsushita and NEC. In Case Three this 
concerned the NEAX61 figural switching systems, which were not only used in Tianjin, but the 
whole ofNorth China, radically improving communication standards. 
2.2.2. Market access in exchange for technology 
For the Chinese State any policy which offers the Japanese market access in exchange for 
technology upgrading could have certain potential advantages. Although national statistics show 
that over half of JAE outputs were being exported into the international market2, many were still 
being sold domestically. In certain Chinese markets, such as soft drinks, cosmetics and 
electronics, it was difficult to find any significant Chinese brands3. According to a Chinese 
manager from Case Two: 
"We produce colour kinescope, a product which almost completely occupies the 
market in its field, deliberately leaving little room for others." 
2.2.3. Technology assessment 
It is commonly considered that most technology transferred to China is already long established 
in Japan. However, it is interesting to note that among Chinese Managers interviewed. many 
considered their technology advanced. This is indeed puzzling, but on further consideration. 
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what Chinese managers called advanced, to other nationals actually is not, thereby reflecting 
different standards. Those managers interviewed were often managing the import of technology, 
so if they acknowledged that this was not fully sophisticated, they might consider their own work 
backward too, and thus potentially lose "face". 
2.2.4. Copyright 
Some Japanese believed that the Chinese do not understand or respect the principle of copyright. 
But these Chinese managers considered that they were still adjusting to this. In the begi1ming of 
China's "open door" policy, many Chinese did not follow copyright, since their laws and 
regulations were then inadequate. Certain Japanese suspect that, once technology is transferred, 
methods will soon spread outside, even when factories come under the state, because of the 
popular Chinese view that "what belongs to them, belongs to us also". However, the situation 
regarding property rights is changing. A Chinese manager from Case Three therefore remarked 
that: 
"It is now vastly improved, we have competent laws and regulations regarding this 
matter and the sense of copyright among the people is being strengthened. Following 
China's economic reform, competition between enterprises is increasing. The 
situation called sharing technology is becoming rarer." 
Some Chinese otherwise regard behind Japanese reluctance to transfer advanced technology as 
an excuse for making their enterprises less competitive than they potentially could be. 
2.2.5. Japanese conservatism 
Although Chinese managers from both Case Two and Three considered there was advanced 
technology transfer, they still considered the Japanese to be conservative about it. A Chinese 
manager from Case Four also said: 
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"When our technical staff were trained in Japan they found the Japanese willing to 
teach general technique, but when asked about some specific techniques, they were 
reluctant to give any precise answer, or else said they needed this agreed by a top 
manager, and thus mildly refused." 
2.3. Management Know-how 
Chinese managers thought that Japanese management know-how was readily accepted where 
cultural similarities were recognized. For instance, in Cases Two, Three and Four, special 
management activities like morning and evening meetings and chanting company slogans were 
found. Such morning and evening meetings revived memories of the Cultural Revolution, when 
Chinese workers would wait for instructions, or report their progress to a picture of Chairman 
Mao. This suggests certain ritual similarities, even in such Japanese management methods as 
"Ringi", a classical Chinese State management method. 
2.4. International Market Channels 
Access to the international market appeared important to the Chinese. Not only has the state 
encouraged JV enterprise sales to international markets, but those enterprises maintain they 
could penetrate such markets further. In all the establishments visited Chinese managers 
appeared eager to supply the researcher with details about their international sales. Any such 
attempt to gain "face" shows how well regarded international market was. 
2.5. Patent Rights and Trademarks 
There are two sides to this. Using a foreign patent right and trademark is a great advantage to 
access markets. On the other hand, when foreign trademarks take over, there could be less scope 
for purely Chinese national trademarks. A Chinese manager from Case Two said: 
"In some industries, foreign trade marks dominated most markets. There are two 
choices for the Chinese in these industries; either refuse JV formations, and be 
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squeezed out of the market by foreign products, the so-called 'waiting for death'; or 
form a JV enterprise, and make new trademarks, the so-called 'looking for death'." 
QUESTIONS TESTED 
The Chinese objective was to acquire Japanese teclmology, funds, management know-how and 
industrial property rights. Their method was to attract more Japanese investment into China by 
means of market access, low cost labour, and raw materials. China's extensive product markets, 
preferential policies, low cost labour and raw materials thereby became locational advantages. In 
having ownership advantage, the Japanese are persuaded to set up their JVs, and hold 
internalisation advantages to avoid market imperfections. For Questions 1, 2 and 3, results were 
thus: 
Ql: It appears that accessing cheap labour, resources and the market were the key motives for 
the Japanese, while the Chinese sought to gain management know-how, technology and 
capital. The Chinese in effect used market access, low cost labour and raw materials in 
exchange for Japanese technology, capital and management know-how. As such both 
sides could potentially derive benefits from investing in a joint venture. The urgent need 
for capital, technology, and management know-how made China increase collaboration 
with Japan through joint ventures. From questionnaires and Case Studies, the Chinese 
managers appeared to favour technology and management know-how transfers. 
Q2: The predicted Chinese and Japanese motives were basically appropriate. Japan needed to 
transfer and use its surplus funds and its mature technology, while China needed foreign 
capital, technology and management know-how for its self-development. Because of their 
different economic development stages, their respective motives for joint venturing 
differed. With regard to its own state policies, the Chinese advantaged the Japanese in 
pursuit of funds and technology, while the Japanese were advantaged by preferential 
policies. 
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Q3: The Chinese market still enjoyed highest priority, closely followed by low-cost labour. 
Because Japan had a better financial base, it could gain by international market 
expansion. The differing motives of the Japanese and Chinese would create scope for 
potential conflicts, where one cannot fulfil what the other is seeking. The Japanese were 
unwilling to transfer their most advanced technology and increase access into 
international markets. At the same time, China may not yet itself offer all the market 
access the Japanese hoped, while coastal region labour costs many well increase, and 
state policy may discriminate less in their favour. 
3. Partner Selection 
Compared with the Japanese, the Chinese were more passive in partner selection, for all its 
importance to joint venture success. The issues driving Chinese partner selection were thus: 
Table 6-3: Initial business contact 
CJV WJV 
Other 41% 20% 
Introduction through embassy I similar organisation 28% 0 
Chinese business delegation in Japan 18% 20% 
Trade exhibition or technology fair 18% 10% 
Direct Chinese solicitation of parent company 8% 10% 
Hired consultant 7% 0 
Table 6-4. How did the Japanese monitor and analyse the Chinese market? 
CJV WJV 
Consultants in China 48% 40% 
Trips to China to meet officials/end-users 44% 50% 
Consultants in Japan 18% 30% 
Representative office in China 28% 10% 
Other 15% 20% 
Consultants in Hong Kong 8% 0 
Japanese-language business publications 7% 0 
Chinese-language business publications 3% 0 
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Surprisingly, most firms choose, or end up usmg, other channels to make initial business 
contacts. These other channels may have recognizable historical links between business 
associates, networking within the business community, and means for effective introductions and 
recommendations from business associates. The WJV responses were nevertheless rather sparse. 
possibly because many Chinese managers would not know how presidents made first contact. 
and were themselves only recruited later. 
The methods of monitoring and analysing the Chinese market were based around consultants in 
China and face-to-face meetings with officials or end-users. Many Japanese prefer more direct 
methods of obtaining information, while discriminating between primary over secondary 
sources. 
3.1. Geographical proximity I familiarity 
The coastal and the northern areas of China, especially the North East, were main sites for 
Japanese firms, having long established connections where older generations may still speak 
Japanese and have proven experience in dealing with them. For example, after the Second World 
War, many Japanese children orphaned in China were brought up by Chinese families in this 
area, and although some returned to Japan after 1979, they may still favour this part of China for 
developing business links. Such longstanding connections enable the business community of 
North East China to appear more receptive to the Japanese. In terms of initial business contacts. 
37% of Chinese respondents replied "other", which included "friends", "other company 
introductions" (see Table 1 0). 
3.2. Economic base 
A main focus concerned revolving fund sources. From eight hypothetical possibilities results 
show that most revolving funds were offered by the Japanese parent company ( 49%) with 
Chinese parents contributing only 17% (see Table 23). The other sources that offered 22% for 
revolving funds included mostly enterprise-generated profits. The Japanese have a wider range 
of revolving fund sources when choosing their Chinese partner, while the Chinese considered 
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themselves disadvantaged in this respect. In all four cases researched, the Japanese firms were 
considered to have started from a more secure economic base, such as Matsushita, NEC and 
Taka-Q. 
3.3. Technology 
Here results collated in Table 24 show that Production Technology was the most common 
teclmology imported from Japan (77%), followed by Operating Machinery (58%) and Production 
Design (30%, compared with a Japanese response of 70%). Despite alleged Japanese 
unwillingness, this table reveals that 13% of Chinese responses considered Research and 
Development type technology had been transferred from Japan, whereas the Japanese response 
was 40%. Chinese managers from the Case Studies emphasised the importance of technology in 
partner selection. In Cases Two and Three, the Chinese believed they chose Matsushita and NEC 
because of their advanced technology, which would upgrade their own production level. Even 
though such Chinese companies did not necessarily receive the full level of technology they were 
hoping for, it was still a large improvement upon their existing technology. 
3.4. Management know-how 
In partner selection, management know-how was influential. Most responses (84%) showed how 
the Chinese admired Japanese management know-how (see Table 25). This was also evident in 
all the case studies. Also, for many Chinese, Japanese management methods were easier to 
accept than Western ones, given their respective cultural similarities. The methods concerned 
primarily consist of TQC, QCC, SS and Kanban4. These were already known by the Chinese 
from books, journals, and suchlike before. When forming JV s, the Chinese sought hands-on 
experience with the Japanese, something they could not always get from other sources. In Case 
Four the Chinese chose Taka-Q Company not only because of investment, but also their well-
respected management skills and training methods. 
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3.5. Reputation 
Another factor for the Chinese selecting the Japanese, concerned company reputation. Chinese 
managers from Cases Two and Three all indicated that they were attracted to Matsushita in the 
television industry and NEC in communication control because both could claim excellent 
reputations. 
QUESTIONS TESTED 
The factors affecting partner selection of the Chinese are similar to their motives for joint 
venturing. While the Japanese possess "ownership", and the Chinese "location" advantages 
regarding partner selection, neither could individually combine ownership and location 
advantages together at a low cost, but they could joint venture to reduce costs. Questions 4 and 5 
are tested as below. 
Q4: This helps explain how Japanese priorities and Chinese priorities were slightly different 
regarding the economic base, technology, and management know-how, although 
historical and relationship influences were less important than expected. 
QS: State and partner relationships are more sensitive for Japanese than Chinese pminers. 
While some Chinese partners also sought good relationships with their own local state 
government they still attach limited importance to them. It cannot be said that the 
Chinese value relationships very much more than other factors, especially where leading 
economic and technological factors were concerned, for these were also considered 
crucial too. 
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4. Control and Conflict 
Control and conflict issues appeared thus: 
4.1. Control 
Shared control is generally perceived as meaning both partners exert control together. In reality 
each partner exerts specialised control. Here control has been further divided into ownership, 
leadership, human resource management and strategic resourcing. 
Table 6-5: Control over main department 
CJV WJV 
Chinese Japanese Chinese Japanese 
Personnel department 92% 8% 70% 20% 
Financial department 87% 21% 50% 50% 
General affairs 79% 2% 60% 40% 
Marketing department 67% 43% 30% 60% 
Manufacturing department 62% 49% 30% 70% 
Technology & equipment department 39% 49% 10% 70% 
Secretariat 66% 8% 30% 10% 
Other 15% 5% 0 0 
Note: Certain responses show some departments controlled by both partners, and some respondents do 
not identify any department, hence the percentage cannot add up to I 00%. 
With most staff being Chinese, it is expected that the Personnel and General Affairs department 
is managed by Chinese, while some smaller ventures may have no Japanese staff at all. In 
general the Japanese exerted more control over marketing, manufacturing and technology & 
equipment in both types of venture. However, even though the Japanese had particular expertise 
in such areas, certain ventures still appoint a Chinese director for these departments. 
4.1.1. Ownership 
The Chinese have been reluctant to limit foreign ownership where this would mean greater 
Chinese investment instead, and even then the other partner could still control technology and 
products, and gain more power accordingly. For instance, NEC only held 35% of Shougang-
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NEC in its early stages, but as it progressed it increased ownership up to 51%5, because the 
Chinese were unable to uphold their ownership stake. A Chinese manager fi"om Case Three 
judged that: 
"If the Japanese have the better half of the ownership, they will put much more 
effort into making it successful as they have more at stake." 
4.1.2. Headship 
Top managers of both partners control management in any JV company. But the partner with 
most knowledge, skill, experience and understanding of headship may dominate. This is evident 
from two cases. In Case One, the Board of Directors consisted of 7 Directors, 3 Chinese and 4 
Japanese, with Chinese as Chairperson and Japanese as a Vice-Chairperson. One General 
Manager was nominated by the Japanese and a Vice General Manager by the Chinese. In Case 
Two, there were 12 directors, 6 Chinese, 6 Japanese6. The situation of the Chairperson and the 
General Manager in this case was the same as in Case One. Normally the Chinese will prefer to 
take the Chair of the Board of Directors, even if this means holding several other jobs at the 
same time. The views of the Chinese case study managers about headship were thus: 
"Often they will find they have not enough time to devote themselves fully to being 
chairperson. When this occurs their power may well be taken from them, leaving them 
with only the name." (Case Two) 
"Some members of the Board of Directors do not have a full understanding of how to 
manage a JV. So they cannot control or supervise JV operations." (Case Three) 
"Some key managers are still using state enterprise management methods from habit, 
although there are more advanced methods available. They cannot fully comprehend the 
Japanese style, therefore they cannot manage the JAEs." (Case Four) 
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4.1.3. Human resources management 
Who determines the main policies in JAEs? While this question is not easy to answer, many 
respondents believed the JAE itself determined these in the five key decision areas identified. 
Tables 21-A to 21-D show that most respondents considered the main policy was determined by 
the JAE itself. Responses about the five decision areas were thus: 
Table 6-6: Main policy area determined by JAEs 
Increase or reduction of staff 
Annual budget 
Production plans 
Output and profit targets 
Product pricing 
72% 
68% 
64% 
57% 
54% 
This suggests that JAEs have most decision-making power in personnel affairs. Although 
Personnel Departments were controlled by Chinese, some Japanese first exerted control when 
selecting key employees beforehand. The chosen employees were typically considered young, 
energetic and/or with high qualifications. Many Chinese managers considered that even though 
they controlled most recruitment, that of the key managers had to be finalised through the 
Japanese. The key managers appointed were often Japanese, while the salary and fringe benefits 
of any foreign employee could be considered to exceed that of the Chinese ten-fold. 
4.1.4. Strategic resourcing 
The Chinese will argue that the Japanese are not transferring their most advanced technology, 
and are reluctant to fully explore R & D opportunities. Cases Two, Three and Four all lack 
sophisticated R&D Departments. Normally R&D is carried out in the Japanese parent company. 
A Chinese manager from Case Three typically asserted: 
"All international marketing channels in the JAEs are under the Japanese parent 
company's control. Hence us Chinese will never thoroughly understand the 
international marketing situation - such as price changes and variations in market 
demand." 
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4.2. Conflict 
Here, it was found that contrasting cultural backgrounds underscored possible conflicts, even 
though there were similar values. The main potential bases for conflict are now discussed. 
Table 6-7. Barriers to importing Japanese management methods 
CJV WJV 
Different economic & business systems 51% 30% 
Different cultures & traditions 34% 30% 
Different political & social systems 26% 10% 
Mutual language barriers 25% 30% 
Low education level of Chinese employees 16% 10% 
Other 7% 0 
Poor co-operation between C & J staff 2% 10% 
The Chinese respondents from WJVs therefore believed that the differences between economic 
and business systems, culture and traditions and respective language, constituted a sliding scale 
of problems. However CJV respondents ranked misfit between economic and business systems 
most problematic. WJVs respondents were reluctant to acknowledge these political and social 
systems differences, which have long been sensitive topics in China. 
4.2.1. Political system 
A Chinese existing in a socialist and a Japanese existing in a capitalist system encounter two 
opposing limitations. The former may allow limited opposition towards workplace management 
but little regarding the state. Of all the choices offered to respondents only "unstable political 
situation" obtained no answers (see Table 36). Considering this questionnaire was carried out in 
China by a Chinese researcher, respondents shared some misgivings. Many Japanese also 
appreciated this, and took this same line, and so did not answer at all. Chinese workers have 
often been told they are the "masters" of their enterprise, but realise that neither they nor their 
managers own that enterprise, giving them scope to criticize the manager's authority when they 
do not agree. By contrast they would consider many Japanese workers more compliant. 
especially because of lifetime employment and seniority system. Therefore. many Chinese are 
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less accustomed to Japanese respect for hierarchy, particularly the way the top management 
treats subordinates, while the Japanese are unaccustomed to challenges from the Chinese 
workers. A Chinese manager from Case Two indicated that: 
"There are some conflicts in BMCC. For example, 'obey' in Chinese company 
is "not absolute"; some workers will not obey in time, if they don't like to do 
something, usually they are against their managers. But, to 'obey' in a Japanese 
company is 'absolute'; nobody opposes their manager in work time. So the first 
problem is how to let the Chinese staff understand the meaning of 'obey', and 
how they should 'obey' in their work time." 
4.2.2. Economic property 
Given different understandings about ownership, certain other differences arise. For example, a 
Chinese manager from Case Four observed his Japanese colleagues thus: 
"Before and after the working day, the Japanese manager always goes to the 
photocopying machine and confirms that the number of photocopies done in 
the morning checks with the number of the previous day. This is to prevent 
employees benefiting from the machine for their own sake." 
This indicates the detail to which some Japanese managers will go. Another Chinese manager 
from Case Two said: 
"When our Chinese staff went to the training course in Japan, they found they 
were not allowed to use the company telephone for personal matters. For this 
they would have to use a pay phone outside. In China usually, taking advantage 
of office equipment for personal matters is acceptable." 
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4.2.3. Culture 
Two illustrative problems were apparent. One was the language barrier and the other the 
Japanese tradition of removing shoes both at the workplace and at home. Many Chinese feel 
uncomfortable when obliged to follow this Japanese tradition in their workplace. It also limits 
the Chinese understanding of workplace rules. Many respondents considered that problems arose 
from the language barrier (see Tables 37 and 38). "Mamafufuism" translated literally from 
Chinese means "ma ma hu !m", "ma" or horse and "hu" or tiger, so that linking them together 
makes both appear in the same light; stating that they are both mammals makes them no different 
from one another. This phrase, although exaggerated, implies that the Chinese are natively crude 
and inaccurate. It actually contains several different meanings: careless - in action; estimated 
and/or unclear in understanding. For the Japanese however, we can see a contrasting trait, being 
keen to appear articulate and precise, both at work and at home. 
In JAEs, differences in the interpretation of rules and regulations exemplify contrasting traits. As 
a Chinese manager from Case Four said: 
"Each point listed in the contract will be precisely followed to the letter by the 
Japanese employee, whereas the Chinese will try to bend it somehow for it to 
work to their advantage, but at the same time still achieving the same result." 
Of course "ma ma hu hu" may restrict work, but when trying to establish a good business 
relationship, "mamafufuism" can be considered necessary to avoid being too frank and upsetting 
to the other party, thus spoiling the relationship. An old Chinese saying is used to describe this 
situation, "If the water is too clear, there will be no fish; if a person is too perfect, he/she will 
have no friends." 
4.2.4. Social factors 
Both parties forming the .JAEs are bound by ties, but those ties may change later. For the 
Japanese it is "Shaen", meaning societal ties, consisting of those within their sphere of in11uence. 
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For the Chinese it is more community or blood ties, consisting of those only within the "family" 
group. When two partners are working together, the Japanese form into groups based on those 
within the company, as if they all follow the same direction, the same proverbial "way of mind", 
the same type of obedience. The Chinese may also form an apparently similar group, but within 
this there may be several smaller sub-groups, each with a different basis, in which they seek to 
be inquisitive, to question an order, to speak their mind. A Chinese manager from Case Three 
said: 
"Normally, Chinese employees used to ask questions when managers let them 
do something, but this greatly vexes the Japanese managers, who are only used 
to giving orders, without explaining them. This is because in Japanese firms, 
when the manager says something the employee will follow, they do not like to 
be questioned." 
This difference causes some Japanese managers to react abruptly to Chinese employees, who 
then raise complaints about their so-called "appalling treatment", as they consider it more 
acceptable to question an order. 
4.2.5. Personal custom 
The Chinese managers were impressed with the efficiency and swiftness of the Japanese 
employees. This was evident in the Japanese parent companies, where work was considered 
efficient, and conducted with a sense of urgency, including physically running to and fro 
between destinations. On the contrary, some Chinese employees from JAEs are used to working 
to a slower, more relaxed pace, following the Chinese custom about working in a more sedate 
manner. These contradictions in social "personalities" can be defined as: the Japanese custom is 
to have a more urgent disposition, whereas the Chinese customarily observe steady pace. 
Chinese history values perseverance, having maintained their existence by agriculture, through 
long and tedious routine work, where energy is expended equally throughout the day. From an 
early age, the Chinese considered they coped with long periods of hard labour throu.gh 
preserYing their energy. The .Japanese often complain of Chinese employees' lack of precision in 
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their work and lack of punctuality. But in the Chinese view, the Japanese are obsessive by being 
attentive to everything, down to trivial details. For example, a Chinese manager from Case One 
said: 
"A timetable which is drawn by Japanese will be detailed down to the exact 
minute. The Chinese feel that when every minute is being dictated to, the 
person will have to become a machine or robot to comply." 
Another Japanese custom is an ever polite and ambiguous manner. They rarely give a sharp or 
straightforward refusal to colleagues of the same rank, they will perhaps apologise for the 
inconvenience or else appear seemingly hesitant. On such occasions, the Chinese will often 
interpret that as what it seems- a hesitation- and may still try to influence any given answer. 
QUESTIONS TESTED 
To control is also to risk conflict. When just one side seeks dominance it may disturb the whole 
venture. The success of joint ventures could come under threat due to opposing wills. The test 
results of questions 6, 7, 8 and 9 are as follows. 
Q6: Ownership leads towards control, but control cannot solely depend on ownership, for 
whoever has the most skill, knowledge and experience can exert control too. In that 
sense, the Japanese could assume more control and they are more likely to be nominated 
President of the venture. The Chinese however, are not content with the more passive role 
of Chairperson of the Board of Directors, and also believe the Japanese obstruct 
international market understanding. 
Q7: There is little evidence directly supporting this question. JAEs often have Human 
Resources Departments (see Table 21-E) headed by Chinese, although even then they 
still believe the Japanese can determine key management appointments. However, much 
decision-making in JAEs is self-contained and the Japanese gain pm1icular control 
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through ownership and strategic resourcing; hence, even in JVs the Chinese exert limited 
control- more so in WJVs where the Chinese do not claim ownership at all. 
Q8: Much evidence supports this. Socialist and Capitalist conventions about freedom of 
speech alone accentuate conflicting views and can provoke resentment. Contrasting 
views on employee treatment arise from the Japanese respect for hierarchy and the 
Chinese lack of it, or the Chinese respect of state authority and the Japanese criticism of 
it. Even the understanding of property rights creates differences on occasion, although 
Chinese partners also fear lack of information about the international market. 
Q9: This is not proven, although both appreciate Confucian values, there are other values 
besides. The language barrier likewise creates scope for misunderstanding between the 
Japanese and the Chinese. Different traditions arise within JAEs, especially those of the 
Japanese, to which many Chinese are unaccustomed. 
5. Performance 
Responses suggest that production, marketing, technology and management transfer were 
considered performance critical. The most important factor was overall satisfaction, but 
profitability, growth and competitive assessments also influenced how performance was judged. 
5.1. Profitability 
Using the same categories about annual turnover as before, overall profitability was judged 
reasonably satisfactory, as many ventures increased their profit from the previous year. 
Table 6-8. Annual Turnover 
CJV WJV 
Higher than the year before 66% 60% 
Similar turnover 7% 0 
Lower turnover than before 7% 0 
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Table 6-9. Profit 
CJV WJV 
Up to 3% of annual turnover 11% 30% 
3 - 8% of annual turnover 28% 0 
8 - 15% of turnover 11% 10% 
Over 15% of turnover 15% 20% 
Breaking-even 11% 40% 
Small deficit 20% 0 
The relative lack of responses may reflect varying knowledge about ventures' annual turnover. 
The lack of response from WJVs may be explained by Chinese managers subordination in that 
respect. CJVs enjoyed particular advantages over WJV where profit was concerned. A high 
percentage of WJVs (40%) broke even, compared with 11% of CJV's, although no WJV's were 
in deficit. Nevertheless virtually 60% of all ventures were considered profitable. 
Certain Chinese and Japanese responses were similar, although the Japanese believed "annual 
turnover" had increased more. Furthermore, in this research, 72% had reached the full production 
stage7• This was higher than in the China National Statistical Bureau's (CNSB)'s san1ple8 (66%). 
In this research, 63% were considered in profit; 17% break-even; 19% in small deficit; and none 
had a large deficit. The CNSB's study found 57% in profit; 41% were in deficit, of which 30% 
had a small and 10% a large deficit. A study by the Export-Import Bank of Japan showed that 
only 60% of the 483 overseas ventures sampled were profitable. Less than half of all these firms 
showed any cumulative profits since their founding, and 68% had not paid any dividends at all. 
How does this compare with profitability of JAEs in China in the 1990s? A comparison of 
profitability between the current and CNSB's sample is possible. The details are as follows. 
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Figure 6-1: A comparison of profits to turnover between JAEs and FAEs 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 
Percentage in profit 
Thus 63% claim profits, 19% none, and 17% break-even. This performance looks slightly better 
than the Export-Import Bank's survey, where 60% claimed to be in profit. It is also possible to 
compare turnover for the first six months of 1993 and 1994. 65% claimed that the 1994 figures 
were higher, a quarter over 50% higher, 5% either lower or 5 similar, and the remaining 23% did 
not know. 
Chinese responses were less concerned about outside competition, while the Japanese also 
appear more sensitive to the level of profitability than most Chinese, who have little experience 
of its calculation, although "not known" responses existed among both. Although both are 
collectively orientated, the Chinese gravitate towards family, whereas the Japanese appear 
otherwise group-orientated, with more sense of ownership over "their" company. Chinese 
employees are not bound in this sense. Both the Chinese and the Japanese have the tradition of 
"keeping up a good public face". Although both try to "keep face", in all four case studies, the 
Chinese were more likely to place achievements over difficulties, whereas the Japanese focus 
more upon operational and future problems. The Chinese state has long encouraged report or talk 
of good news, while holding back bad news; citizens are officially encouraged to be positive and 
not negative. 
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5.2. Growth 
The Japanese responses regarding the realisation of full production, the marketing region and 
sales in and outside of China, were similar to these Chinese responses. However, there were still 
certain differences thus: 
Table 6-10. Realisation of funi production 
Yes 
No 
Table 6-11. Regional Market 
Chinese market 
Japanese market 
Other markets 
CJV 
79% 
21% 
CJV 
84% 
61% 
44% 
(some respondents made more than one selection) 
WJV 
70% 
20% 
WJV 
40% 
80% 
60% 
Most ventures were thus in full production, CJVs slightly more than WJVs. As expected, the 
main marketing region of WN's was Japanese whereas CJV's produced a mostly domestic 
market, but still with some export outside. 
The Japanese appeared more concerned with future problems over growth itself whereas the 
Chinese were also concerned with future rewards and benefits as well A further point of 
comparison between this sample and the survey CNSB's concerned any intention to increase 
investment, output and type of products thus: 
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Figure 6-2: Comparison of future intentions between JAEs and F AEs 
Withdraw 
Dcurrent 
Static investment 
Increase investment 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 1 00% 
This suggests that the production situation of JAEs was slightly better than that of F AEs in 
general. Therefore, although Japanese investment in China was third ranked overall, their 
prospective business priorities were different. In the CNSB sample, the average agreed capital 
outlay was US $1.76 million, while the actual capital outlay was US $1.64 million. However, 
only in the case of Japan does actual capital outlay virtually match agreed capital outlay, in 
which respect only the UK and Germany stand immediate comparison. Case Two illustrated 
mutual co-operation by China and Japan. In order to produce high quality products, it is 
officially emphasised that advanced production facilities require excellent workers who operate 
them properly and never ignore defects. All production and quality assurance workers were said 
to "extend their untiring efforts to maintain high but consistent quality" . Up to 1996, it had four 
rounds of investment making gross investment seven times the original. After a third production 
line was established, the annual output of Case Two exceeded over US $ 3 billion . 
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5.3. Competitiveness 
Over half the ventures used advertising in China to attract customers. Most respondents indicated 
they had more advantages in the domestic than other Asian markets (see Table 32-A). Overall, 
both the Chinese and the Japanese believed that "high quality" gave advantages. When products 
were compared with Japanese parents, the quality was found to be lower, emphasizing the need 
for continuing improvements. 
In terms of marketing region, 20% sold all their products outside China, with 10% selling them 
in the Japanese domestic market; 20% sold them in the Chinese domestic markets; the rest sold 
their products across markets. A comparison with the CNSB' s sample appears thus: 
Figure 6-3: JAEs and FAEs regional markets compared 
JAEs & JAEs regional markets compared 
All sold in China's market 
Sold by foreigner in China 
Sold by self in China 
All sold in other market 
Sold by foreigner in other m 
Sold by self in other market 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
Percentage of sales 
80% thought their mam advantage in the China market was high quality ; 41% top product 
des ign ; 48% service back-up. In Case Two, quality was a key fac tor. The quali ty of their 
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products was considered to reach international level, as with Matsushita's products in Japan. 
which used the "Panasonic" trademark. Overall: 
1) the Japanese originally paid attention to the Chinese domestic market; 
2) the Japanese control most sales outside China; 
3) high quality, top product design and service back-up were considered mam market 
advantages; and 
4) attention spanned both current sales and future market potential. 
In the Chinese domestic market JAEs took up 77%, in the Japanese domestic market 66%, and 
outside China and Japan 49% (see Table 29). This suggests Japanese firms have a particular local 
market orientation. Two cases demonstrate this. In Case One the feasibility report indicated: 
" products that have a larger market in China. Recently, the requirements 
have already been large, following the oral nutrition, liquid medicine and 
beverage etc, the rapid development in China shows an increasing market there 
in the future." 
In Case Two it was suggested that: 
"In general, about 70% of products are sold to the Chinese market, and another 
30% are exported to foreign countries including Japan, Malaysia, Mexico and 
Indonesia. The main aim of exports is to balance enterprise exchange." 
Exports to Japan and other countries therefore amounted to 66 and 49%. In Case Two 30% 
production was exported outside China and in Case Four 65%. Considered from an economic 
and cultural dimension, the further issues were thus. 
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5.3.1. Economic 
The results suggest that 36% (see Table 28) never used advertising. In general the Chinese 
customarily put less effort into marketing products because they effect to feel modest about their 
efforts, putting on a facade of not being worthy of other's praise. Advertising is seen as seeking 
ways to boast about products, which was once considered against Chinese custom. There is a 
saying in China, "the Emperor's daughter never fears becoming a spinster". This can be referred 
to as another reason for Chinese reluctance to advertise, and a result of state-ownership, which 
eliminated any fear of un-saleable products. Other responses suggested the Chinese prefer 
newspaper advertising (46%), as it often appears the cheapest method, attracts most attention, 
and fits Chinese custom better. 
5.3.2. Cultural 
Both the Chinese and the Japanese may claim to be modest about their talents. For example, even 
though as hosts both will spend time creating a feast for their guests, they will customarily refuse 
any praise for the result. Many Chinese still believe that if the product is good enough it will 
make its own publicity. "Seclusion will not be feared by wine so good" is a customary metaphor 
which indicates the underlying attitude, but 58% still replied that advertising had increased their 
sales (see Table 28). 
5.4. Overall Satisfaction 
Both partners categorise their overall satisfaction as "good" even where further improvements 
were possible. From the results of the questionnaire, all JAEs will continue into the near future, 
but less than half would raise investment. Others would increase the range and volume of 
production instead. Most Chinese believed they would still continue with the same partner. 
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Table 6- 12: Further development intention 
CJV: WJV: 
Increase investment: Yes 57% 60% 
No 43% 40% 
Increase output & range of products Yes 93% 90% 
No 7% 10% 
Continued partnering Yes 93% 0 
Not known 7% 0 
Both therefore attended to increasing output and range of products, however, just over half 
would increase investment, while might imply that other were sufficiently profitable to expand 
without extra capital from outside. Almost all ventures would continue to grow and expand, 
which again implies prospective success. 
In terms of imported Japanese management methods responses were thus: 
Table 6- 13: Imported Japanese management methods 
(Compare between Chinese and Japanese respondents) 
Chinese: 
ss 69% 
QCC 46% 
Enterprise internal welfare system 32% 
Enterprise length of service system 27% 
Other methods 10% 
No import 11% 
Not known 6% 
Japanese: 
80% 
70% 
60% 
50% 
10% 
0 
0 
The Chinese responses therefore appeared less convinced than the Japanese. The Chinese were 
less reasonably satisfied with overall performance. They believed that more results of their 
efforts were being appropriated by the Japanese and that their share of the benefits was smaller. 
Chinese managers often need to explain state policy towards foreign investments to employees 
while bearing certain criticisms in mind. JAEs staff themselves appear satisfied with the overall 
performance, but in recent years those Chinese not connected with JAEs are less convinced. On 
the other hand, when they categorised their overall satisfaction as "good", some Chinese may 
well have compared the .JAEs with Chinese parent companies, thereby presenting them in better 
light. The Chinese and Japanese both dislike losing face. This occurs especially in the case where 
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the Chinese acts as a host to welcome Japanese investment. They feel obliged to ensure a 
"pleasant atmosphere" for this. And, as a host, it is difficult to express their anxieties because 
this would seem impolite. 
QUESTIONS TESTED 
In the previous chapter, the Japanese appeared more satisfied with performance than other 
foreign investors not least because they enjoy a higher relative success rate. This section shows 
that the Chinese appear satisfied with overall performance. From the theoretical angle, it could 
be said that there are more internalisation advantages in the Sino-Japanese case than elsewhere. 
Questions 10, 11 and 12 appear thus. 
QlO: Most JAEs in China were reported profitable and growing, albeit at different rates. Less 
than 20% of ventures were only breaking even or in deficit and growing at slow rates. 
These results show that both CJVs and WJVs were similarly profitable, approximately 
50% clearly so, while the great majority were still aiming for further growth. 
Qll: Response to QlO, where it is shown that most JAEs were planning to grow, further imply 
that there was sufficient confidence and commitment as to regard ventures as satisfactory 
performers thus far. However, constraints upon satisfaction arose from contrasts between 
political and economical systems, as well as the cultural factor whereby both parties 
tended to put on a "good face", hiding minor dissatisfactions. 
Q12: Since 90% of JAEs would increase their output and product range, they were becoming 
increasingly established in China. As was indicated earlier, China was 19th in the list of 
Japanese JV withdrawals, out of 20 in total. The performance of JAEs was steadily 
improving, pmtly due to Japanese management methods, technology and capital. All this 
suggests that other Japanese will continue to develop more ventures in China. 
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6. Environment 
Dividing this into "hard" and "soft" the main features were thus:. 
6.1. "Hard" Factors 
The Japanese originally considered this problematic. Their reasons for concern included 
unreliable transportation, poor routes, lack of discipline and inconveniences during construction 
work, and a lack of up-to-date communications equipment and technology. Many Chinese were 
found sensitive to these issues too. However, there were still some differences. When asked 
"what were the key problems encountered in your enterprise's development?" 11% of Chinese 
and 40% Japanese respondents replied "poor infrastructure" (see Table 36). In the case studies, 
the Chinese managers interviewed were "quite satisfied" with the working environment. In Cases 
Two, Three and Four, when Chinese managers acted as company guides, they indicated that their 
current workplace was much better, but improvements were still needed. Chinese and Japanese 
standards of assessing the "hard" environment differed due to their respective backgrounds. 
What to some Chinese may be the best to many Japanese appears simply ordinary. These 
different levels of appreciation occur especially where technology and facilities are concerned. A 
typical example can be gathered from respective views on the use of electricity; the Japanese 
encourage its use, whereas Chinese people are encouraged to conserve energy, due to a frequent 
shortage of supply. Traditional Chinese culture urged people to minimise and have little beyond 
the "necessity of life", allowing only the occasional indulgence. The "Mamafufuism" mentioned 
before also contradicts Japanese concern for precision and exactitude. 
6.2. "Soft" Factors 
Although both partners first identified the hard factor as most problematic, they later found more 
"soft" increasingly difficult. Other evidence shows differences between Chinese and Japanese 
thus: 
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Table 6- 14: Key problems encountered in the course of enterprise development 
CJV WJV 
* Cash flow difficulty: 66% 20% 
* Ineffective laws and regulations: 30% 50% 
* Problems of developing domestic market: 28% 30% 
* Excessive entertainment expenses: 21% 20% 
* Problems in training local managers & technical staff: 20% 40% 
* High cost of goods & materials storage: 13% 20% 
* Inefficiency of local government: 16% 30% 
* Lack of local knowledge: 3% 20% 
* Poor infrastructure: 11% 10% 
*Other: 18% 0 
* Low production efficiency: 8% 0 
* Extra expense of transfer account: 3% 0 
* Difficult to get Chinese visas & work permits: 2% 0 
* Unstable political situation: 0 0 
Even though cash flow difficulties occur in all JAEs, it was significantly more for CJVs, because 
they firstly deal with dual currencies, and secondly Chinese currency means that the process of 
transferring funds will be slower due to an inefficient domestic financial system. WJVs will of 
course experience some variation in cash flow, but mostly after the initial transfer of capital into 
the venture, when it is necessary to engage in local financial activity. Another significant 
discrepancy concerns the response of CJVs and WJVs to inefficient laws and regulations in 
China. In CJVs, the Chinese do not react quite so much, as they are more accustomed it. WJVs 
lack knowledge of Chinese regulations when faced with a new and unexpected problem. On the 
whole, hard factors received less concern than soft factors however. 
Table 6- 15: Limitation upon transfer of Japanese management methods 
CJV: WJV: 
Economic & business systems differences 51% 30% 
Cultures & traditional differences 34% 30% 
Language barriers 25% 30% 
Politic & social systems differences 24% 20% 
Low educational level of employees 16% 10% 
Poor co-operation 2% 10% 
Other 7% 0 
Chapter Six 
The economic and business systems differences in CJVs are the most pressing for CJVs, whereas 
W JV s did not consider any one in particular most difficult. W JV s rank the top three restrictions 
equally, since there is unitary ownership, and the problem of conflict between owners does not 
arise. Overall, however, venture ownership did not account for any significant differences in the 
obstacles encountered. 
QUESTIONS TESTED 
There were few significant differences between the views of WJVs and CJVs regarding the 
"hard" and "soft" environment. The overall response to Q 13 and Q 14 is thus: 
Q13: In coming to consider the "soft" environment more problematic, WJVs tended to agree 
with the CJVs. Factors such as cash flow, employee training and legislation in the "soft" 
environment came to be of more concern than those in the "hard" environment, such as 
infrastructure. Therefore, JAEs on the whole experience particular "soft" environment 
problems in China. 
7. Summary 
CJV and WJV responses were similar regarding investment motives, the former emphasising in 
particular technology and management skill development. International business strategy was 
likewise a subject of some agreement between the two types of ventures. To attract JAEs, China 
considered offering major market access, low labour costs, state support, and raw material 
supplies, along with a willingness to relinquish power in partner selection. A number of control 
factors are identified and the scope for conflict identified. A slight majority of ventures were 
reportedly profitable and would continue in future even when no further investment was to be 
raised. CJV and WJV views appeared to converge regarding future development plans and 
possibilities although respective reasons for doing so could vary. 
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Notes 
I. "Interim Provisions on Guidance for Foreign Investment", jointly promulgated by Decree No. 5 of the 
State Planning Commission, the State Economic and Trade Commission and the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade and Economic Co-operation on 20'" June 1995. 
2. Bai, C. ( 1995), "The Rapid Development and New Problems of Japanese Direct Investment in China" 
(Riben Duihua Zhijie Touzi de Dafazhan ji Mianlin de Xinwenti), Journal of Japanese Studies 
(Riben Xuekan ). Beij ing, No. I, pp39-48, in Chinese. 
3. See Xia, H. and Liu, Y., "The crisis of China's national industry", Beijing Youth Dai~l' (Beijing 
Qingnian Bao), 23rd May, 1996; Qin, S., "JV home appliance industry tidal wave in 1996", The 
Worker's Daily (Gongren Ribao), l91h December, 1996; and others; in Chinese. 
4. TQC: Total Quality Control. 
QCC: Quality Control Circles. 
SS: Arrange, RectifY, Eliminate, Clear and Educate, so called because these five words in Japanese all 
begin with "S", such as Seiri, Seiton, Seisou, Seiketsu and Soyou. 
Kanban: Notice board. Japanese managers use it to show the progress of operations. 
5. See Table 7-8 at Chapter Seven for more details. 
6. See Case Study at Chapter Nine for more details. 
7. Normally, in China so-called "full production stage, means the production capacity achieved has 
exceeded 80% of the designed capacity. 
8. CNSB's sample, made by China National Statistics Bureau in 1994 was based on a sample of 1066. 
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Chapter Seven 
Findings Ill~ The Japanese Perspective 
1. Introduction 
The importance of studying how different cultural perspectives influence IJV management has 
already been underlined. For all their close proximity, Sino-Japanese ventures are difficult to 
understand by other nationals outside. In comparison with their Chinese counterparts, Japanese 
managers have gained more IJV experience, and can put Sino-Japanese relations into wider 
contexts when comparing their performance. More specific differences of perspective could then 
become clear once both Japanese and Chinese managers' respective viewpoints have been 
sampled simultaneously. In addition to the complete range of respondents, this chapter therefore 
draws upon 10 leading Japanese managers' own responses to the same questions posed of the 
larger Chinese management group outlined in Chapter 6. These Japanese were of relatively high-
ranking status, and thus some seniority; in addition, their views have been supplemented with 
more qualitative findings from the 7 other Japanese managers interviewed during the Case Study 
research programme. Such simultaneous eo-sampling of Japanese and Chinese viewpoints will 
later enable further contrasts and comparisons to be drawn. 
2. Investment Motives 
Asked to rank possible Japanese investment motives, respondents considered the following items 
either "very important", or "important" thus: 
Table 7- 1: Rank importance for Japanese investment in China (Japanese responses) 
WJV CJV 
Market attraction 75% 100% 
Labour costs 75% 83% 
State policy 75% 66% 
International strategy 50% 83% 
Raw material costs 25% 83% 
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International competition 
A voidance of trade friction 
Other 
0 
25% 
0 
33% 
0 
0 
Note: WJV stands for Wholly-owned Japanese Venture, while CJV stands for Chinese-Japanese Joint 
Venture 
On the whole, "market attraction" and "low labour costs" enjoyed high with "trade friction" 
lowest ranked. However, market, labour, international strategy and raw materials related factors 
were all ranked somewhat more important in CJVs than WJVs. To these Japanese, the main 
corresponding Chinese motives appeared thus: 
Table 7- 2: Why the Chinese chose a Japanese company (Japanese responses) 
WJV CJV 
Technology and equipment 0 83% 
Management skills 0 83% 
Marketing channels 0 50% 
Strong reputation 0 66% 
Finance and economy 0 50% 
Patent rights and trademark 0 33% 
Other 0 0 
Access to key material 0 0 
Technology and Management were thus most highly ranked, with patent rights and trademarks 
lowest, implying certain ventures had relatively limited innovative potential from the outset. 
2.1. Market Attraction 
The "Chinese Market" could be judged in terms of both its immediate condition and future 
development potential. Three broad types of firm were identifiable in this respect. One saw this 
market in terms of providing an opportunity for quick profits that did not require much longer-
term planned commitment. At the other extreme came those like Kanebo, which expressly 
sought to establish a "strong foothold"' through longer-term commitments. In the middle were 
firms that, even though did not expect immediate yields, did require a certain degree of 
profitability in the near future. In the Case Studies, both Matsushita and NEC emphasized both 
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immediate market condition and longer-term development potential. The long term character of 
Japanese thought about China was also apparent in historic investigative reports. Such tempered 
judgement could also have influenced the scale and sophistication of any technology transfers 
made to meet anticipated market needs. However, what to some Japanese might appear mature 
and ageing may appear newer and more promising technology to many Chinese, reflecting 
differing cultural perspectives upon technology generally. 
2.1.1 Historical tradition 
Since before the Second World War, leading Japanese have envisioned a maJor role for 
themselves in the Chinese market, from a particular understanding of Chinese culture, 
particularly markets. This is not only from Japanese firms located in China, but arises from 
extensive close investigations often obtainable in Public Libraries throughout Japan. The 
researcher found many texts related to China in Hitotsubashi University Library. These include 
data from an investigation in the North East of China, in Manchuria. Aspects ofthis investigation 
include agriculture, climate, transport, housing, forestry, mining, industry, population, and 
religion, which showed just how thorough many such studies were. 
2.1.2 Geographical proximity 
Because Japan and China are very close neighbours, the movement of materials, goods, and 
people from one country to the other is rapid. For some Japanese employees, China is a preferred 
location because, in general, Japanese dislike working further abroad. They prefer China because 
it is comparatively close, not only in distance, but also they can communicate more easily, follow 
respective customs and traditions, and adjust more easily. This is a factor specified by the 
Director of BTQLP Factory thus: 
"Close to Japan, this is a great reason for many Japanese staff choose China to 
do their foreign country work. For example, flights from Beijing to Tokyo only 
take four hours, and if we have a holiday over two clays, we would have 
enough time to go back to Japan to see our family. On the other hand, Chinese 
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culture is also close to Japanese, we can accept them (and their customs and 
foods) more easily than other countries'.'' 
2.1.3 Economic Factors 
Japan allocates to China its older and more established production lines and technology, although 
many Chinese would not necessarily regard this as obsolete. In recent years, China's 
development has created a growing market for foreign suppliers. Foreign input is sought for 
many aspects of the Chinese economy. Many Japanese firms have identified specific technology 
needs. For example, Matsushita has founded more than thirty and NEC more than ten branches 
throughout China. NEC set up "NEC China" in 1996, as a holding company for all NEC's 
business in China2. Along with this expansion, NEC China's liaison offices will eventually 
include Shanghai, Guangzhou and other major cities and the number of employees will be 
increased. 
2.2 Labour Costs 
These were undoubtedly important for most Japanese. Case Study Four illustrated this 
particularly well. It concerned a venture that imported fabrics into China where low labour cost 
production converted them into garments, which were then re-exported back to Japan. Yet some 
respondents were also aware that labour costs varied enough within China itself not to be taken 
for granted in future. Even Chinese wage seeking behaviour was not necessarily considered 
particularly straightforward. Some Chinese were thought likely to prefer working for lesser 
wages in their own natively owned workplaces because there were less direct production 
pressures. Others considered the very process of recruiting Chinese staff was coloured by local 
as well as business and production related custom and practice as well. For example, a Japanese 
manager in Case Four expressly claimed that: 
"When we recruit new workers, we always meet some problems. For example, 
some workers quality is not high, but we must still recruit them, because their 
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relatives may be working at the Chinese parent company in top management, 
or our Chinese managers are friends of them or their relatives. We cannot 
refuse them, for if we do we may face trouble in future." 
Little evidence was gained to contradict the belief that the Japanese actively preferred younger 
aged workforces, leaving the Chinese state with the problem of providing for their older 
counterparts. Such younger workforces were more likely to have undergone at least secondary 
education encompassing the "three pillars" (academic, moral, and physical). However, some 
respondents believed they were more likely to apply its precepts within rather than outside the 
workplace, and also acknowledged how varied educational standards had proved, particularly 
those between urban and rural areas, in terms of respect for authority generally. One Japanese 
manager from Case Four indeed remarked that: 
"My colleagues and I think that the required skills between Japanese and 
Chinese employees are similar. The only difference is that if an order is given, 
the Japanese will follow this order to the letter; whereas if the Chinese can find 
a suitable shortcut, it is very probable that they will take advantage of it. 
Sometimes, they will miss out something they think is unnecessary, to save 
material for the firm." 
2.3. State policy 
As third most important factor, this brought issues about China's official preferential policy into 
focus, although that has been variously modified since. A number of respondents were sensitive 
towards what effects any such changes might have. Later official assurances following Deng 
Xiaoping's death may well have grasped this issue again. One particular respondent from Case 
Three asserted that "as soon as we grasp a new policy concept, it is discarded; as soon as a policy 
is confirmed, it is replaced by another". Sensitivity about such apparent policy shifts suggests 
that these Japanese remained alert towards state related matters generally. 
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2.4. Raw material costs 
While these were less highly ranked than might first have been expected, they were sometimes 
the subject of considerable prior historical investigation, and ranked more important for joint 
than wholly owned ventures in particular. It was also possible that, having been more thoroughly 
investigated beforehand, some Japanese managers believed such costs were more predictable, 
and thus controllable. 
2.5. Internationan strategy 
More recent academic literature frequently stresses the actual and /or prospective 
internationalization and globalization of Japanese business and management. The Japanese state 
has indeed actively promoted "internationalism" as a required national ethic. In Case Four, 
greater internationalism was an express objective, while the express objective in Case Two was: 
"Ready to challenge the CPT's international competition with absolute sincerity and 
unity". 
"To recognise our responsibilities as industrialists, to foster progress, to promote the 
general welfare of society, and to devote ourselves to the further development of 
world culture". 
Although other nationals might find these very broadly phrased, such objectives were often 
highly profiled within these ventures themselves, and sometimes publicly recited too. 
QUESTIONS TESTED 
Set against Questions l & 2 these findings can be interpreted thus: 
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Ql: While the overall composition of Japanese investment motives appears relatively 
predictable, their exact order of importance can and did differ in its par1iculars. 
Q2: The predicted importance of market, labour cost, and raw material attractions was 
supplemented with the importance assigned to international and competitive advantage 
related factors as well. 
Q3: As Tables 7-3 & 7-4 below show, there were certain demonstrable similarities with other 
declared Japanese investment motives across Asia at large. Market and low-cost labour 
factors were particular priorities, but one should not overlook either technology transfer 
or culturally related constraints. 
Table 7- 3: Japanese investment motives in Asia in two samples3 
o;o Survey in 1985 u/o 11 Survey in 1992 
41.8 Extend local & other markets 26.3 Su22_ort local market 
24.9 Utilise cheap labour 115.5 11 Ensure cheaE labour 
16.3 Preferential government 11.5 Abundant raw material 
policy 
Source: Modern Japan Economics, No. 3, 1994. 
Table 7- 4: Japanese overseas investment motives in two samples4 
o;o Survey il!D. 1984 o;o Survey in 1991 
27.4 I Extend local & other markets 35.1 Ensure local market 
19.0 Occupy local product market 15.5 Collect patents & information 
8.9 11 Collect information 12.5 
.11 ~~:ate network for 
rnational ~oduction 
Source: East Asian Economy Weekly, 7 August 1992. 
3. Partner Selection 
This was judged in terms of how contact was lirst established and the Chinese market itself 
monitored thus: 
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Table 7- 5: Initial business contact 
Trade exhibition or tech fair 
Hired consultant 
Introduction through embassy or other organisation 
Direct Chinese so licitation of parent company 
Chinese business delegation in Japan 
Other 
WJV 
0 
0 
25% 
0 
0 
50% 
CJV 
0 
17% 
50% 
33% 
0 
33% 
Table 7-6. How did the Japanese monitor and analyse the Chinese market? 
WJV CJV 
Consultants in China 75% 100% 
Trips to China to meet officials/end-users 50% 33% 
Consultants in Japan 50% 17% 
Consultants in Hong Kong 0 50% 
Representative office in China 0 50% 
Chinese-language business publications 25% 17% 
Japanese-language business publications 25% 0 
Other 25% 0 
Chapter Seven 
In general, first modes of contact among WJVs appears relatively restricted, if not indeed 
ambiguous; similarly, even CJVs made particular use of third parties, not least consultants. 
WJV s made little use of Hong Kong based specialists, but used a more informational than 
relationship based approach. 
More specific attention can now be given to traditional, spatial, economic, technological, and 
labour related factors. Certain Japanese partner selections were broadly influenced through past 
custom and practice. For example, Matsushita's pioneering Shanghai plant was founded in 1938, 
then closed in 1946, before a further joint venture was re-founded in the late 1970s, an example 
duly followed by Sanyo, whose President was that early factory's former Managing Director5. 
Spatial factors were likewise cited in Cases Two, Three and Four, where transport (location 
within a 150 km radius of an accessible airport for home return journeys), lifestyle 
considerations (Japanese friendly schools, restaurants and medical assistance), and business 
facilities (business associations for information/protection), were mentioned. Nevertheless, the 
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economic profile of potential partners was well considered, not least regarding finance, premises 
and equipment. More particularly, there was some bias towards Chinese state-owned enterprises 
being better "guarantors" of partner commitment, although there were some reported differences 
over technological capability. Any preference for state-owned enterprise partners could be 
continued into the appointment of party-state officials onto enterprise boards. For example, the 
first Chair of the Board in Case Two was the former General Secretary of the Beijing City 
government. As regards to labour quality, long considered to be an important potential Japanese 
concern, it was formally apparent that age, skill, education, and responsibility were much 
emphasized. In Case Two one Japanese manager indeed suggested that: 
"We produce qualified people before producing goods, since we firmly believe 
that people are the key to success. That's why we put a higher priority on 
training and education. In fact, all of us hold the same objective of high morale 
under good guidance and implementation of the company's policy." 
QUESTIONS TESTED 
From the Japanese perspective that process of partner selection was thus tempered in a number 
of directions, more specifically: 
Q4: Financial, technological, material, and relational factors were predictably important, but 
other features like spatial profile came under consideration, particularly among traditional 
coastal locations. 
QS: Although relationships with the Chinese state were indeed important, this was not always 
exclusively so, and other factors like finance and teclmology also exerted some bearing. 
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4. Control 
This poses sensitive Issues for many IJV managements, along with conflict management 
generally, so both were assigned individual sections within the research questionnaire. Much of 
the so-called Japanization literature also emphasizes control-related issues, which are also likely 
to receive particular attention within Sino-Japanese field situations. All respondents were asked 
to nominate who controlled each individual enterprise department thus: 
Table 7- 7: Main department control nationality 
WJV CJV 
Chinese Japanese Chinese Japanese 
Personnel department 50% 50% 100% 0 
Financial department 50% 50% 83% 17% 
General affairs 50% 50% 83% 0 
Marketing department 50% 50% 83% 33% 
Manufacturing department 25% 100% 67% 17% 
Technology & equipment department 25% 100% 50% 67% 
Secretariat 75% 0 17% 17% 
Note: Certain responses show some departments controlled by both sides, and some respondents do not 
identify any department, hence the percentage cannot add up to 100%. 
Such findings suggest that more particular Japanese control within WJVs than CJVs, where 
Japanese controlled manufacturing as well. 
The next issue concerned the sources of influence over enterprise policy making itself. The full 
findings are displayed in Tables 21 A - 21 E. Simply summarized, 68% of all enterprises 
controlled their annual budget, with few instances where both Japanese and Chinese parents also 
both influenced it. 57% of all enterprises decided their own output and profit targets, 64% their 
own product pricing, and 72% overall staffing level policies likewise. But, while most such 
enterprises thereby enjoyed some autonomy, the Japanese were still relatively more influential 
than Chinese parents, for reasons now considered further. 
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4.1. Ownership 
Table 13 shows few major differences between respective ownership levels. However, having 
previously specified foreign ownership levels should not exceed 50%, official policy later 
emphasized minimum 25% levels instead. Hence, in the NEC case for example, the exact level 
of holding clearly varied over time thus: 
Table 7- 8: NEC investments in China 
Date Company NEC Holding Location 
DEC. 1989 Tianjin NEC Telecommunication Engineering 39% Tianjin 
DEC. 1991 Shougang NEC Electronics 51%* Beijing 
JAN. 1992 Tianjin NEC Electronics & Communications 35% Tianjin 
JUN. 1992 Wuhan NEC Fibre Optic Communications 35% Wuhan 
DEC. 1993 Wuhan NEC ZY Mobile Communication 60% Wuhan 
DEC. 1993 TCL Mobile Communication Equipment 60% Huizhou 
JUN. 1994 NEC-CAS Software Laboratories 90% Beijing 
MAY. 1995 Benxi NEC Communications 40% Benxi 
JUN. 1995 Shanghai NEC Computers 70% Shanghai 
DEC. 1995 Guilin NEC Radio Communications 60% Guilin 
NOV. 1996 NEC (China) 100% Beijing 
NOV. 1996 NEC Systems Integration (China) 100% Beijing 
JUL. 1997 Shanghai NEC Semiconductor 28.6% Shanghai 
JAN. 1998 Xi' an NEC Radio Communications 60% Xi'an 
JUN. 1998 Beijing Hua Hong NEC IC Design 60% Beijing 
Note: Made by the researcher accordmg to NEC News Release data. 
*· At the beginning, NEC only held 35%; after 1995 it rose to 51%. 
Such data is very much in line with any general trend towards increasing numbers of wholly 
owned, or near wholly owned, ventures. 
4.2. Formal Headship 
As Table 20 demonstrates, most Board Chairman were Chinese, while most Presidents, who are 
expected to be more occupied with daily affairs, were Japanese; indeed, Japanese respondents 
did not identify any Chinese Presidents as such. Even as Chairmen many Chinese would 
probably maintain close relationships with the state however. For example, the Chair of the 
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Shanghai Sharp Company was also Deputy City Mayor. With their particular concern for 
maintaining "face" through stately relationships, some Japanese might accept this on the basis 
that their own Presidential role opens other channels of influence. 
4.3. Financial management 
While this touches upon the performance related matters considered later, Table 19 shows 
surprisingly restricted direct Japanese control over Finance departments, although they could 
well have sought more indirect control. For example, it was commonly claimed in the Case 
Study ventures that Japanese parents were more insistent upon detailed reports than their Chinese 
counterparts. 
4.1.4. Technology 
Issues concerning strategic resource control will be discussed in the following sections. Here the 
Japanese officially stress that only technology appropriate to a country can be transferred. They 
believe Chinese do not respect the concept of exclusive rights enshrined in patents, trademarks 
and copyright. Until recently technology transferred from Japan to China appeared relatively 
established. No large company investigated had set up a research and development (R & D) 
department in China. However, 16% specified that limited R & D capability was available (see 
Table 28), all of which was relatively small, often using Chinese technical staff. The Japanese 
therefore control technology resources, and will only transfer what they regard as necessary, 
which is not necessarily all the Chinese originally seek. In most JAEs, the Technology and 
Equipment Department was under Japanese control (see Table 19). 
4.4. TcchnoiObl)' and Patents & Trademark Rights 
Previous literature suggested these were likely matters over which Japanese and Chinese 
interests could differ. In this respect the Japanese could have obtained considerable potential 
control over technology development, although few Japanese considered patents and trademarks 
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important investments either (Table 15). In the Matsushita Case all China based enterprises used 
its own recognized trademarks, one Japanese manager further remarking that: 
"Not only do we like to use it, but Matsushita's trademark strengthens the 
competitiveness of JAEs' products and helps these products penetrate Chinese 
and other international markets. Our Chinese partners clearly agreed with this." 
4.5. International marketing 
While just over half of all Marketing departments were under Chinese control, 43% 
were under Japanese control, including international marketing activities in particular. 
On occasion this could raise issues of trust, so that one Chinese marketing manager 
observed: 
"The Japanese managers even control retailing for the Chinese market. The 
Japanese feel that they are under suspicion from the Chinese. Because the 
Chinese do not have a direct knowledge of the international market, whatever 
they know they have acquired from the Japanese. This makes us afraid of being 
deceived." 
4.6. Management know-how and enterprise culture transfer 
As one means for leveraging control, Table 25 shows that Japanese management methods were 
specifically imported in 84% of all cases, the "SS" in 70%, "quality control circles" in 49%, and 
"enterprise welfare systems" in 36%, according to all respondents, with all the cases where no 
such transfer was reported being small and medium sized enterprises. The entire sample of 
Japanese respondents emphasized the importance of "on-the-job" training, and 90% "training in 
Japan", as detailed in Table 26. Overall 78% of all respondents claimed employees to have been 
trained in Japan, 58% claiming this applied to anything up to 30 individuals, and 20% for periods 
up to 6 months long. All Japanese respondents considered this enabled further control over their 
ventures when they were first founded and/or operated later. 
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5. Conflict 
Considering the importance attributed to the transfer of Japanese management 
methods/enterprise culture it was first important to determine anything that held this back: 
Table 7-9. Restriction to importation of Japanese management methods 
Language barriers on both sides 
Differences between C & J cultures & traditions 
Differences between C & J economic & business systems 
Differences between C & J political & social systems 
Low education level of Chinese employees 
Poor co-operation between C & J staff 
Other 
WJV CJV 
75% 
75% 
25% 
50% 
25% 
0 
0 
33% 
17% 
17% 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Perceived language and cultural differences were thus clear barriers, and educational levels and 
co-operation much less so, with economic and business system differences lying somewhere 
between. Most Japanese respondents appeared notably reticent about political differences, while 
also believing that many Chinese did not fully understand competitive market workings, to the 
extent that a top manager in Case Two specifically instructed such employees that: 
"The management and operation of our company can be compared to the 
navigating of our own big ship to its destination in a stormy and rough market 
sea. There is always a chance of sinking. To reduce this risk, we work with 
maximum efficiency at all times and are on their guard for any signs of 
danger." 
The way some Chinese readily appreciate such 'under siege' images of organisation, \Vhere 
differences must be buried in the face of commonly uncharted risks was particularly revealing. In 
cross-cultural terms, the ideal of "equilibrium" ("He") is instilled within both Japan and China. 
except that each subjects it to its own particular sense of meaning, posing other problems for 
mutual conflict management accordingly. Many Chinese have otherwise favoured personal 
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relationship ("guanxi") based business dealings which some Japanese could never consider 
enhancing workplace efficiency. 
To the extent that they cannot fully appreciate such relationship factors, those Japanese could 
face problems when dealing with mutual disagreements. One Japanese manager from Case Four 
indeed asserted that: 
"Under normal circumstances Japanese employees would not criticise a 
manager. They would obey even though they disagreed with the order. The 
Chinese, however, will speak up if they disagree. They are not so reserved." 
QUESTIONS TESTED 
The overall direction of these particular findings can be interpreted thus: 
Q6: Formal top-ranking role differentiation between Japanese and Chinese could have 
potentially enabling, and also legitimizing, effects for these ventures. However, a certain 
threshold of trust was necessary before the Japanese could realize full control over 
Technology/Equipment and Management Methodology transfers for example. 
Q7: By increasing investment, the Japanese gained more control within the CJV. This was 
apparent in NEC and other such companies. The ownership and control relationship 
remained as predicted: control was acquired through ownership as with WJV s. Control 
was also sought through strategic resourcing. 
Q8: Those Japanese without much Chinese grounding clearly saw more potential 
management problems and further scope for potential conflict, unless their subsequent 
socialization helped them learn otherwise. Therefore differing business systems was an 
apparent cause of conflicts, though economics and politics contributed too. 
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Q9: Personal, social, and wider cultural differences also created scope for further contlict, 
which common cultural grounding in Confucian principles might have helped alleviate, 
except that these could also be interpreted differently too. 
6. Performance 
This was considered m terms of turnover/profitability, production/market growth, 
competitiveness, all linked into overall satisfaction per se. 
6.1. Turnover/Profitability 
As previously stated greater Japanese experience with IJV management generally would suggest 
they were more potentially calculated about their satisfaction with these ventures. Table 33 
indeed shows that 65% considered annual turnover was higher than the year before, with only 
10% deeming this either static or declining, the rest intimating that they simply did not know. 
Japanese respondents in particular underlined higher WJV turnover growth, although in Table 34 
36% of all respondents- an appreciable minority- judged ventures to be either breaking even or 
unprofitable enough to question just how worthwhile turnover growth alone might be. Of those 
considered profitable, 14% designated this between 8% and 15% of turnover, and 12% in excess 
of 15% of such. Japanese respondents own estimates of profit were thus: 
Table 7-10. Annual Turnover 
Higher than the previous year 
Similar turnover 
Lower than last year 
Table 7-11. Profit 
Extent of up to 3% ofturnover 
Extent of about 3 - 8% of turnover 
8- 15% 
Over 15% 
Break-even 
Small deficit 
W.W CJV 
100% 
0 
0 
WJV 
25% 
50% 
25% 
0 
0 
0 
66% 
0 
0 
CJV 
17% 
17% 
17% 
0 
17% 
33% 
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Once agam, therefore, WJVs were notably highly profiled, and considered more potentially 
profitable than CJV s. 
6.2. Growth 
As Table 7-12 below shows, WJV capacity appeared most utilized: 
Table 7-12. Realisation of full production 
Yes 
No 
WJV CJV 
100% 
0 
33% 
50% 
Table 29 further shows that while most targeted is the Chinese domestic market (77%) is the 
most targeted, Japan was also in focus (66%), with increasing searches outside both. Differences 
between types of venture appeared thus: 
Table 7-13. Target Market Region 
Chinese market 
Japanese market 
Other markets 
WJV CJV 
50% 
100% 
17% 
83% 
66% 
50% 
N.B. some companies sell to multiple markets, hence the surplus percentage. 
This helps explain added Japanese presence within those CJVs reaching towards further foreign 
markets. As Table 30 also shows, many ventures had gained some autonomy over deciding how 
they approached the Chinese domestic market, while Japanese parents exerted more influence 
over foreign markets outside. 
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6.3. Competitiveness 
Table 28 shows that 64% of ventures advertised within China, using newspapers, magazmes, 
television, and event sponsorship in that order of preference, leaving a substantial minority that 
did not advertise at all. When asked about which factors they considered most crucial to 
competitiveness, respondents typically emphasized high quality, service backup, low brand price, 
and top product design. 
While the Japanese were also likely to prioritize these in particular, 44% of all respondents stated 
that product quality was similar to that of their Japanese parents, and 20% possibly better, or still 
had the potential to improve. 
6.4. Overall Satisfaction 
The Case Study research in particular suggested that overall satisfaction was tinged and 
tempered with the recognition that there were still developmental problems ahead. A particular 
split was found among those who would, and others that would not, raise their investment in 
future, the division being 56% I 44% respectively. However, 94% would raise output and/or 
increase their product range, though none reported they would look for another partner. In some 
respects, therefore, a sense of further, if not continuous improvements, could be inferred from 
such responses. 
QUESTIONS TESTED 
Although the time of this research may have influenced these results, they partly differ from 
parallel studies like Beamish (1993), in that they report relatively more, though still not future 
assured, overall satisfaction with performance thus far. More particularly: 
QIO: WJVs were higher ranking performers in terms of turnover and profit and also achieved 
such successes faster. This equates with Japan-China Investment Promotion Association 
1995 survey results thus: 
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Table 7- 14: Profit and loss position of JAEs in China 
Da- Bei- Tian- Jiang- Shang- Zhe- Guang- Shen- Other Total 
lian jing .iin su hai jiang zhou zhen 
Expect profit 35 37 I6 20 50 5 5 I8 44 230 
More ex_pected 13 6 6 3 17 --- I 4 I2 62 
Same expected IO 2I 7 8 I6 --- 1 8 I1 82 
Less expected 8 9 3 4 II 2 2 5 12 56 
No answer 4 1 --- 5 6 3 1 1 9 30 
Change 35 37 16 20 50 5 5 18 44 230 
Constant profit 6 9 4 5 19 --- I 7 16 67 
Constant loss 12 7 2 3 10 --- 3 1 4 42 
Loss to profit 1I 14 IO 5 15 1 --- 9 12 77 
Profit to loss --- 2 --- --- 6 --- --- --- --- 8 
Balance 2 2 --- --- 1 --- --- 3 IO 
No answer 4 3 --- 5 --- 3 1 1 9 26 
Source: Xue, J., "Raising Investment and Withdraw of Japanese Affiliated Enterprises", ("Ri Zi Qiye 
de Zai Touzi yu Chezi") Journal of Pacific Study (Taipingyang Xuekan), No. 4, 1997, 
pp.62-65. 
Qll: To a degree, any overall satisfaction also arises from preplanning, methodical 
management, and selected performance indicators, but there was still recognizable scope 
for improvement. 
Q12: The performance of most JAEs in China was improving. This investigation reports no 
withdrawals from China, although it only covers a small percentage of ventures. In 
reality, from 1979 to 1995, the Japanese did withdraw from some JAEs, but only from 34 
projects in China. China is reportedly number 19 on the Japanese investment withdrawal 
list.6 This suggests that the Japanese do not feel the need to withdraw from projects in 
China. In this research, 60% Japanese respondents planned to increase investment; a 
figure which matches JETRO's 67% (2000)7. 
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7. Investment Environment 
The distinction between "hard" and "soft" investment environment features was explained 
before. In terms of "hard" factors, these Japanese were notably critical of Chinese transportation 
systems and facilities, despite various reported improvements. Table 36 fm1her shows that 40% 
of Japanese respondents were dissatisfied with their enterprise infrastructure, for example poor 
water or electrical connections, and subcontractor work, not least in Case Four. Communication 
capabilities were also found problematic, with not only faxes and computers, but even telephone 
facilities thus regarded, and postal deliveries judged potentially umeliable. In terms of "soft" 
factors, those concerning enterprise development, and Japanese management transfer, were 
acknowledged before, while there were no responses concerning politics, even though managers 
in Cases Three and Four spoke orally about such. By contrast, Chinese laws and regulations 
provoked more open comment, one Japanese manager in particular stating that: 
"The Chinese legal system is not comprehensive enough, and where there are 
laws, they are often ignored. Policies are ever changing and are issued from 
many different state departments, so we Japanese sometimes find that two sets 
of policies contradict each other, leaving us wondering which one to follow." 
QUESTIONS TESTED 
The environment for international joint ventures in China always appears in need of attention. 
The state of the environment is of direct relevance to locational advantage. The findings for 
questions 13 is as follows. 
Q13: Both "hard" and "soft" factors might first pose problems, while their subsequent 
improvement did not particularly suffice, and certain "soft" factors like Chinese laws and 
regulations were later found more problematic than before. 
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Chapter Eight 
Discussion: How the Chinese and 
Japanese Compare 
1. Introduction 
The last two chapters dealt with both the Japanese and Chinese perspectives. This research 
differed from others in a number of different respects. Firstly it encompassed the whole process 
from partner selection to eventual venture performance. Secondly it compares Chinese and 
Japanese perspectives with respect to the following five categories. Motives: market attraction 
was more important than low labour costs and state policy for the Japanese, whereas technology 
and management skills transfer were more important than just capital and international marketing 
alone for the Chinese. Partner selection: the results were in line with previous research 
concerning historical, economic and relationship factors in partner selection, while geographical 
factors were also important. Control and conflict: this study extended previous research 
regarding the whole process of control with respect to departmentalization, decision making, 
ownership, key managers, strategical resources and overall enterprise culture. Performance: this 
study encompassed both Chinese and Japanese views about profit, growth, competitiveness and 
hence overall venture satisfaction. Environment: by distinguishing the "hard" and "soft" 
investment environment this research found growing concern with "soft" rather than "hard" 
factors, although the Chinese ranked this somewhat differently to the Japanese. This further 
chapter therefore will seek to explain if and why Chinese and Japanese perspectives differ in this 
research with regard to possible historical, political, economic, and in particular cultural and 
personality influences. 
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2. Motives 
Respective rankings can first be compared thus (see Table 8): 
Table 8- 1: Relative importance of J][J)I for China 
Factors: Chinese: Japanese: 
Technology and equipment 
Management skill 
Marketing 
Strong reputation 
Finance and economy 
Patent right and trade mark 
Not known 
Other 
Access to key material 
65% 50% 
44% 50% 
41% 40% 
34% 40% 
23% 30% 
13% 20% 
10% 40% 
13% 0 
4% 0 
Both Chinese and Japanese identified "technology and equipment" and "management skill" as 
main reasons for JDI. It was only in their response of "not known", that the Japanese were 
otherwise markedly different. Respective responses with regard to the motives of JDI in China 
compared thus (see Table 8): 
Table 8- 2: Why did the Japanese seek a Chinese partner? 
Factors: Japanese: Chinese: 
Labour costs 80% 82% 
Market attraction 90% 79% 
State policy 70% 66% 
Raw material costs 60% 49% 
International strategy 70% 49% 
International competition 30% 25% 
Other 0 10% 
A voidance of trade friction 20% 6% 
Both therefore considered labour cost and market attraction important, but where the Japanese 
considered market attraction more important than cheap labour, they differed over international 
business strategy. Nevertheless, both ranked state policy more important than raw material costs. 
making this the third most important factor. Five specific points about Chinese motives are now 
considered: 
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2.1. Historical Influence 
When Matsushita Company founder Konosuke Matsushita first visited China, he talked with the 
Chinese leaders about the necessity of foreign trade, particularly FDI, on the basis that further 
transfer of foreign technology and management know-how would be more valuable than merely 
importing foreign products'. A Japanese manager from Case Two said that: 
"Mr. Matsushita was very interested in China. He thought that China would 
have the largest influence on the development of Asia and the world. Also he 
twice visited China, in 1979 and 1980. He told many Chinese leaders that it 
was not enough only to import equipment and technology from Matsushita, 
because management know-how would be more important than equipment." 
Officially the Chinese leaders were said to accept this view, which others had also advised, but 
were still less strongly motivated to form JV s in fear of a "foreign economic invasion", and even 
being overwhelmed by "western capitalism". As Pearson (1991) observed, in the late 1970s 
Chinese leaders were concerned about FDI's potential negative impact, and restricted economic 
re-entry2, referring to their "open door" and economic reform policy as "crossing the river by 
feeling the stones underfoot"3, implying an essentially cautious, incremental approach. 
The Japanese, however, planned to re-enter China and secure their foothold in key markets, 
particularly during the mid-1980s when the value of the Yen rose. The Japanese would indeed 
transfer more capital to international markets. Data from the Japanese Finance ministry shows 
that FDI value increased from US $49.22 billion in 1978-84 to US $227.15 billion in 1986-90, 
rising about 4.6 times. The Yen's sharp rise gave impetus to widen the investment target from 
the US and Western European across more Asian economies 4 as well. In this period, the relative 
intensity of any Japanese motives towards possible JVs appeared significantly higher than the 
official Chinese5 . 
Over twenty years later, the Chinese have encountered both advantages and disadvantages. Their 
managers have acquired more skills to manage JVs, but even now, there are still official 
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leadership anxieties about excessive foreign capital undermining the national econom/'. No 
matter what is officially declared there may still be mixed motives in this respect. 
2.2. Political Influence 
Japanese motives relate to the Chinese market, to secure a strong foothold and alternatively to 
increase influence over China, and thereby protect its leading status in Asia7. 74% of Japanese 
parent companies and 89% of JAEs studied here were in manufacturing sectors. It is significant 
to note that upmarket Japanese global investment in financial and services sectors in North-
America and Europe was coupled with lower level manufacturing investment in Asia. 70% of 
Japanese respondents believed that state policy helped them invest in China, which only ranked 
after market attraction (90%) and low labour costs (80%). However, when compared to the 
Japanese, Chinese politics appear more influential. For example, apart from their economic 
motives, the Chinese's JV motives were also subjected to central and local government 
influences, and the national Five-Year Plan process8. One task set by the Fifteenth National 
Congress of CPC in October 1997 was to continue to attract FDI in terms like: "We shall use 
foreign capital actively, rationally and effectively"9 . 
2.3. Economic Influence 
Given their own domestic economy it was predictable that the Japanese ranked profitability 
highly. As a consequence, Japanese managers looked for extensive markets, low labour costs and 
low raw material costs 10, to increase profitability for their parent company. 90% of Japanese 
respondents considered that market opportunity most attracted them to China, followed by 80% 
low labour costs, and 60% raw material. For the Chinese, the situation was more complex. 65% 
of Chinese respondents rated teclmology and equipment, 44% management know-how, 41% 
access to international market and 23% capital access highest on their agenda. On the other hand, 
Chinese managers may share a common outlook towards forming a joint venture, but differ over 
subsequent stages of implementation. Central government may look on a joint venture as an 
investment opportunity and local government may use this to their advantage to develop the local 
economy and to increase their power with the centre 11 • 
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The Japanese exerted considerable economic influence, 62% of JAEs chose 11-20 years for co-
operation and Japanese ownership was rising more than before (see Table 7-3), with more firms 
looking to found wholly-owned enterprises 12 • All these could potentially increase Japanese 
economic influence. The Chinese partners were mostly state-owned enterprises (59%). Neither 
these nor JV enterprises are in any way owned by the managers, which reflects the prevailing 
Chinese mind-set. 
2.4.Cultural Influence 
Chinese cultural influence on motives was comparatively stronger than Japanese. As well as 
restructuring their economy, they also intend to learn about technology and Japanese-style 
management, which can include the way "Japanese enterprise culture" works. The main Chinese 
motive was to transfer Japanese technology (63%) and management skills (44%)(see Table 9). 
84% of respondents replied that they had imported special Japanese management methods, such 
as QCC, 5S (see Table 25). Even as the Chinese were striving conscientiously to learn Japanese-
style management, they were, in actuality, re-learning partly from themselves, or at least from 
their historic past. Some critics consider that Chinese-style philosophical management thought 
was exported overseas and has now returned. Undervalued native Chinese ideas were imported 
by the Japanese, who reconstructed them, and now they are returning to China at a higher price 13 . 
It is further said that the Chinese now deliberately put higher value upon foreign things, to the 
extent that "the foreign moon more round than the Chinese". 
2.5. Personality Influence 
In the early stages Chinese managers place pariicularly high value upon discernible motives for 
founding ventures, and seek to understand them as a kind of intelligence puzzle, whereas many 
Japanese extrapolate towards eventual operating problems, as the feasibility study in Case One 
demonstrated. Under the influence of "mamafufuism" Chinese may approach these problems 
more loosely than methodically. 
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3. Partner Selection 
Compared with the Japanese, the Chinese were initially more passive m partner selection. 
despite its importance to joint venture success. The several issues stating partner selection were 
thus. 
3.1. Historical Influence 
Japanese companies had a wider potential choice in partner selection than Chinese, who were 
initially very experienced at this process but needed to learn from experience. Japanese 
management had developed its own particular understanding of China, even before joint 
venturing, and had thus accumulated empirical studies, both before World War II and after 
197914. The Japanese were therefore unusually informed about possible choices, while the 
Chinese officially plan to seek business with foreigners, including the Japanese. In short, the 
Japanese enjoy more potential advantages regarding original partner selection 15 • 40% of Chinese 
and Japanese respondents had over 20 years, and 26% between 11-20 years background 
experience. However, most Chinese had only worked within native enterprises, whereas more 
Japanese managers interviewed had worked outside as well as inside Japan, making them more 
sensitive towards issues of partner selection compared with their relatively inexperienced 
Chinese counterparts. 
3.2. Political Influence 
While partner selection was still under political influence the Japanese could have more scope 
for partner choice. When asked how initial contact was made, 26% of total respondents answered 
through their embassy (see Table 1 0). 59% of Chinese partners were state enterprises, which the 
Japanese may consider offered political reassurance, while the Chinese authorities likewise 
prefer alliances they can control. Chinese firms, when selecting a partner, are expressly advised 
by the state to refrain from joining any "non-friendly" partners, and there are prohibitions upon 
joint ventures which may damage national sovereign rights, and violate national laws, or are not 
in conformity with national economic development 16 . For political reasons China also prohibits 
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certain foreign investment in politically and ideologically sensitive areas such as newspapers, 
publication, broadcasting (both radio and television), post and telecommunication 17, although the 
exact sectors are being reconsidered as part of the WTO process. 
3.3. Economic [nfluence 
The Chinese may first have to partner certain firms because their own managers initially seek 
transfer ofteclmology and management skil1 18 . Secondly, most Chinese managers originate from 
state enterprises, which exert different ownership pressures. Thirdly, where Chinese managers 
lack economic knowledge, they cannot fully appreciate their partners situation from that angle. 
On the other hand, even if the Chinese strongly influenced partner selection, they may have less 
choice then the Japanese. A Chinese manager from Case One said that: 
"The parent company has 40 factories. Most of them wanted the chance for the JV to 
improve themselves, but only we had the opportunity. Japanese firms have a much 
wider choice." 
The Japanese have strong potential economic influence in this respect, more opportunity to 
identify partners, and thus a larger range of partners to select from. As noted earlier, there are 
proportionately many more Chinese firms willing to enter into joint ventures. Furthermore, 
Japanese industry is a global investor which has gained much experience in cross-cultural co-
operation, and partner selection generally. Similarly, 47% of Chinese parent companies' 
employed over 500, but 81% of JAEs employed under 500, implying the Japanese are used to 
choosing large scale partners to do small scale business in China in particular. 
3.4. Cultural Influence 
The Japanese therefore had particular potential strength in pa1tner selection. However, 
differences were still found on both sides. As discussed before, the Japanese not only look at the 
"hard" environment, but also pay attention to the "quality" of Chinese employees such as 
education, and technical skills. For example, Chinese managers ti"om all four cases considered 
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their employees' education level to be higher, and the average age lower, than in their parent 
companies. The Chinese would often prefer the Japanese partner to be: respectful/friendly, and 
have real willingness to help the Chinese develop and improve. Normally, a Japanese firm would 
like to select the partner directly by themselves 19, but Chinese firms often depend on a third party 
to find partners. As described by a Chinese manager from Case One, central and local authorities 
can help a parent company find Japanese partners, while the Japanese visited several times 
before signing any agreement. Since the Chinese rarely visited Japan, they lack the resources to 
find partners by themselves, and also lack outside experience and business links, and even resort 
to consider partner selection to be like marriage, which their parents traditionally arranged. 
3.5. Personality Influence 
Here Chinese influence appears limited because of the lesser range of choices available and 
personality characteristics, which restricts how they search and investigate possible partners. A 
simple unquestioning belief in Japanese technology will not therefore prevent some dated 
technology being transferred into joint ventures in situations where Chinese managers do not 
fully investigate beforehand. By comparison, the Japanese did investigate first and 52% of total 
respondents claimed they used consultants beforehand, and 44% had met Chinese officials and 
end-users as part of their prior investigation, whereas the Chinese managers in the case studies 
rarely conducted similar investigations. 
4. Control and Conflict 
Shared control is generally perceived as enbracing both partners together. Often partners control 
those aspects over which they have the most expertise, that being a respected source of power in 
itself. The control of JAEs in China can be divided into four areas, namely ownership, 
leadership, human resource management and strategic resourcing. What was the scope for 
conflict in joint ventures? Here, it was found that contrasting cultural backgrounds could 
underscore possible conflicts, despite other similar values: homogeneous beliefs; collective 
achievement; maintenance of public face. and so on. Certain potential bases for differences and 
conflict are now discussed. 
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4.1. Historical Influence 
The Chinese authorities originally sought tight official control over all JVs. Two much quoted 
reasons were considered: the balance of ownership forces, and the possibility that their ventures 
would spread 'capitalist culture' across other spheres as well. 
However, where the Japanese sought further control, they also encountered ideological and 
business differences. Until recently the Chinese authorities seemed less concerned about the 
exact proportion of ownership, provided there was no loss of majority control, and neither is 
there the same official concern about capitalist culture. On the other hand, the Japanese have 
gathered additional working experience in China, and have developed further means for 
controlling more JAEs themselves. In this research 74% of JAEs were joint, 7% co-operation and 
17% wholly Japanese owned ventures. The latter were more numerous than at the original stage 
(1979-83), and still increasing. For example, NEC has established 15 ventures in China, its 
ownership clearly increasing over time (see Case Three). 
In the beginning, the Chinese wariness of capitalist culture, and unfamiliarity with the Japanese 
style of business was undoubtedly problematic. As Shen (1982) indicated, "we can co-operate 
with capitalism economically but, politically and ideologically, we should by no means accept 
decadent capitalist elements"20 . However, as time progressed, the balance gradually shifted 
towards the Japanese once they gained more detailed control. A particular feature of the balance 
of power came from Japanese control over international market networks. For example, a 
Chinese manager from Case Four said that: 
"The international markets are all controlled by the Japanese, and even in the 
Chinese domestic market Japanese managers have monitored Chinese sellers to 
the main markets very closely." 
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4.2. Political Influence 
Both the Chinese and the Japanese could potentially exert relatively strong control. Japanese 
concerns about political influences appear linked to motives regarding market access and 
increasing influence over China generall/ 1• These results suggest the Japanese had most control 
over technology and equipment (54%), production (49%) and marketing matters (43%). 
Considering there ~ere 20% of JAEs where there was no Japanese staff, these percentages 
appear high. The Japanese may therefore carefully select those main departments which will help 
them to achieve their strategy, while recognising the Chinese will ultimately exert political 
control. Although branches of the CPC were not independently stationed in JAEs, as they have 
been in state enterprises, followers of the CPC do exist in JAEs, and could become top managers, 
formally obliged to maintain the party's political influence. On another level, the Women's 
Federation, the Youth League and the Trade Union are all affiliated to the CPC22. These results 
show that Chinese nationals control personnel (86%), general affairs (73%), and secretariat 
(60%) departments in JAEs, which should enable some political influence to continue (see Table 
19). 
Potential conflicts exist regarding both partners' political influences. Some Japanese are 
suspected of "great-power chauvinism", which may lead to powerful prejudices against the 
Chinese. A Chinese manager from Case Three said that: 
"The Japanese sometimes appeared to be arrogant. Chinese employees do not like to 
work with them when they think there is nothing special about the 'little Japanese' 
(normally the Japanese are shorter than the Chinese, who are called 'little' 
condescendingly)." 
Conflicts also occur over CPC influence. Some Japanese maintain that it is not necessary to bring 
such influence into the workplace. A Japanese managing director from Case Four said that: 
"Sometimes the Chinese parent company asked employees to undertake political 
activities. For example they asked some top Chinese managers to attend a political 
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training course. This was judged not good for the company's day-to-day operation. 
On the other hand, Chinese managers controlled the personnel department, and some 
of their relatives and friends entered the company through the "back door". These 
employees proved difficult to manage." 
4.3. Economic Influence 
The Japanese also exert considerable control over J AEs through ownership, key managers, 
strategic resources, and technology. In comparison, Chinese economic influence appears weaker, 
and more closely protected. Furthermore, many Chinese lack market knowledge, and an 
organisational network to exert control. The results showed that: 
Table 8 -3: Control in JAEs 
Investment forms (see Table 15) 
Cash: Chinese 57% 
Machinery & equipment: 
Management know-how: 
Departmental control (see Table 19) 
Finance: 
Technology & equipment: 
Production: 
Marketing: 
Japanese 
Chinese 
Japanese 
Chinese 
Japanese 
Chinese 
Japanese 
Chinese 
Japanese 
Chinese 
Japanese 
Chinese 
90% 
23% 
44% 
2% 
31% 
79% 
26% 
35% 
54% 
54% 
49% 
62% 
Japanese 35% 
(international market entirely Japanese controlled) 
Chairman of the Board & President (see Table 20) 
Chairman: Chinese 65% 
Japanese 35% 
President: Chinese 44% 
Japanese 56% 
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Main policy source (see Table 21) 
Rank I: 
2: 
3: 
4: 
5: 
6: 
7: 
JAE itself 
JAE & Japanese parent 
JAE & Japanese & Chinese parent 
Japanese parent alone 
Japanese & Chinese parent 
J AE & Chinese parent 
Chinese parent alone 
Considering there were 20% of JAEs with no Japanese staff, this suggests quite considerable 
Japanese control. Certain Chinese managers may indeed accept this and prefer that Japanese 
managers exert control, as in Case Two, where it was said: 
"The Japanese have more power, and also more responsibility, and we would like to 
support them to carry out their advanced operation thought in developing our 
company." 
A difference in perspective can create difficulties within the firms, but differences over economic 
principles could pose special problems. 44% of all respondents further considered that different 
economics and principles restricted Japanese management and technology transfer (see Table 
37). One Chinese manager from Case Three said that: 
"We tried to accept more Japanese methods, but sometimes this was really difficult. 
For example, some products did not achieve the first level of quality, and the 
Japanese manager asked for them to be thrown away. However, the Chinese 
employees thought it was a second level product, and could still be sold at a low 
price, so why waste it?" 
4.4. Cultural Influence 
The Japanese are considered more group-orientated at work. This springs from their traditional 
concept of ''Wa", which means harmony, peace, and tranquillity are pre-eminent concerns. 
Under this concept an individual standing alone is incomplete and can find fulfilment only by 
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lending his personal will to the needs of his societl3. Although minor contradictions will always 
occur among fellow workers, Japanese employees working in JAEs are commonly considered a 
very close group. Chinese culture is often referred to as "collectivism", but even within groups 
there is scope for subtle expression of individualism. Collectivism arises from the Chinese 
traditional concept of "He", which means harmony, peace and tranquillity. "He" and "Wa" share 
the same Chinese character, same concept, same source (all derived from Confucianism), and are 
only pronounced differently in Chinese and Japanese language. Chinese employees who work in 
JAEs cannot appear to unite like Japanese. 78% of JAEs sent employees to Japan for training, 
and 84% had imported special Japanese management methods, thereby extending prospective 
Japanese cultural influence (see Tables 27,25). 
Any scope for differences and conflict can be associated with: 1) the strength of the Japanese 
corporatism and outbreaks of individualism within Chinese collectivism; 2) the national cultures 
of the two countries; 3) the Japanese governed market ideology and the Chinese socialist market 
ideology; 4) any Japanese public tolerance for other ideologies which absorbs new knowledge 
more easily than the Chinese. All these cultural differences could accentuate the scope for 
difference and conflict in JAEs. 36% of all respondents considered that cultural differences and 
tradition restricted the transfer of Japanese management methods; 28% and 21% considered 
language barriers similarly obstructive; 22% considered it difficult to train local staff. 15% 
thought the low education level of Chinese employees presented some difficulties, and 6% 
deemed local "worldly wisdom" problematic (see Tables 36, 37, 38). 
4.5. Personality Influence 
Here the basic Japanese notion of being thorough and methodical enabled their managers to gain 
a degree of everyday control. Moreover some Japanese believed their Chinese counterparts were 
naive when imitating their approach. For example a manager in Case Three claimed that those 
Chinese who actually did so, wrongly believed they would soon rise to the top of the hierarchy 
when usually they lacked the exact "attitude" required. He did not believe there were many 
unique qualities in Japanese management methods, except that they were very suitable for the 
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Japanese, but others would find them difficult. With their strength in accuracy, discipline and 
aptitudes the Japanese created scope to increase their detailed control over JAEs operation. 
However, the native view IS that when either a meticulous Japanese works with a 
"mamafufuism" Chinese, or when a conventional Japanese works with a creative Chinese, or a 
'quick action' Japanese works with a 'slow action' Chinese, some differences and cont1icts 
invariably result. In general, sharper cont1icts arising between Chinese and Japanese were 
commonly attributed to contrasting cultures and economic differences. However, these detailed 
personality differences should not be ignored. 
5. Performance 
The responses suggested that production, marketing, teclmology and management transfer were 
critical to performance, overall satisfaction being the most decisive, but profitability, growth and 
competitive assessments also int1uencing how performance was regarded. 
Profitability 
Using the same four levels of satisfaction about annual turnover as before, overall profitability 
was considered reasonably satisfactory, especially when ventures increased their profit from the 
previOus year. 
Table 8- 4: Chinese & Japanese responses about annual turnover 
Higher than last year: Chinese: Japanese: 
1-5% 3% 0 
6-10% 8% 0 
11-50% 30% 40% 
Over 50% 23% 40% 
Similar 6% 0 
Lower than last year: 
1-5% 0 0 
6-10% 0 0 
Over 10% 6% 0 
Not known 24% 20% 
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Table 8- 5: Chinese & Japanese responses about profit (as percentage of turnover) 
Chinese: Japanese: 
Profit 63% 60% 
Under 3% 14% 20% 
3-8% 23% 20% 
8-15% 13% 20% 
Over 15% 14% 0 
No profit 18% 20% 
Little deficit 18% 20% 
Big deficit 0 0 
Balance 17% 20% 
Not known 1% 0 
There were many similarities between Chinese and Japanese responses, although the Japanese 
believed "annual turnover" had increased more. Furthermore, in this research, 70% had reached 
the full production stage (see Table 22). 
Growth 
Overall Japanese responses regarding the realisation of full production, the marketing region, and 
sales in and outside China, were similar to Chinese responses. However, there were still 
differences thus: 
Table 8- 6: Chinese & Japanese responses on realised full production stage 
Chinese: Japanese: 
Realised 1-5 years ago 68% 40% 
Realised 6-1 0 years ago 6% 10% 
Realised over 1 0 years ago 0 0 
Will reach after 1-3 years 21% 40% 
Will reach after 4-6 years 0 0 
Not known 6% 10% 
Table 8- 7: Chinese & Japanese responses on sales to China & other markets 
In China sold by: 
Japanese parent 
Chinese parent 
JAE itself 
Other Chinese company 
In other market sold by: 
Chinese: 
6% 
6% 
80% 
1% 
Japanese: 
0 
0 
90% 
0 
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Japanese parent 65% 80% 
Chinese parent 4% 0 
JAE itself 30% 50% 
Other Chinese company 1% 0 
Other Japanese company 4% 20% 
Both the Chinese and Japanese saw possibilities for growth in future. The Japanese gave more 
attention to possible problems en route. Although the Chinese were relatively concerned about 
these future difficulties, they will put more emphasis upon possible rewards, especially compared 
with state employment type alternatives. 
Overall Satisfaction 
Both partners categorised their overall satisfaction as "good" even where they believed further 
improvements were possible. From the results of the questionnaire, all JAEs will continue in the 
near future, but less than half would raise investment. Others would increase the range and 
volume of production instead. Most Chinese believed they would continue with the same partner. 
Table 8- 8: Chinese & Japanese responses about venture development 
Chinese: Japanese: 
Increase investment: Yes 42% 60% 
No 58% 40% 
Increase output & range of products Yes 93% 100% 
No 7% 0 
Continue co-operation Yes 90% 100% 
Not known 10% 0 
When asked about further development the Chinese appeared less convinced than the Japanese, 
because therefore lack the ability to increase investment, and have much less experience of IJV s. 
Although the Chinese criticised the Japanese as unwilling to transfer advanced technology, they 
still received some comparatively advanced technology, although only 16% considered that to be 
research & development technology (see Table 24). In addition three cases indicated production 
technology was transferred from Japanese parent companies and, although Case Two transferred 
some relatively advanced technology, the two other cases suggested only existing technology 
was transferred. 70% used "SS" and 49% chose QCC management methods (see Table 25). 
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'fabDe 8- 9: Japanese management methods imported 
Chinese: Japanese: 
ss 69% 80% 
QCC 46% 70% 
Enterprise internal welfare system 32% 60% 
Enterprise length of service system 27% 50% 
Other methods 10% 10% 
No import 11% 0 
Not known 6% 0 
Chinese responses appeared relatively less convinced than the Japanese, were less reasonably 
satisfied with overall performance, and believed their efforts disproportionately benefitted the 
Japanese. On the other hand, when they categorised their overall satisfaction as "good", some 
Chinese may have compared JAEs with Chinese parent companies, a comparison which could 
present them in a better light. The Chinese and Japanese both dislike losing face. So, where the 
Chinese act as host to welcome Japanese investment, they feel obliged to present a pleasant 
atmosphere, whereas hosts they do not express anxieties about the venture, as this would seem to 
them to be impolite. 
5.1. Historical ][nflu.ence 
The Japanese methods for improving JV performance were more advanced than Chinese. Several 
factors contributed to this. The Japanese set higher than usual targets for China. They did once 
seek to persuade the Chinese authorities of the benefits for their entire national economy. In 
contrast the Chinese were still at an experimental and exploratory stage where there were doubts 
about eventual success. The situation has since developed and the Chinese authorities are less 
doubtful and seek to improve performance as much as possible themselves. The Japanese still 
intend to improve, but can appear less concerned with immediate than long-term performance. 
One manager from Kanebo Ltd simply said: 
"I wanted to set up a venture there, no matter how small, which lay deep roots in its 
soil, rather than just export technology or plant."24 
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Also Case Three shows that Matsushita likewise looked towards long-term performance in 
China. 63% of JAEs were considered to have obtained some benefits and 43% would increase 
their investment before the Asian crisis intervened. 
5.2. j>olitical Knfllucl!1ce 
The Chinese appear to exert greater political influence over performance, in terms of attracting 
more foreign investment later, while justifying the present official structure. Chinese managers 
from Cases Two, Three and Four all highlighted the official importance of performance. A 
Chinese manager from Case Two said that: 
"This influence was not only from local but also from central authorities. This was 
particularly true since the Prime Minister visited the firm to give hope to employees. 
Staff experienced political pressure to achieve satisfactory performance in 
responses." 
Similarly, many Japanese sought to report good performance to their parent company to gain a 
'good reputation'. 62% of JAEs had chosen 11-20 year co-operation agreements. Many 
manufacturing companies were at a stage where they considered they soon could obtain profits, 
and 11-20 years was judged an ample term to recoup investments. 
5.3. Economic Influence 
Both partners have other potential influence over performance. Chinese managers aspue to 
satisfactory performance levels for national related reasons, in terms of the "open door" policy 
and economic reform25 . The Japanese seek satisfactory enough performance to sustain their own 
national economic standing where this is a firm slogan. 98% of JAEs were already in operation 
with 70% at full production stage. Even firms like Matsushita, and Kanebo did not expect any 
immediate short term profit, but did expect it in future26 . 63% of JAEs were considered 
profitable, 91% would continue to co-operation, and 94% would increase output, and 44% 
invcstment27 . 
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5.4. CuDtural Influence 
Confi.tcianism's "Harmony" ("He" or "Wa") and Western management know-how all effect to 
make managers performance conscious. The Japanese have variously inherited and absorbed 
these. For example, when top and middle managers and employees all embrace "Wa", they make 
ideals of excellence, co-operation, and loyalty between each other. On the other hand, face is a 
special concept in both Chinese and Japanese culture. People say having "face" means having a 
high recognition status in the eyes of peers, which is a mark of personal dignity28 . The Chinese 
and Japanese are normally sensitive about face in social and business life. Face can be given, 
lost, taken away or earned. If business performance is judged good, people seeking face respond, 
for poor performance leads to loss of face instead, but there are certain differences: the Chinese 
are normally much more concerned about the face of their family and themselves, but Japanese 
are concerned about face, in terms of themselves and society. The Japanese see the enterprise 
more collectively, and do not like to lose face in front of the Chinese. Further, in the Chinese 
transitional economy, they do not yet use the "He" of Confucianism in a way that will absorb 
Western management know-how well, so cultural influence over performance leaves them 
considerably weaker. 
5.5. Personality Influence 
Chinese managers are concerned with motives and performance for what they see as both 
intellectual and temperamental reasons. Even when reporting actual results they may filter out 
the least favourable factors because of the loss of "face" that may arise from these being more 
widely known, while any sense of inferiority may also embrace both their families and other 
organisations too. However, the Japanese approach is considered more direct and methodical, 
and less bound by wider social customs, so to safeguard their face, some Chinese will gloss over 
mistakes, where the Japanese do not29 . 
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6. Environment 
Dividing this into "hard" and "soft" the main features to arise were thus: 
Hard Factors 
The Japanese originally considered this would be most problematic. Many Chinese were 
sensitive to these issues too. However, there were still some differences. For example, when 
asked "what were the problems in your enterprise's development?" 11% of Chinese and 40% 
Japanese respondents replied "poor infrastructure" (see Table 36). In the case studies, Chinese 
managers interviewed appeared quite satisfied with the working environment. In Cases Two, 
Three and Four, my Chinese guides all indicated that their current workplace was better than 
before, although further improvements were needed. Chinese and Japanese standards of 
assessing the hard environment could well have differed due to their respective backgrounds. 
What to some Chinese may be advanced, to the Japanese appears simply ordinary. These 
different levels of appreciation occur especially where technology and facilities are concerned. 
"Mamafufuism" also contributes to the concept that nearly or almost is enough, a possible 
contradiction for many Japanese, for whom greater precision and exactitude are required. 
Soft Factor 
Although both partners first identified the hard factor as most problematic, they later found 
"soft" more difficult. Other evidence shows differences between Chinese and Japanese below: 
Table 8- 10: Problems in the course of enterprise development 
Ineffective laws and regulations 
Problems over developing domestic market 
(Table 36) 
Chinese: Japanese: 
32% 60% 
27% 40% 
Such evidence suggests these were more serious problems to the Japanese and that lawfulness 
remains a sensitive point still. 
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Table 8- 11: Transferability of Japanese management methods 
Chinese: Japanese: 
Economic & business systems differences 48% 20% 
Cultures & traditional differences 35% 40% 
Language barriers 25% 50% 
Political & social systems differences 24% 20% 
Low educational level of employees 15% 10% 
Poor co-operation 3% 0 
The Chinese identified more economtc and business systems blockages where Japanese 
emphasised language barriers. Both considered culture and traditional differences relatively 
restrictive, although education levels were not considered problematic, and poor co-operation 
even less so. In essence, "macro" factors would appear more problematic than "micro" factors in 
the workplace values and significant issues over the transferability of Japanese management 
methods at this time. 
6.1. Historicallinfnuence 
Some Chinese officials believed the "soft" environment better for JV s than for Chinese 
enterprises themselves. Such officials believed they originally took the standard of the 
environment they have to offer into consideration when selecting a compatible partner30, while 
continuing to improve individual "hard" and "soft" environment factors. However, many 
Japanese believed Chinese standards were still not fully acceptable, despite those recent 
improvements. 
Generally the "hard" environment has improved more quickly than the "soft" in China, since 
"soft" factors such as laws, policies and especially ideology were considered more difficult to 
change. JAEs here reported most difficulty with managing cash flow (56%) while laws and rules 
were still difficult to apply (36%), and it was still difficult to penetrate China's own domestic 
market (30%). Retrospectively, two factors underwent limited change, namely: investment 
environment and partner selection. The Chinese exerted stronger influence on the former, but 
less regarding the latter. However, on the three other aspects, there was change; the Japanese 
were no longer as strong on motives to form JVs and performance. but had gained intluence 
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regarding control and conflict. The Chinese arguably showed three particular potential strengths 
- motives, environment and performance, leaving the Japanese with two - control and conflict, 
and partner selection. 
6.2. Political Influence 
Chinese political influence was mostly apparent regarding "soft" features, such as laws, 
regulations and policies. As previously noted, Chinese policy regulation is liable to vary31 . This 
instability can be the result of power struggles and related events. 36% of total respondents 
considered Chinese laws and rules inadequate (see Table 36) and 23% considered they restricted 
the transfer of Japanese management methods (see Table 38). Compared with the Chinese, the 
Japanese political system appeared weaker in this respect, although the Japanese also politically 
influence partner relations in the JVs; some Japanese managers' political beliefs conflict with 
Chinese, thereby affecting partner relationships.32 The policies of China's transitional economy 
can permeate JV enterprises through political organisations such as CPC's branches, Trade 
Unions, Youth League and ideological activities such as political studies, all in a way that does 
not customarily apply in Japan today. 
6.3. Economic Influence 
The "hard" environment certainly influenced the Japanese. 15% of total respondents considered 
the infrastructure imperfect, although the Chinese were less critical (see Table 36). In terms of 
"soft" environment, 57% of total respondents considered cash flow, and 36% laws and rules 
were inappropriate. While 28% reported domestic market difficulties, and 22 and 21% 
considered it difficult to train local people and incurred excessive entertaining expenses, while 
19% considered local government inefficient (see Table 36). However much the Chinese may 
seek "soft" environment improvements for economic purposes, their political involvement limits 
them from bringing this about. 
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6.4. Cultural Influence 
The Japanese have selectively absorbed other cultures and then created their own distinctive 
Japanese-style enterprise culture. Corresponding Chinese culture is still at the so-called 
transitional stage. Such "cultural gaps" caused further difficulties: for example, Cases Two, 
Three and Four all sent employees to Japan for training. To explain the reason one Japanese 
manager said that: 
"The first stage to is send them to Japan to learn technique and management skills, 
the second is let them know the different quality of environment including enterprise 
culture in our Japanese company." 
Because Chinese-style enterprise culture has not yet fully developed, Chinese cultural influences 
were limited. Since 1979, the Chinese authorities started the "anti-political" culture movement, 
which would lead to a more "business ideology", a transition that is still under way. In these 
circumstances China lacks one mainstream culture, hence the perception of policies diverges 
accordingly. So the modern Chinese enterprise system is intended to have a legal basis, but 
Chinese culture has little legal tradition and even though the state has passed more laws, there is 
no proven tradition of abiding by such. 
6.5. Personality Influence 
Many Japanese may be expected to be more precise about the "hard" environment and have 
higher expectations about it. Only 11% of Chinese managers considered infrastructure 
problematic as against 40% Japanese managers (see Table 36). One particular Japanese manager 
in Case Four emphasised that: 
"The transportation system is comparatively out of date. It is often slow and lacks 
modern facilities, with much time wasted in waiting. Some buildings have poor 
quality construction, and very often water and electricity has not yet been connected 
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when the operation begins. Communication is far behind developed countries, even 
the post was slow and inefficient, while many business opportunities are lost through 
communications problems ... " 
Similarly the Japanese were more detailed in their appreciation of "soft" factors and went well 
beyond the minimum guidelines which Chinese managers typically considered most important. 
To summarise, such influences did potentially permeate JV practice, and indeed may have 
eventually led towards the creation of more wholly owned ventures, but their exact role clearly 
requires more research. 
7. Summary 
We have discussed a variety of influences on the development of JAEs. The discussion of each 
historical, political, economic, and cultural and personality aspect was, in the body of this 
chapter, limited with respect to the theoretical model and questions posed. In terms of history 
China is still a more politically orientated nation where there is such sensitivity to related matters 
that few are willing to be questioned about it. The Japanese have more business cultural 
influence in this respect whereas Chinese business cultural development has lagged behind. 
Chinese culture is now in a transitional period where influence is potentially weaker than 
Japanese culture in this respect. Unlike previous studies, this research has paid attention to those 
social personality influences which could underscore other mutual differences and conflicts 
between the Chinese and the Japanese. 
From the viewpoint of those employed in JAEs, Chinese managers and employees may learn 
from the Japanese, simply in order to further their own development. Although no culture stays 
unchanged, many such changes only evolve slowly and gradually, and not without some tensions 
and contradictions. As Harris and Moran (1987) have indicated, in resolving conflicts between 
two cultures even within the same organisation, three methods have been used: Dominance; 
Compromise; Synergy33 . Dominance is where one culture dominates another; Compromise is 
where both cultures participate in give and take until agreement is reached: Synergy is the 
formation of a new culture, born through the two original cultures. When considering conflicts 
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between Chinese and Japanese in JAEs, the Compromise method would appear most suitable 
where cultures are relatively similar, and have both originally evolved from the similar strands. 
The following five sections attempt to draw together the five influences described above to 
demonstrate that overall impact by means of more formal diagrammatic representation. 
7.1. Historical influence 
Figure 8-1 illustrates the major historical trends over the last two decades in the form of radar 
diagram. In this diagram, a star legend represents the Chinese, a circle legend represents the 
Japanese. If the position of the star or circle in black line comes close to the centre, it means that 
in this aspect the country is weaker; if it is further from the centre it is correspondingly stronger. 
The area bounded by the connecting lines for each country defines how much comparatively 
weaker or stronger it is. It is 20 years since China first started establishing international joint 
ventures. During these years, the JV process has undergone many changes and developments, 
which we may consider to be historical influences spanning both countries. Figure 8-1 (a) depicts 
the dynamic of the process towards joint ventures as originally being stronger for the Japanese 
than for the Chinese. Figure 8-1 (b) then suggests the Chinese have since gained strength relative 
to the Japanese. 
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7.2. Politican Influence 
Figure 8-2 shows how Chinese political influence exceeded the Japanese. The Communist Party 
of China (CPC) provides China's official national ideology. The Party is claimed to listen and 
collect suggestions from the people, on the basis of which practice can develop34 . Formerly state 
enterprise employees were politically dependent, and every enterprise contained a CPC cell or 
party branch, dating back to the mid-1950s. Party cadres in the enterprise are expected to provide 
political leadership, often in the context of political and ideological study sessions, as well as 
being involved in day-to-day matters. After it was officially announced that the party's role in 
day-to-day management was to be reduced, and the authority of line managers and technical 
experts increased, in 198435 party cadres struggled to maintain their power. However, there is no 
independent official system for CPC branches established in JV enterprises. This is different 
from state enterprises, but many members of the CPC may have joined the unofficial branch at 
JV enterprises36 . While party secretaries are not officially given seats on JV boards of directors, 
they potentially have a voice there through other political organisations like Trade Unions. 
Organisations such as Trade Union, Women's Federation and Youth influence JVs. On 
occasions, the party secretary is simultaneously the Trade Union leader in JV enterprises37, 
although political influence inside them is less intense than in state enterprises. However, all 
employees in a JV enterprise officially have the right to set up Trade Unions, which they 
themselves have the right to organise political studies38 . 
Figure 8-2a shows that Chinese political influence on JV enterprises is markedly stronger than 
Japanese, and demonstrates where this counts most. Compared with China, Japan has a 
constitutional monarchy and its political system has so-called organised mass parties like the 
Komei Party and the Japanese Communist Party within it, but the Liberal Democratic Party plays 
the leading role in Japan at presene9. 
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No single party in Japan can presently impose ideological control, and most are influenced by 
outside contact, with the West in particular. The Japanese may now seek leaders more like those 
of Western powers40 . Otherwise, there are no independent political organisations directly located 
within enterprises or political studies involved in enterprise activities. 
7.3. Economic li~rnfluence 
Figure 8-3 compares Chinese and Japanese economic influences. The Chinese economic system 
is the so-called socialist market economy, which involves elements of a planned and free-market 
economy, as if it can enjoy both. The Fourteenth National Congress of the CPC put forward this 
socialist market economy in 1992, whereby the means of production are owned by the state but 
managed according to free market principles41 . 
Although nominally a market economy, Japan still exerts some central control through 
"administrative guidance", and similar systems that co-ordinate key national strategic actions. 
The President in Case Two, indicated that the operation of the enterprise could be compared to 
navigating a big ship to its destination in a stormy and rough sea42 . 
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Figure 8-3: Economic influence between the Chinese and Japanese 
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Figure 8-3a shows the Japanese duly gaining stronger economic influence upon JV enterprises 
than the Chinese. The reason can be found in Figure 8-3b. The Japanese are stronger regarding 
organisational, marketing, ownership and ideological aspects. China officially is a socialist 
market economy, whose central planning aspect is stronger, but in marketing - especially 
international- it falls behind the Japanese. Contemporary Japanese economic structure has been 
very much influenced by Western - particularly US - economic theory and business practice. 
The Chinese economy has been less influenced this way, and only started to embrace Western 
economic ideology two decades ago, leaving some scope for potential ideological conflict43 . 
7.4. Culturan llnfluel!llce 
Japanese cultural influence appears, on the whole, potentially stronger than Chinese in JAEs, as 
can be seen from Figure 8-4. A more detailed analysis shows that the Japanese, on some specific 
points, may even exceed the cultural influence displayed by the Chinese. Although both cultures 
originated from Confucianism, they still differ in other respects. So-called Corifucianism is not so 
much a religion as an ethical code. Its basic tenets has been summarised as obedience to and 
respect for superiors and parents, duty to family, loyalty to friends, humility, sincerity, and 
courtesy44 . 
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Figure 8-4: Basic human relationships of Confucianism 
Source: Kirby, D.A., and Fan, Y., "Chinese Cultural Values and Entrepreneurship: A Preliminary 
Consideration", Journal of Enterprising Culture, Vol: 3, No. 3, 1995, pp245-60. 
Although China and Japan share a historic Confucian cultural heritage it is not the only cultural 
influence in either, and more recently other Western elements like Marxism have been added to 
the prevailing "cultural mix". Since then the "political culture" element has been critized in the 
light of economic reform although selected features still remain. Officially the idea of "business 
culture" has enjoyed support, but any such culture must initially develop alongside other cultural 
traditions, at least before actually replacing them. China is therefore in a state of "cultural flux" 
while other are taking place. 
lt seems debateable where Japanese cultural influence could exceed the Chinese, as can be seen 
from Figure 8-Sa. Can China exert so little cultural influence that it is exceeded by the Japanese. 
whose own culture originally evolved through the Chinese? This may be explained by Figure 8-
Sb. There are six factors such as Ideology, Collectivism, Confucianism, Education, Western 
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culture, and Family in this fi gure, but onl y the customary Chinese famil y is arguabl y s tronger 
than the Japanese. 
Figure 8-5: Cultural influence between the Chinese and Japanese 
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The situation in Japan is different when the Japanese incorporated Chinese culture over two 
thousand years ago45 , that included Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism, and even some classic 
Chinese-style management thought46 . Japanese society was publicly influenced by the thought of 
Confucius47 . Aspects of the Confucian ethic were transferred into Japanese business conduct, so 
that younger people are expected to defer to their elders in speech and manner, and elders are 
expected to reward juniors who work well. Seniority has been an important criterion fo r 
promotions and wage increases. As a result Confucianism has helped to develop and legitimise 
workplace hierarchies. So, looking at Figure 9-Sb, the Japanese here appear stronger than the 
Chinese. Only in ideological influence may the Chinese readily exceed the Japanese. As noted 
before, Japanese culture has drawn upon others outside its boundaries despite its overall sense of 
unopenness . We can see from the proverb that a Japanese may be given Shinto (a Japanese 
traditional religion) rites at birth, a Christian ceremony at marriage. and a Buddhist funeral at 
death48 . 
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7.5. Personality hlflUJience 
The special meaning of personality varies across cultures. Many Western cultures emphasise 
individual personality whereas some Eastern cultures regard individualism differently. Trait 
psychology has previously influenced much Western thought on this subject. Usually this has 
been highly individualistic. This alone limits its usefulness in a Chinese or Japanese field 
situation. Nevertheless speculation about why Chinese and Japanese personality may 
fundamentally differ has its own long history even within the West. For example Bertrand 
Russell ( 1922) speculated about this along philosophical grounds. He argued that many Chinese 
were of conservative and gentle disposition, preferred equable relations, and valued compromise 
and money49• Particularly after World War Two there were more direct studies of so-called 
"national character", again partly based upon trait psychology, which were later subject to some 
dispute on both theoretical and methodological grounds. Nevertheless some speculation of this 
type still continues. For example Matsumoto (1995) describes Chinese personality as typically 
open towards ethnic differences, anti-war, diligent, enduring, culture - affirming, yet also 
inefficient, passive, and maybe crude and careless50 . Although this particular combination of 
traits itself appears somewhat contradictory, the Japanese are said to demonstrate some 
additional differences, such as impetuosity, speediness and aggression. As regards the 
understanding of joint venture founding and development such speculation may not take us very 
far but it does at least remind us of how deeply differences may go whatever the venture 
concerned. Figure 8-6(a) attempts to relate possible personality influences over joint ventures in 
this light: 
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Figure 8-6: Personality influence between the Chinese and Japanese 
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The possible personality differences are then transposed onto Figure 8-6 (b). This shows historic 
Chinese claims to intelligence and temperament might influence certain features and Japanese 
claims to accuracy, attitude, and aptitude others. To repeat, this is not based upon this research 
data, but does reflect customary thinking about how Chinese and Japanese natively differ, 
whatever the individual venture concerned. 
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It is difficult to compare intelligence and aptitudes between Chinese and Japanese. There are 
psychological test studies which show broad cross-cultural comparisons, for example Stevenson, 
Lee, Stigle et. al (1990) found that Chinese children surpassed Japanese and American children 
in reading scores, and both Chinese and Japanese obtained higher scores in mathematics than 
American, but the differences related more to their school and home experience than innate 
intellectual ability51 . As regards temperament, the Chinese are considered more gentle and open 
than the Japanese, who appear more excitable and conservative. The Chinese are still associated 
with "mamafufuism" where the Japanese are much more attuned to fine details. For example, 
one particular difference can be traced in the chopsticks both use. Chinese chopsticks tend to 
have the same width, both ends are rather blunt, so it is only possible to pick up larger items. 
Japanese make chopsticks so that one end slopes inwards, forming a sharper point, this is so that 
the user can pick up even the smallest grain of rice. Other differences can be partly explained by 
such proverbs that Chinese think more with their hearts than with their heads52 . Such proverbs 
imply the Chinese prefer using emotions rather than intellect, they appear less articulate, whereas 
the Japanese tend to calculate and analyse in more detail. 
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7.6. Sub-summary 
The results suggest that, compared with the Japanese. the Chinese are less powerful when 
managing JAEs. The Japanese hold more advantages in both tangible and intangible aspects. 
Therefore, by means of ownership, board of directors, formal agreement, key managers, financial 
control, strategic resources and enterprise culture, they gain control, and extend their influence 
over the Chinese and international markets. This is illustrated in Figure 8-7: 
Figure 8- 7: Strength of Influences over JAE Strategy 
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Directors 
Employees 
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Note: Thicker blacker lines denote greater strength. 
Although there are shared influences in certain respects the Japanese may gain more power and 
control over the wider spectrum as ventures develop and mature beyond the original founding 
state. 
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Case Studies 
Chapter Nine 
This chapter presents key findings from four individual case studies, each analyzed with 
reference to the theoretical model outlined before, and cross-referenced in the Chapters detailing 
Japanese and Chinese perspectives. Based in Beijing, Tianjin and Chengdu, the case study sites 
entailed some travel, but both Japanese and Chinese top level managers proved accessible for 
these purposes. 
The overall purpose of these case studies was to provide more qualitative depth to, and another 
type of check of, those survey findings summarized before. Each case was selected for differing 
purposes thus: 
CASE ONE: Sino-Japanese Sichuan Sanhai Plastics Co., Ltd 
The purpose was to investigate how an individual Sino-Japanese venture was so conceived and 
planned as to demonstrate clear tangible benefits to both respective partners and the Chinese 
economy at large. The researcher interviewed four representatives from the top management 
level of this venture. They were: a Deputy Managing Director, a Secretary from the Chinese 
parent companies, a Managing Director and a Deputy Managing Director from the JV company. 
Altogether, the researcher visited the company on four separate occasions: twice to the head 
office for interviews totalling about seven hours, twice to a factory for interviews and tours 
lasting two whole days. 
1.1. Motive 
Negotiations to set up a joint venture began in June 1992 between China Mianyang Plastics 
Factory and Sichuan Plastics industrial Company and Japan Hi-Sheet Industrial Co., Ltd, Mitsui 
Petrochemical industries, Ltd and Mitsui & Co., Ltd from Japan. After two years of negotiation 
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and planning, a contract was signed on I lth April I 994 to establish a Sino-Japanese JV 
Company in China Mianyang National New Hi-tech Development Zone. The total amount of 
investment was US $3.07m, with a registered capital of US $2.15m. Of the registered capital, the 
Chinese would invest US $0.86m in cash, accounting for 40% of the total, and the Japanese US 
$I .29 in cash, 60% of the total. The main stated business was to produce plastic caps, PE plastic 
closures and other plastic products, and to market plastic building products and related materials 
both at home and aboard. 
Stated Objectives These were to promote the development of the plastics industry in China, 
particularly Sichuan, and to increase and strengthen international trade and technical exchange. 
The JV was to adopt advanced technology and management methods to continuously improve 
production efficiency and increase profitability to enable the parent companies to obtain 
satisfactory return. PE material is used in a wide range of Hi-tech products, especially in Japan. 
However, production of this material in China was just at the initial stage with poor production 
equipment and techniques resulting in low quality products. The Hi-Sheet Co., Ltd had advanced 
technology and a high quality product they would transfer, along with Japanese management 
methods to ensure they would be appropriately utlized. 
Projected Plan The two Chinese compames and three Japanese compames formally 
agreed to invest cash in Mianyang, to establish a JV company to produce and sell PE material 
and other plastic material products. The main product market was located Sichuan and related 
areas of China. The General Manager would carry out the various decisions of the board 
meetings and organise the daily operational and management work of the JV. The duration of the 
JV was formally fixed at 50 years. There were 7 JV company board members: 3 Chinese and 4 
Japanese. The JV company's designed capacity was lOOOT/year of PE mats material, to be used 
to produce 750T/year of flake. 
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1.2. Partner selection 
Sichuan Provincial Plastic and Hi-Sheet Industrial originally initiated this Joint Venture with the 
following ownership make-up. 
Mianyang plastic factory This factory was one of the main Sichuan based plastic producers, 
and one of the top 500 nationally. The gross capital was 34m RMB, and the total number of 
employees 384, including 57 engineers. Since 1983, the factory had imported five advanced 
production lines and key equipment from Japan and HK. By I995 its production capability had 
increased to I OOOT/year. The gross value of industrial output exceeded RMB 30m, and profits 
and taxes amounted to RMB 2m, following 5 years of continuous improvement. 
Sichuan Provincial Plastic Industry Corp. As a corporate body, they engaged in 
commercial trade, and assisted the government in managing the Sichuan plastics industry, 
including planning work quality and facilitating international co-operation. With some 280 
subsidiaries and about 30,000 employees, the corporation purchased and sold around 30,000 tons 
a year of both imported and China made polymers, and was engaged in wholesaling the plastic 
end-products of its enterprises. 
Hi-sheet Industrial Co. Ltd Hi-sheet was the principal Japanese investor and most 
directly involved in technology transfer and operational management. Hi-sheet was established 
in September I972 as a subsidiary of the Mitsui Petrochemical Industry Co. Ltd. It was 
capitalised at I OOm Japanese Yen (end of Jan. I994) and its main business was producing and 
selling plastic products. 
Mitsui Petrochemical Industries Ltd This IS a maJor Japanese petrochemical industry 
enterprise and one which possessed advanced technology and productive methods. Mitsui 
Petrochemical had a gross capital of 32b Japanese Yen (end of Jan 1994), and a total output 
value of 330.82b Japanese Yen (end of 1991 ). It was the parent company of 1-li-sheet. 
200 
Chapter Nine 
Mitsui & Co. Ltd Mitsui & Co. Ltd was the most important trade and investment company 
in the Mitsui group with a gross capital of 179.3b Japanese Yen (end of Mar 1994). It is the lead 
company in this programme. 
Source and Composition of JV Capital: 
Gross investment: 
Registered capital: 
Composed of: 
Mianyang Plastic Factory 
Sichuan Plastic Industrial Corp. 
Hi-sheet Industrial Co. Ltd 
Mitsui Petrochemical Industries, Ltd 
Mitsui & Co. Ltd 
US $3.07m (Accounting to US $1 = RMB 
8.7521 =Japanese Yen 105) 
US $2.15m 
US $0.645m, 30% of the total. 
US $0.215m, I 0% of the total. 
US $0.645m, 30% ofthe total. 
US $0.43m, 20% of the total. 
US $0.215m, 10% ofthe total. 
Gross Chinese investment of US $0.86m included US $0.16m from the enterprises themselves, 
plus a US $0.7m loan from a Chinese ban1c The gross Japanese investment was US $1.29m. 
Both sides invested in cash. The balance of the gross investment came from a bank loan taken 
out by the JV company itself after its establishment. 
Technology equipment and production capacity: 
o Techniques and know-how was to be transferred with compensation from Hi-sheet Industrial 
Co. Ltd. 
o Following an assessment of equipment available in the Chinese domestic market, both sides 
concluded that the technical performance and quality of Chinese made machines was 
inadequate. The Japanese first suggested that the main production line and key machines 
should be imported from Japan and South Korea, and both sides agreed. 
o Some auxiliary machinery was tested in the Mianyang Plastic Factory after which both 
partners decided that the JV company could buy it on the Chinese domestic market. The JV 
company would give priority to other Chinese auxiliary equipment while it met the required 
standard. 
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Raw material siUipplies: 
The density of polyester to be used by these products was assessed through trials after which it 
was decided that 1C7A polyester produced by Beijing Yanshan Petrochemical Company was the 
most satisfactory. This and other secondary material would be bought in the Chinese domestic 
market. 
Operation budget: 
Investment budget 
a. Land purchase ( 1.66 hectare) 
b. Capital construction 
c. Machinery and equipment 
d. Technology transfer 
e. Working capital 
f. Design, debugging, repair etc. 
g. Unforeseen expenses 
us $190,500 
us $354,400 
us $344,760 
us $1393,500 
us $348,300 
us $318,200 
us $120,340 
Timescaie It was planned to become operational within thirteen months of receiving an 
official permit, and designated capacity would reach within two years. (PE flake 1000 tons/year, 
and caps products 750 tons/year) 
1.3. Control and conflict 
Organisation Structure The Chinese and Japanese partners in the JV had set up a Board of 
Directors, consisting of 7 directors, 3 Chinese and 4 Japanese. A Chairperson was nominated by 
the Chinese while a Vice Chairperson was nominated by the Japanese partners. The formal term 
of office for the Directors was 2 years. The Board of Directors was granted supreme authority 
over the JV. It could itself only decide on major issues by unanimous agreement through 
discussion in accordance with stipulations specified in the contract. The Board of Directors 
would convene at least one routine meeting every year. An interim Board meeting could be 
convened at the request of the Directors. The Chairperson would preside over the Board meeting, 
with the Vice-Chairperson acting in the absence of the Chairperson. Quo racy was fixed at 2/3 of 
the total including proxies. Detailed minutes of all the meetings convened by the Board of the 
Directors would be kept. The JV company was to have one General Manager and one Vice 
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General Manager, with the General Manager nominated by the Japanese, and the Vice General 
Manager nominated by the Chinese. The power of both the chairperson and the General Manager 
would be stipulated in the JV company rules and regulations. Each investor would assume risks, 
losses and debts conesponding to their prefixed portion of the investment, and similarly few 
profits. The Chinese employees would be recruited by the JV Company itself, subject to the 
approval of the local labour management department. 
1.13. Staff training 
Schedule for operations training in Japan 
Staff I Number 11 Time I Place 
Operational manager 1 month Tokyo 
Marketing manager 1 month Tokyo 
Design manager 1 month Katsuta factory 
Production manager 1 3 months Katsuta factory 
Operations staff 4 3 months Katsuta factory 
Interpreter 1 4 months Katsuta factory 
Total 9 13 montllns 
E I t t mp oyment s rue ure 
Unit p 0 s t JSe E m p I o y e e s Female Nationality Total 
Management General manager 1 Japanese 3 
Deputy general manager 1 Chinese 
Assistant general manager 1 Japanese 
Office Director I Chinese 13 
Staff Interpreter I Chinese 
Secretary 1 Chinese 
General affairs I Chinese 
Accountant 1 Chinese 
Cashier 1 Chinese 
Driver 2 Chinese 
Cook 2 Chinese 
Porter 2 Chinese 
Cleaner I Chinese 
Operations Director 1 Chinese 9 
Department Sales 2 I Chinese 
Purchasing 1 Chinese 
Stock-keeper (material) 1 Chinese 
Stock-keeper (products) I Chinese 
Driver I Chinese 
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Technology Director 1 Chinese 7 
Depatiment Technology, quality 1 Chinese 
Equipment 1 Chinese 
Statistician 1 Chinese 
Safety production 1 Chinese 
Electricity 2 Chinese 
Manufacturing Production director 1 Chinese 27 
Section Handle, model, cut 25 Chinese 
operatives 
Tester 1 Chinese 
Total 53 6 59 
1.4. Performance 
Market analysis From June 1992, both partners carried out joint market research on 
demand in the Chinese domestic market. This product had a wide range of uses, but their 
research concentrated on white spirit factories first, and then cosmetic, other beverage etc. 
factories second. It showed that six leading white spirit distilleries alone required over 1 billion 
PE caps in Sichuan Province alone, excluding a further 1 billion requirement by medium and 
small sized distilleries in Sichuan. Therefore, just the Sichuan white spirit distilleries requirement 
exceeded the annual output of 1000 ton/year. Many other factories expressed some interest in the 
products offered, on the basis that they would receive early supplies. Furthermore, by 1994 
market research predicted that oral tonic and oral liquid medicine bottles would start to use PE 
plastic caps instead of rubber. The annual output of these products was 14 billion in 1993 and 
expected to be 20 billion in 1995 with a requirement of 3500 ton/year of PE plastic material. In 
addition there were a large number of beverages which would use PE plastic bottle caps. The 
market for these products in Sichuan and the rest of China was thus considered potentially large, 
and the capacity of this programme was actually lower than the predicted requirements of the 
Chinese domestic market. 
Economic evaluation (by both partners) 
Economic Evaluation of Sino-Japanese JV Pro· cct (1) 
------~-=------~~~------=--=-=~~ Project Unit !Price situation I situation 2 
=====r====~======:P=====r====,====~ I I !amount RMB RMB/kg ount RMB RMB/kg 
~================~p==~==~iF 
Sale volume I I OOOt 18.65m 18.65 750 20.76m 27.69 
----~----_.------~----~~~---=~ 
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Output(%) t/y 1000 750 
% of raw material used % 90 85.5 
Amount of raw material t/y 1lll.l 874.1 
Costs (variable) 
Raw materials kg 6.7 1111.1 7.44m 7.44 874.1 5.86m 7.81 
Materials kg 0.2 1000 0.2m 0.2 1000 0.2m 0.27 
Electricity kha 0.25 1247 0.31m 0.31 1582.5 0.4m 0.53 
Water m 0.23 5000 1200 0 5000 1200 0 
Fuel I 3.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
N2 m 70 2000 0.14m 0.14 2000 0.14m 0.19 
Packing materials kg 0.1 0.1m 0.1 0.1m 0.13 
Direct sales costs kg 0.12 0.12m 0.12 0.09m 0.12 
Interest 0.12 4663 0.56m 0.56 5192 0.62m 0.83 
Technology royalty (sale quota x 2%) 0.37m 0.37 0.37m 0.5 
Total variable costs 9.25m 9.25 7.78m 10.38 
Gross profit 9.4m 9.4 12.98m 17.31 
ThE e . E I f COnOIDIC va ua Ion o rs· J mo- apanese JV p . t (2) rOJCC 
Project Unit Price situation 1 situation 2 
!amount RMB RMB/kg amount RMB RMB/kg 
Costs (fixed) 
Labour 44 (C) 0.23m 0.23 63 (C) 0.32m 0.42 
2 (J) 0.36m 0.36 2 (J) 0.36m 0.48 
Health and sales 0.6m 0.06 0.09 0.12 
Depreciation charges 
Building % 4 3179 0.13m 0.13 3179 0.13m 0.17 
~quipment % 10 13247 1.32m 1.32 18073 1.8m 2.41 
Land % 0 3892 0 0 3892 0 0 
Technology % 10 1662 0.16m 0.17 1662 0.16m 0.22 
Equipment 0.54m 0.54 0.73m 0.97 
maintenance 
Equipment insurance 0.05m 0.05 0.6m 0.09 
Equip. fund interest % 12 7006 0.84m 0.84 11832 1.42m 1.89 
Interest on techn. fee % 12 1662 0.2m 0.2 1662 0.2m 0.27 
Factory management fee 0.05m 0.05 0.05m 0.07 
Indirect sales costs % 1 0.19m 0.19 0.2m 0.28 
R&D % 0.5 0.09m 0.09 0.1m 0.14 
Total fixed costs 4.51m 4.51 5.96 7.94 
Interest % 3 -6256 0.19m 0.19 6256 0.19m 0.25 
Total costs 13.57m 13.57 23.55m 18.07 
Profit before tax 5.08m 5.08 7.2m 9.62 
Sales tax (sales quota x 0.17/1.17) 2.17m 2.17 3.02 4.02 
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Purchase tax (estimate quota x 0.17 /1.17) 1.26m 1.26 
Profit after tax 3.63m 3.63 
Main basic funds 0.15 0.54m 0.54 
Profit 3.09m 3.09 
Balanced sale price 15.02 
A. Table One shows the balance between profit and loss. 
B. Annual gross profits and taxes and nets profit. 
a. Sales of PE plastic material at a price of RMB 18650/ton 
on mmual sales of 1000 tons: 
Annual gross sales: 
Annual profit and tax: 
Annual dividend: 
RMB 18.65 million 
RMB 5.08m 
RMB 3.08m 
b. Sales of PE plastic seals at RMB 27690/ton 
on annual sale of 750 tons: 
Annual gross sales: 
Annual profit of tax: 
Annual profit: 
Annual dividend: 
RMB 20.76m 
RMB 7.21m 
RMB 5.26m 
RMB 4.47m 
Chapter Nine 
7.33 9.78 
1.07m 1.42 
5.26m 7.02 
0.79 1.05 
4.47 5.96 
20.67 
Operational Strategy Elsewhere there were high-class products with low-class 
packaging. There was a need to improve the quality of seals up to world levels. With imported 
foreign advanced equipment and teclmology, and using proven operational management 
methods, it would be possible to produce high quality products at a more competitive price and 
thus increase profits. 
1.5. Investment Environment 
China's packaging and packaging materials industry was considered well behind more developed 
countries. This was especially true of the seal material field, where many factories still used 
rubber seals. This not only resulted in high costs and low efficiency, but seal quality problems 
reduced overall production improvement. China's PE plastic productions was still in its infancy. 
production technology was poor, and output was so restricted that it could not satisfy all th~ 
demand for air tight material. With this gap between demand and supply, the JV company would. 
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in principle, be in an ideal position to take an early market lead. By importing more Japanese 
advanced technology, and transferring certain Japanese management skills, the Chinese 
packaging material industry could be brought up to the technical level of more developed 
countries, and provided other competitors did not enter it, both partners could profit from this JV. 
o The two Chinese compames had much expenence of the plastics industry. They were 
financially stable, technologically competent, leading companies in the Sichuan area. The JV 
company would be located at the Mianyang New High-tech Development Zone which 
enjoyed a good geographical position, and favourable local government. The three Japanese 
companies possessed finance and technology, they had rich experience in production and 
operational management. The development of high quality products with advanced 
production technology would be to China's advantage. 
e The technology and quality of the PE plastic material were of a sufficiently high level; 
products were very competitive with a large potential market and excellent future prospects 
in China. 
9 In comparison with the rest of the Chinese plastics industry, Japanese production technology 
and products were far superior. 
• This project would utilise foreign funds and import advanced technology to develop new 
products, so therefore it accorded with the Chinese government's economic development 
policy. Furthermore, it was predicted that the venture would soon be in profit. 
Based on above, both the Chinese and Japanese partners thought that the transfer of Japanese 
technology and equipment, and the early supply of PE plastic seal material to China's domestic 
market was all very feasible. 
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CASE TWO: Beijing Matsushita Colour CJRT Company Ltd. (BMCC) 
The purpose was to investigate key features of a Sino-Japanese venture once successfully 
founded but rapidly becoming identified as a key player in its particular sector in China. BMCC 
was one of the leading JV companies among foreign affiliated enterprises in China. Six years 
after starting operations, its total reported profit and tax was RMB 2.04 billion, 4 times the 
original investment. In 1995, BMCC reportedly became one of the top twelve enterprises in 
Chinese manufacturing, and number one in its electronics industry. The researcher interviewed 
four representatives from the top management level of BMCC in Beijing, two Chinese and two 
Japanese. 
2.1 Motive 
Reason for founding Why did the Beijing partner prefer a joint venture with Matsushita? 
How did the Matsushita Electrical Industry Group embark on its investment in China? The 
interview answers were as follows: 
"The basic reason for our group of companies to enter into investment in China was 
that the founder of the Matsushita Company Mr. Matsushita, was very interested in 
China. He thought that China would have the largest influence on the development of 
Asia and the world. Also Mr. Matsushita has twice visited China, in 1979 and 1980. 
He told many Chinese leaders that it was not enough only to import equipment and 
technology from Matsushita, because management know-how would be more 
important than equipment. Based on this background, in 1985, the Director of 
Matsushita Electric Industrial Corporation at that time, Mr. Y amashita, discussed 
details with the Mayor of Beijing Mr. Xitong Cheng. They reached agreement about 
50%: 50% equal partnership. They signed a JV agreement on the 22nd May 1987. At 
that time, all Chinese colour CRTs were imported from foreign countries using 
valuable foreign exchange. Production of CRTs is a very complex industry. It needs 
high technology and equipment to produce colour CRTs. Therefore, the Matsushita 
company has 140 projects in the form oftechnical assistance. BMCC was Matsushita 
Co.'s initial joint venture company, established on the 8111 of September 1987." (The 
answer from the Japanese interviewee) 
"The establishment of BMCC was jointly proposed by the leaders of Beijing 
Municipal Government and Matsushita Electric Company of Japan. They wished to 
set up such a joint venture enterprise to develop an advanced enterprise with a strong 
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competitive capacity in the world market. They hoped to provide domestic and 
international markets with a large number of top quality CRTs, produced with first 
rate technology, and thus give momentum to the development of China's TV 
industry. We think that to make a careful study of advanced technology we need the 
management know-how of Matsushita Electric Company, and especially its 
experience in personnel training. With ten guiding principles BMCC will try its best 
to produce an army of staff who are morally good and technically qualified. In 
today's world no nation can develop rapidly and fully unless it communicates and 
co-operates with other nations. The establishment of BMCC has provided a good 
opportunity for Chinese and Japanese to learn from each other. China and Japan have 
different national and social characteristics and a diverse historical and cultural 
background, but both share trust and understanding in the management of BMCC." 
(The answer from the Chinese interviewee) 
2.2. Partner selection 
Beijing Matsushita Colour CRT Company Ltd was established on the 8th September 1987, as a 
joint venture limited company. Matsushita secured its partners for the joint venture after 
contacting the local government of Beijing. The gross capital was approximately RMB 500 
million, of which the Chinese partner provided 50% and Matsushita 50%. The members Board 
represented were as follows: 
Beijing partner: Beijing Electronics Tube Factory, China National Electronics 
Import & Export Corporation Beijing Branch, The Commercial Bank of China-
Beijing Branch and Beijing CRT Factory. Matsushita partner: Matsushita Electric 
Industrial Company Ltd and Matsushita Electronics Corporation. 
The number of employees was approximately 2450, and the term of the joint venture was 20 
years. They had two production lines with one producing 21" FS tubes for colour TV s, with 
production beginning 1st July 1989, and the other producing 14", 19", 21" FS tubes for colour 
TV s. In total production capacity was I million items per year, and production began 1st May 
1990. However, it recently began producing a new type of tube, the "GAOO 29" CRT Panel 
(SF), double the diagonal axis compared with the conventional type, increasing total production 
capacity to 2.8 million items per year. In general, about 70% of its production was sold on the 
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Chinese market, with 30% exported to overseas markets, including Japan, Malaysia, Mexico and 
Indonesia. The main stated aim of exporting was to balance the enterprise foreign exchange 
requirements. 
2.3. Control and conflict 
The Organization Structure of BMCC Management 
Director of Board 
Chairman & Vice-Chairman ofthe Board of Directors 
Chinese & Japanese Partners Sharing the 
I 2 Directorships 
I 
PRESIDENT 
AND 
VICE-PRESIDENT 
I 
Manufacturing ,_ r- Engineering Planning & Finance 1- r- Equipment & Power Department Department Department Department 
Materials & Supply Personnel General Affairs Marketing 
Department 
f-'-
Department Department 
I-'-
Department 
At the initial stage, the Chairman of the Board was Mr. P. Zhang (Chinese), the Vice-Chairman 
of the Board was Mr. Danjo (Japanese), and the President of BMCC was Mr. Ninagawa 
(Japanese), the Vice-President was Mr. Z. Zhang (Chinese). The Board of Directors formally 
meets annually. The Head of the Personnel and General Affairs Departments are Chinese, other 
Departments are all headed by Japanese, with Chinese deputy heads. The staff in each 
depat1ment varies: the Equipment and Power Department has most with 75 staff, the 
Manufacturing Department 50, the Engineering Department 45, and other departments each had 
20 staff. 
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Staff Development BMCC put strong emphasis on educating its staff and workers before 
making products. The ten rules of BMCC developed from the seven rules of Matsushita Electric 
Company are as follows: 
The Ten Rules of JBMCC 
According to published documents and statements there were: 
1. Make a contribution to the nation by developing industry. 
2. Seek truth from facts. 
3. Develop through reform. 
4. Co-operate in a friendly way. 
5. Rely on fairness and honour. 
6. Work with unity and solidarity. 
7. Work hard and aim high. 
8. Show courtesy and modesty. 
9. Abide by laws and regulations. 
10. Serve society. 
With these ten rules as its guiding principle, BMCC endeavoured to develop a corps of staff who 
were considered morally superior and technically qualified, willing to unite in order to build 
BMCC into a "model" joint venture enterprise. Its express objectives and aims were thus: 
The Objective of BMCC 
To challenge international competitors in CPT with resolution and unity. 
The Basic Aims 
To recognise our responsibilities as industrialists, to foster progress, to promote 
the general welfare of society, and to devote ourselves to the further 
development of world culture. 
It aimed to "produce qualified people before producing goods", on the basis that the key to 
success was people. BMCC developed many training programmes to enable staff and workers to 
raise their skill levels and morale. For example: 
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o Defining an annual company policy and announcing it to everyone as a key company 
management strategy. BMCC held an annual company policy announcement ceremony every 
year. 
o Every Monday morning, BMCC holds a general assembly, where it hoists both the national 
and company flag, and everyone chants the company's objectives and ten rules in unison, in 
order to strengthen unity and develop staff morale. 
o BMCC believed it very important that all people should love their company and be clearly 
aware of its future development plans. To achieve cost rationalisation, BMCC regularly 
carried out suggestion committee activities. 
e No company can continue to progress without efficient people. Therefore, BMCC made 
particular efforts to train newcomers in its philosophy. A language laboratory provided the 
chance for all to study foreign languages. BMCC also encourages its staff to participate in 
various approved cultural activities. 
2.4. Performance 
Technology Transfer and Staff Training All the manufacturing and power equipment was 
imported from Japan; the technology used to produce the products is 100% Matsushita designed. 
BMCC's CRTs had the following technological features: 
• IN-Line. Self-Convergence and Self-Pincushion-Correction system, and high resolution 
electron gun which adopts Over Lapping Field lens (OLF) and Aberration Reducing Triode 
(ART) to improve focus quality. 
• 22.5mm mini-neck to reduce deflection power consumption. 
• Low transmitting panel, black-matrix and pigmented phosphorus to enhance contrast. 
e Quick-heating low-power cathode for instant picture. 
• Implosion protection and full protection from X-ray radiation, to meet international safety 
requirements. 
BMCC also sent staff to .Japan for training. Prior to the start of production engineers and workers 
were sent to .Japan Matsushita Electric Company to study the necessary technology. They 
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worked in the Matsushita factory under the guidance of Japanese engineers and workers, on the 
production line alongside Japanese, and were involved across all stages of manufacture. A 
number of Japanese managers, engineers and workers were assigned to BMCC to pass on their 
skills and teach Chinese staff how to operate their Matsushita production line. At the initial 
stage, BMCC sent about 250 Chinese staff to Japan to study the manufacturing and management 
methods of Matsushita Electric, and all stayed in there for about 5.5 months. After this, BMCC 
expanded rapidly to employ over two thousand staff members. In addition, about 200 Japanese 
staff were variously assigned to BMCC to help transfer Matsushita technology and management 
methods. 
BMCC informed new staff that, in order to produce high quality products, it employs advanced 
production facilities and seeks superior workers who never ignore any possible defects. Workers 
went through a thorough training course before they could enter the production line. The training 
course consisted of three parts: BM CC's basic guiding principles and objectives; CRT teclmical 
know-how; and company employment regulations. In addition, because BMCC used Japanese 
management methods, staff were trained in those methods, in training courses lasting for three 
weeks full-time. 
Production and Marketing According to the initial plan, production began two years 
after the signing of the agreement, i.e. 1st September 1989, but the first production line actually 
started on 1st July 1989, two months earlier than planned. The second production line was 
started on 1st May 1990, also two months earlier than the initial plan. A shift work system was 
applied to the second production line from June 1990, several months earlier than planned. By 
the end of 1992, BMCC had produced a total of about 5 million units, and in 1992 alone, BMCC 
produced 21", 19" and 14" FS CRTs to a total of about 2.06 million units. 
Quality was a key factor. The quality of BMCC's CRT was considered to reach the international 
standards comparable with Matsushita's products in Japan. BMCC products all use the 
Matsushita trademark "Panasonic". BMCC was the first company in China to pass all 4 major 
safety standards. These are "UL" of the USA, "BSI" of the UK, "VDE" of Germany and "CAS" 
of Canada. 
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2.5. investment Environment 
BMCC considered two markets when making product decisions. These were TV factories and 
the end-users. Because the BMCC product is an intermediate product, it was sold to TV factories 
before end-users. For future development, BMCC will also pay more attention to both the 
domestic and international market, and both current and future market potential. About 80% of 
the total of BMCC's materials were sourced in China, with only 20% imported from Japan, but 
BMCC also faced international competition not only in quality but also in price, making 
continuing product development essential. 
CASE THREE: Tianjin NEC Electronics & Communications Industry Co., Ltd 
The purpose was to investigate key features of a longer established venture having made a 
proven contribution in its particular sector in China. NEC supplied its first NEAX61 public 
switching system in China to Tianjin in 1985 and since then, has supplied switching, optical 
transmission and radio transmission systems throughout China. In 1992, NEC further established 
Tianjin NEC Electronics & Communications Industry Co., Ltd. (TJNEC), a manufacturing and 
marketing subsidiary for switching systems. As a major supplier of telecommunications systems 
in Tianjin and other cities, NEC stated they have made a major contribution to the construction 
of a sound telecommunications infrastructure in Tianjin. 
3.1. Motive 
NEC, ranked forty-seventh in Fortune magazine's annual Global 500 survey, was Japan's fourth 
largest manufacturer in terms of non-consolidated sales. Since 1972, NEC established and 
developed its business in communications, computers and electronic devices across China, and 
has seen its annual sales grow to over 150 billion yen. The first NEC-China JV company was 
established in 1989, since when each of NEC's main products in China (semiconductors, digital 
switching systems, optical communications systems, mobile communications equipment. 
computers and software) have been produced domestically. As a result, NEC's overall 
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investment in China is valued at approximately US $1.8 billion while the company overall 
employs 6,000 people with 19 subsidiaries, making it the largest single Japanese corporation 
operating in China. In 1996, NEC established "NEC (China) Co., Ltd.", a holding company to 
manage all of its China business, and plan and progress further investment towards the Chinese 
domestic market. 
3.2. Partner selection 
TJNEC has capital of US $64 million, 35% held by NEC, 10% by Sumitomo Corporation, with 
the other 55% held by Tianjin Zhonghuan Computer Corporation and Tianjin Local Telephone 
Bureau. The Telecommunications Ministry, in this case, initiated their original mutual contact. 
Tianjin NEC Electronics & Communications Industry Co., Ltd (TJNEC) has more than 600 
employees. There are 18 Japanese staff working in management and technical positions. The 
Chairperson of Directors Board was Chinese and its President Japanese, TJNEC began 
production on 1st January 1992. All employees are considered to have a high education level, 
many have graduated from professional colleges, and managers had university degrees. 
3.3. Control and conflict 
To control its JV, NEC not only appointed its own Japanese staff as key managers, it also 
required all Chinese employees to undergo its own specific management and enterprise culture 
training in order to place the Japanese management and operation style at the centre of the 
venture. 
Employee training The top managers of TJNEC are required to view their employees as their 
most valuable resource. Therefore, if TJNEC employees possess the right skills and knowledge. 
it is argued they will provide maximum contribution to the company, for which reason TJNEC 
had established an Education Section to provide training courses with the aim of helping 
employees to improve their skills. Training was said to be provided in the following areas: 
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a) Initial training When new employees join the company they undergo three days initial 
training, including knowledge of production, basic understanding of "SS", characteristics of 
production line and sense of product quality etc. They then have ten days further "on the job" 
training which introduces them to the process of production and understanding the basic theory 
of production. 
b) Project training This included practical training in the workshops to demonstrate product 
quality, special production skills and key procedures regarding technical problems. 
c) JLong term training Each manager from the mid and pnmary level management 
received six hours regular special training per month to improve both their technical and 
management skills. 
d) Abroad trairnnng Mainly technical staff were sent to the Japanese parent company to have 
systematic training. Over 50 had been sent to Japan and training abroad was set to continue on a 
regular basis. 
Learn Japanese management skinis in the practice The Chinese managers and 
employees not only learn the theory of Japanese management skills, but also its practice. 
Through working with 18 Japanese staff, the Chinese could potentially observe the differences, 
and compare themselves. For example, on the factory floor all Japanese staff were treated as 
"nobody special" and did not remove their uniform, even during the warmest summers, since all 
employees must be uniformed. However, the Chinese themselves were much less strict. The 
Japanese Vice Managing Director always placed his cigarette ash in a small box to the 
amusement of Chinese staff. Asked why he did so, he replied that, though his ash is minute, if 
many others simply flicked ash on to the floor, how could the "SS" movement be carried out? He 
emphasized that so-called Japanese management was not only the methods or regulations, but 
also the conscience and spirit of the employees. Although other might consider this a trivial 
example such small matters were very much part of everyday management folklore. 
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Company's Slogans for NEC 
These included: 
Make NEC the Best Company in the World 
Offer the World's Best Products. 
A Cheerful Workplace. 
Better Teamwork. 
Zero Defects. 
Such slogan were prominently depicted right across venture premises. 
3.4. Performance 
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The main business of TJNEC was producing, selling, setting up, and maintaining NEAX61 
digital switching machines, while providing training and system development. Its products were 
used in Northern China in up to ten provinces where they were considered successful in training 
communication capabilities generally. 
3.5. :n:nvestment EllllviromDlleliD.t 
"SS" and ZD Movemel!llt The "SS" movement is a basic management method intended to 
encourage employees to better safeguard the working environment and to better observe working 
discipline. There was a "SS" management section regarding "SS" activities, including total "SS" 
management training, analysis of "SS" activities and rectification of errors. "SS" movement thus 
appears to support the operation of TJNEC in a positive way. The ZD movement is intended to 
eradicate mistakes and to increase business profitability. It also aims to instill a sense of 
teamwork throughout NEC. The movement dictates that employees of TJNEC must avoid 
making even the most trifling error, which could lead to product defect, as well as themselves 
having first-class technical skills. The elimination of defects will both improve the product 
quality and reduce its costs. Firstly, they must ensure that employees understand the necessity of 
ZD before introducing on-the-job practical training for the managers from primary level. 
Secondly, monthly employee appraisal was conducted to examine any quality related problem in 
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the process of "self-work", in order to monitor closely the product quality. Thirdly, based on the 
characteristics of product quality, according to the situation of supply and demand, the three 
classes of A, B and C were applied to quality management. Finally, to achieve quality at 
company level, it would regularly monitor and improve the areas of technology, quality, 
efficiency, cost, and marketing. 
CASE FOUR: Beijing Taka-Q Leimeng Fasllnion Co., Ltd 
The purpose was to investigate key features of a leading venture in the highly invested textile 
and fashion industry where, unlike Case 2 and 3, the relative importance of technology was less 
highly profiled, and other factors were given further consideration. Since a large amount of 
Japanese direct investment in China has been concentrated in the textile and fashion industries, 
the researcher finally chose a fashion industry enterprise in Beijing for an in-depth case study, 
including face to face interviews. Six top management representative were interviewed. Two 
were Japanese (the Managing Director ofthe company and the Director of the factory), and four 
Chinese (the Deputy Director of the company, the Head of Affairs Office, the Assistant Director 
ofthe factory and a Sales Manager ofthe Fashion Shop). 
4.L Motive 
This Sino-Japanese Joint Venture fashion company was established in September 1992. Its total 
investment was Japanese Yen 1.3bn (equivalent to US $13m). The registered capital was Yen 
0.7bn (US $7m). The Chinese side would invest 30%, and Japanese 70% of the total. There were 
900 employees, and an annual output of 510,000 garments of all kinds, 65% of all production 
being exported. This company is an integrated business, in that it includes technology, 
production, marketing and trade, and has a fashion factory shop. The aim of the company is, 
through Sino-Japanese economic and technical co-operation, to utilise advanced production 
technology and management know-how and the experience of marketing, to establish and 
develop the production base and marketing network, and thereby produce profits. At the same 
time, it intends to use high quality products, fair prices and good service to increase the 
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competitiveness of the company in the world market, and continuously to expand overseas trade 
and reap good returns. 
4.2. Partner seHection 
The Chinese parent of this JV Company, established in 1961, was the largest company in fashion 
production in Beijing fashion industry, and comprised 176 factories and 48,000 employees. Not 
only did it lead in size, but was also regarded as a leader in design, production, research, 
education and marketing in fashion. Its annual output approached 40m garments of all kinds. The 
parent company was one of the best-known fashion companies in China, has rich experience of 
the fashion business, and many factories with a long history of fashion production. There are a 
number of Japanese partners in the JV Company, including well-known companies such as ltoh 
Commerce Co., Ltd, but the main parent company was a leading company in Japanese fashion 
industrial circles, the largest commercial group holding many famous brands of goods around the 
world. It has 500 factories and shops in Japan and has many subsidiary companies overseas. 
The JV Company had already been in business for three years, employing Japanese-style 
management skills from the inception. These skills have been codified through the company's 
"Japanese-style Management Skills Training Programme", from this programme we can see how 
this JAE formally managed its business. 
Japanese-style Management SkilHs Training Programme 
Objective, Target ami Tutors To train and develop the skills of managers and workers in 
the company and allow them to operate and manage the company independently from the third 
year after start-up. The first stage was to set up a training tutor group, to transfer Japanese 
management skills. This group comprised members of both Chinese and Japanese staff and its 
task was to promote the implementation of the training plan, and to assess those staff who were 
involved in the training course. Next came training of 30 managers of the company through that 
tutor training group. Lastly, those 30 managers were, in turn, to train all relevant staff. The 
membership of this training group was four Japanese and three Chinese tutors. 
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!Factory Management Training Specification 
Japanese language education All members of the training course needed to learn basic 
Japanese, and be able to use a language handbook of corresponding terms. The learning methods 
were step-by-step from simple conversation, and training, through daily morning and evening 
meetings and general conferences. 
Basic knowledge The principal vehicle for transfer of Japanese-style management skills, 
through the training course, was the study of those components listed below, which were 
considered by the Japanese to represent "basic management knowledge". 
0 Promoting methods of management, e Standardisation, simplification and 
0 Enterprise organisation and specialisation, 
organisational structure, Promoting methods of . . e 1mprovmg 
€1 Organisation function, management, 
Ill Faults produced, 9 Activities to Improve and rmse 
0 Accident prevention and first aid, management skill, 
e Develo in initiative. 
It is not appropriate here to cover all these elements in details, but a selected expansion will give 
a clearer view of issues underlying certain key issues. For example, "promote methods of 
management" raised the following questions and issues of concern: 
a.) What is active management and the responsibilities of the manager? 
b.) What is on-the-spot management? {The five tasks of on-the-spot management: 
quality, output, cost, discipline & safety. How to grasp problems on the spot, 
explain problems on the spot to workers, and strengthen quality commitment) 
c.) The analysis ofthe main areas of management. 
d.) The definition of management terminology. 
e.) Assignment and acceptance of instructions. 
f.) Report, contact and discussion. 
On the other hand, that element "promoting methods of improving management" was concerned 
chiefly with the key point that improvements must start from an awareness of problems, and 
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would comprise the elements of investigation, analysis, discussion, testing, examining. On the 
other hand again, the element "activities to improve and raise management skill", was concerned 
with key tools, such as JS, 4S, SS; ZD movement; QC. 
4.3. Control and conflict 
Labour Management Labour management is one of the most important elements m 
Japanese-style management. In this section, the training course gave some main pointers to 
managers, such as the purpose and ideal organisation of labour management, personnel matters, 
testing and assessment, the labour management of enterprise, aspects of general dissatisfaction 
on the site, labour policies, training through QC activity, suggestion and commendation systems, 
and production bonuses. It is interesting that Japanese tutors prepared many diagrams for the 
main pointers to helping engendering sound understanding for managers. Five in particular 
illustrate the training process. In the first, "the ideal organisation of labour management", 
Japanese tutors illustrate the trinity of operator, production line and workers. 
Labour 
Management 
on the spot 
Operator 
(Putting plans into practice) 
(The evaluation of subordinates) 
The concept of labour management 
The basic policy of labour management 
The strategy of labour management 
Work condition design 
Regulation; 
Plan project 
Special service for production lines; 
Labour affairs; 
Safety and sanitation; 
Testing 
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The second, illustrates the division of "the personnel matters test" content: 
I Personal test I 
I 
Outstanding quality,rate 
of attendance, Assess-
ment, self evaluation 
Comprehensive 
evaluation 
Basic skill, 
temperament, 
attitude towards work 
Chapter Nine 
The third was concerned with "aspects of general dissatisfaction on the site". Four forms of staff 
dissatisfaction were indicated: dissatisfaction with treatment (salary and working conditions); 
dissatisfaction over management's failure to recognise labour's contribution (e.g. achievement, 
existing values, personal disparities); dissatisfaction over the lack of information (explaining 
and publishing the policy and plan before the event, during development and in the result); and 
dissatisfaction arising as a result of lack of understanding of site conditions (personnel problems, 
equipment and machinery and environmental problems). 
The fourth concerns labour policy. Investigation, analysis and discussion would continue about 
how pay will increase working consciousness of workers and establish a long-term policy based 
on: 
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I investigate, analyse, discuss 
I 
I design year plan 
I 
I publish year plan 
I I organisation establishment 
I I design practice plan 
I 
I carry out 
4.4. Performance 
I 
I 
J 
I 
J 
I 
I 
any problems? 
what is the actual problem? 
where does it start from? 
1----J which methods & means will be used? 
the budget: 
who will undertake? 
when should it start? 
when should it be completed 
Production ma~rnagement Production Management was the other main aspect of Japanese-
style management. Here, managers were said to need, initially, to understand the definition, 
systems and main function of production management. They need to learn the organisation and 
function of management, the methods of making annual and monthly plans, and the relevant 
documentation, methods of promoting of production line production, and cost management. The 
Japanese tutors characterised the production management system as the control system and 
structure for establishing, issuing and carrying out the production plan, recording the results, and 
adjusting to the plan. The key elements of such a system were considered to the follows: 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Planning product type and amount; e 
Making plans for affiliated equipment; 
Planning equipment, staff and production a 
patterns; 
Establishment of project order, standard o 
time, quality and cost etc.; o 
Planning ordering of goods; 
Checking material stocks and initiating o 
the purchase of merchandise; o 
the planning of project schedule; o 
Preparation and publishing documents on 
production techniques and types; o 
Quality control, progress control, 
equipment management and safety 
management; 
Adjustment of relationship between 
operation, design and material; 
Determination and recording of results; 
Settling difference between practice and 
plan; 
Evaluation of production result; 
Organisation & function of management; 
Labour policies (initiative, education and 
training); 
Promoting ZD movement and QC 
activities. 
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It was pointed out that there are three main factors, which hamper the structural factors, and 
machinery factors. Managers need to determine the reasons and to settle the problems. 
Finally, emphasis is placed upon the managers recording results of production line production. 
and cost accounting. Recording results of production line production 
Ledger Ledger of production line products, the progress table of production 
Line workshop production, record of production line workshop 
Production, ledger of external processes, the ledger of substandard 
products in the workshop. 
Statistics Time table of customer and products production, the statistical chart 
Of production line production results. 
c f ( "t . t . ) ost accoun mg um pnce, proJec pnce 
Schedule cost of Measure of production line productivity, 
product production Distribution table of production line fixed expenses, 
line the plan of department's production line fixed & variable 
expenses. 
Real cost of product Table of production results, the distribution of the 
production line production line fixed expenses, department production line 
fixed & variable expenses. 
By analyzing each respective case in term of the theoretical framework previously outlined the 
same structure was applied right across them all and their potential comparability further 
enhanced. 
22-t 
Chapter Ten 
Chapter Ten 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
1. Introduction 
Various model explanations for Japanese and Chinese viewpoints were discussed in the chapter 
before. These were constructed from a variety of different sources, but clearly focused upon the 
key variables identified throughout this whole study. Now the leading priorities, approach, and 
key findings of the research are finally concluded, and the wider developmental implications 
assessed. 
2. Sino-Japanese Context 
China and Japan share an intricate historical relationship which outsiders find difficult to 
understand. Iriye (op cit) indeed argues it is difficult to be enough of a "China-and-Japan" 
specialist to fully enlighten this historic relationship. More recently the emphasis in their historic 
relationship has changed, having become increasingly economic as well. Thus mutual trade, and 
incoming Japanese aid and investment are all more highly profiled than before, and even taken as 
indicative of East Asian prosperity generally. Yet, whatever its original entry mode, FDI can 
only be fully realised through further organisation and management, although debate over the 
effects of entry mode continue (lsobe, Makino, Montgomery, 2000). While newly emerging 
international business and management thought increasingly acknowledges its post-entry 
requirements, it has not usually considered how this occurs within Sino-Japanese contexts 
however. Although China only officially reopened to FDI just over twenty years ago when the 
Japanese were still gaining new international venturing experience elsewhere, the sectors 
concerned have often been closely controlled with the Offshore Chinese taking the lead. Right 
until the early 1990's the Japanese were considered surprisingly slow investors into China itself 
and their position still generates much debate even now (Taylor, 1996; Naughton 1997; Rong. 
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1999) while China is a major investment destination. To acknowledge that complexity this study 
has attempted to observe the historical, economic, political, cultural and personality context of 
the JAEs under study, while focusing upon their evolving organisation and management. 
That focus is considered important because, while there are more studies of foreign direct 
investment and joint ventures in China, these have not necessarily concentrated upon their 
further developing management. Thus Child (1994) considered that, despite this accumulation. 
there was still much that needed to be known about such management and not just when ventures 
were first founded. This study therefore attempts to redress any possible imbalance by applying 
an independent model of IJV development process and its management as seen from both 
Japanese and Chinese perspectives. 
3. Research Priorities 
This research sought detailed knowledge of the management of JAEs and their overall pattern of 
their development. Although based and conducted within China itself the very fact that these 
were often - though not entirely - manufacturing joint ventures had important implications. In 
particular this meant understanding how both Japanese and Chinese interests were represented in 
manufacturing ventures and what perspective they each brought to them. To gain a more 
impartial appreciation an independently developed model of IJVs based upon the work of 
Harrigan, Parkhe and others was applied throughout. This model identified motives, partner 
selection, control and conflict, performance, and the investment environment surrounding IJV s 
as key variables for further study. 
Although these variables address the overall character of IJVs, rather than any one particular 
recognised management speciality, it proved useful for investigating their development over 
time. While an in-depth explanation of each key variable was discussed in the previous chapter it 
is, of course, their mutual interaction and fit within JAEs which determines their overall 
character, performance, and respective partners relationships. To understand the latter it was 
particularly important to obtain top ranking managers' own viewpoints. 
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4. Research Approach 
The research approach therefore sought a balanced understanding of Japanese and Chinese 
perspectives upon JAEs' management and overall development thus far. As a result the approach 
adopted had certain distinguishing features. To begin with it was considered to be exploratory 
given the prevailing state of knowledge concerning IJVs later development and the relative 
newness of many JAEs themselves. As well as being exploratory it was also China-based and not 
focussed upon "parent" companies. It was furthermore, in Western terms, a top/senior 
management board sample, where most respondents were highly ranked, having spent varying 
lengths of time within JAEs themselves. Organisationally many such ventures were relatively 
young and/or still evolving as well as relatively small scale compared with their parent 
companies. The approach was therefore aimed at enabling senior managerial respondents to give 
an overall assessment of relatively green-field JAEs evolving over time while also indicating 
how they judged their possible future. Although a limited quantity and quality of response to 
questionnaires appears relatively common to research in China the amount of detail requested 
here could perhaps only have been provided by relatively senior and experienced managers and 
officials. In addition the research approach sought both quantitative and qualitative data from the 
combination of questionnaires, case study and interviews used. To limit its overall scope, and 
make it more manageable, the field research was manufacturing focussed, within selected areas 
of China. Although that touches upon other issues associated with Japanese aid and assistance, 
along with growing (though still much smaller scale) service sector interests, including retailing 
and consumption, these were judged outside the scope of this study, although later research by 
Lu (2000) had drawn cross-sectional comparisons. Likewise, the field research was conducted 
before Hong Kong was officially handed over, whereas its incorporation into China raised 
questions about how the considerable Japanese business and commercial interests there were to 
be classified. Finally the approach was conditioned by the whole economic situation at mid-
decade before the Asian crisis intervened. Although there were some problematic perforn1ers 
among the ventures studied most were previously relatively growth conscious businesses. The 
relationship between this and subsequent research will be outlined at the end of this concluding 
chapter. 
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5. Key Research Resu.nnts 
Using the fivefold variable model outlined before these key results can be briet1y summarised 
thus: 
5.1. Motives 
JAEs themselves were very much smaller than their parent companies. Some JAEs were 
pathfinding experiments for those Japanese parents who had only made one major investment in 
China thus far. However a number had made between 2-5 such investments already and would 
anticipate more. Otherwise some variation in the way possible motives were expressed became 
apparent following the case study interviews in particular. For example, in Cases Two and Three. 
it was clearly intended that standards should exceed those of Chinese State Enterprises even 
though these were some Japanese parents' first preferred partners. Other publicly expressed 
motives cited such wide ranging phrases as "to devote ourselves to the further development of 
world culture" for example. For that reason it proved important to examine key respondents· 
own definitions of what the founding motives were. Typical leading Japanese motives were 
related to accessing the Chinese domestic market, taking advantage of low labour costs and, with 
reference to broader state policy, internationalising the parent company generally. For Chinese 
respondents the corresponding motives concerned technology and management transfer, growing 
the Chinese domestic market, and exporting foreign currency earning goods. Taken together both 
partners therefore reported a range of motives overall. The length of contractual agreements 
nevertheless suggested that Japanese partners applied longer timescales. Given the age of these 
JAEs, and the limited time most respondents had worked in them, a number were still short of 
full maturity, while a significant percentage indicated there would be no further major 
reinvestment, even though after operating improvements were sought. Those who argue for the 
importance of entry mode as an exploration for later performance should clearly giw 
consideration to how motives at entry are ascertained, from whom, and at what stage of venture 
development they are being obtained. 
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5.2. Partner Selection 
As with the discovery of what the key executives consider to be the leading motives for seeking 
to find JAEs, this process can be difficult to study and observe directly while it actually happens. 
Respondents' varying length of experience suggests they did not necessarily experience the 
original selection process themselves. Otherwise these findings identified certain differences 
between respective partners. For example the Japanese emphasised geographical proximity of 
location while Chinese respondents emphasised management know-how, and both emphasised 
selected non-economic factors as well. In general the Japanese had a wider choice of potential 
partner, and employed a wide range of channels, both official and nonofficial, to gather potential 
information, as well as having greater potential experience of partner selection elsewhere. 
Equally they might increasingly short-circuit this process, particularly regarding wholly owned 
ventures in this sample, the number of which has increased generally, though with variation in 
resulting performance. Judged from these responses few were then contemplating partner de-
selection while even cases of admitted partner mis-selection appeared few. Where applicable co-
operation agreements were often relatively long term and with some time to run. However. as 
indicated before, there are more options available to the Japanese when selecting a partner. For 
that reason the Chinese considered they had less choice, and were less powerful accordingly. 
5.3. Control, Differences and Conflict 
Mixed motives for joint venturing in the first place, and differing means for mutual partner 
selection, raises questions about how respective partners would control JAEs, and how this might 
create scope for differences and conflict. However, since most, if not all, JAEs were relatively 
small, often employing less than 200, frequently with few if any Japanese on site, any such 
differences were not highly profiled, particularly when this implied partners "losing face". 
Despite their limited presence overall, Japanese typically headed technology and equipment, 
production operations, and (particularly international) marketing specialisms within these 
ventures. Chinese typically headed general affairs, secretariat, and personnel specialisms and, 
rather surprisingly, some finance designated specialisms too. To some extent these specialisms 
229 
Chapter Ten 
afforded distinctive functional control to respective partners while there were further distinctions 
between who filled Chair of Board of Directors and presidential positions. 
But there were also certain ambiguities. For example, although the Chinese typically headed 
personnel, the Japanese were still credited with holding power over key recruitment policies. 
Similarly the Chinese often headed finance specialisms which they claimed only enjoyed limited 
control over matters like product pricing and output/profit targeting within JAEs themselves. 
Close mutual interaction was also suggested regarding exposure to certain Japanese management 
and/or staff working and training methods, which some Chinese considered they would 
particularly benefit from. On the other hand those Japanese managers who were least familiar 
with China found it more problematic than others, implying that greater mutual exposure might 
help some features of joint "enterprise culture" develop over time, as similar mutual responses to 
the research questionnaire would imply. With few Japanese on site, and fewer still being 
interviewed in other research studies like Taylor (1999), there is a limited on-site Japanese 
presence overall among manufacturing ventures particularly. 
Exactly how far this mutualizing enterprise culture had developed, and whether it would endure 
serious setbacks and reversals, was difficult to determine however. Although the findings 
regarding continued partnering would suggest few were planning to exit from these ventures, it 
must be noted that many Chinese have been officially encouraged to appear publicly positive 
about these matters, whatever their actual reservations, and some could later choose to exit and 
"sell" their interests if more of these were converted over to wholly owned ventures instead. 
In this research JAEs generally secured what might be called "selective autonomy" in how they 
determined their policies relative to their parents, as Figure 10-1 below demonstrates: 
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Figure 10-1: Main policies determined by JAEs 
Product pricing 
Output & prof1t targets 
Production plan 
Annual budget 
Staffing level 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 
%Determined by JA Es 
Where autonomy was more limited, if not actually withheld, Japanese parents were held most 
responsible, not least regarding matters concerning technology transfer and international sales 
and marketing. However, many Chinese respondents obeyed the custom of not openly criticising 
their own Chinese partner companies in this respect. Finally there were differences between 
Japanese and Chinese regarding how potential conflicts were understood and expressed -
differences which outsiders may find difficult understand if they were not natives to either 
country. With their differing national interests and identity there was considerable potential 
scope for differences and conflict bui lt into these ventures from that background factor alone. 
Such differences may well underscore what otherwise appear more technical and business related 
disputes. 
5.4. Performance 
This poses critical issues for JA Es. Since 60% were only between 2-4 years old , and 23% had 
not yet reached full production stage, judgements could still partly depend upon prior 
expectations however. In some senses such judgements were as much qualitatively as 
quantitativel y based. Certain cultu ral and perso nality factors lay behind thi s. For example, there 
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are limits to how openly and critically Chinese will discuss such issues with outsiders and/or 
foreigners. Any inference of success or failure can have some bearing upon "face" in this regard. 
Moreover researchers can find it difficult to check such assertions against written/statistical 
evidence. This research, like that of Lu (op cit), therefore relied heavily upon respondents' own 
perceptual judgements of performance against specified criteria like profitability, turnover, 
growth, market coverage, and future plans for example. Although there were some variations 
between respective partners' knowledge about these matters- over 20% of all respondents did 
not know their JAEs turnover for example - there was some general satisfaction, without 
necessarily assuming this performance would continue in future. So, while a majority (63%) was 
judged profitable, a significant minority of JAEs were only breaking even, or incurring losses at 
this time, before any Asian crisis intervened. Without having reached full maturity, there was 
some residual preference for intensifying/extending production rather than reinvesting, implying 
recognised scope for performance improvement. 
This occurred even where improvement may customarily be regarded as a more Japanese than 
Chinese preoccupation. Chinese respondents appeared less convinced about how improYements 
would be brought about. Likewise, regarding knowledge of market performance, Chinese 
respondents believed the Japanese were more informed, and more in control over international 
channels in particular, yet still believed the Japanese were originally more concerned with 
China's own domestic market. However, the practice of re-exporting back to Japan would partly 
explain this response, although it does raise further issues. For example any such re-exporting 
raises issues of transfer pricing and tax regulation, particularly where respondents considered 
their JAEs had limited discretion over product pricing generally. On the other hand, particularly 
in the case study ventures, Chinese managers would keenly point out their export achievements, 
as if this would give these ventures added status and reputation. However, the belief that 
technology transfer was limited, and on-site research and development was similarly restricted, 
was judged to limit future potential performance, although Fan and Chi ( 1999) found that 
Japanese affiliated ventures perform better in labour than capital intensive sectors generally. 
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5.5. Investment EnllVironment 
The theoretical model applied proposed that JAEs interaction with "hard" and "soft" factors 
would influence performance over time. In China any clear-cut distinction between individual 
venture and the state in its various forms can prove artificially misleading. However. any direct 
questioning about politics is nevertheless still very sensitive in China's present transitional state, 
and this research elicited few responses about it. The main finding was that, when differing from 
Chinese responses, the Japanese judged these issues more seriously in general, and were also 
more reserved about how much/well this environment would be improved. Through time the 
Japanese had switched attention from "hard" to "soft" factors as their main object of concern, 
having learnt to do so from experience. The better facilitation of cash flow, laws, regulations, 
and communications were of more apparent concern to them than for many Chinese partners, 
although many Japanese had chosen their original location relatively conservatively. How much 
of a blockage this investment environment posed to JAEs performance was difficult to qualify, 
but it was clear that, despite previous improvements, a number of respondents believed more 
could be done, even if they differed over how and when this might best occur. 
The Japanese have more rigorous expectations about the standard of environmental maintenance. 
Because they are more environmentally conscious, they deem it important that China should 
match their standards, or at least become comparable to them, in terms of upkeep and respect. 
The Chinese, however, being accustomed to their own existing standards, do not regard this as 
necessary to bettering JAR performance. 
6. Wider Developmental Implications 
This study was concerned with the differing interests that JAEs encounter in China. From this 
base it is possible to outline a range of different possible development paths for JAEs in future. 
For these purposes these development paths reflect what they might ideally aspire to develop 
towards. These paths respectively relate to interstate relationships between China and Japan 
generally; the guiding investment focus; overall JAE management strategy itself; and differences 
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and conflicts, in that chosen order. This order has been chosen because, as was emphasised 
throughout this study, even existing JAEs investment and management can only be explained 
against its wider context (Deng, 1999), and now that context may itself change compared with 
when this research originally began. 
6.1. Interstate IRcBationslh.ips 
A vitally important part of the context concerns the relationships between China and Japan 
generally. Respective states play an important role both here and across East Asia at large. The 
main potential development paths therefore appear thus: 
From: 
Vertical Economic Nationalism 
High Political Sensitivity 
Developmental Divergence 
Towards: 
Horizontal Economic Complementarity 
Greater Economic Sensitivity 
Mutual "Business Culture" 
Both the Chinese and Japanese states basically set the overall public agenda for JAE 
development. Formerly matters like restricted investment flows and opportunities and 
technology transfers attracted considerable official attention. This study suggests that, if greater 
economic complementarity is to be achieved, investment should continue to become a less 
political and more economically sensitive official matter. However, for China, this could still 
prove difficult given the presence of state and party officials and also continued political 
instruction within the workplace itself. Japan may likewise appreciate China's transitional 
economy and move towards a more "business culture" before further mutual understanding will 
an se. 
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6.2. Guidill]g ][nvestment Focus 
Appropriate investment into China needs to be suitably guided. The state variously sanctions or 
supports some part of this process. The main further development paths would therefore appear 
thus: 
From: 
Sectoral Divisions I Inequalities 
Variable Investment Cycles 
Aspiring Investment Environment 
Restrictive Technology Transfer 
Towards: 
Sectoral Equalisation 
Stable Investment Flows 
Developed Investment Environment 
Growing Technology Transfer 
Compared with the Offshore Chinese, and particularly Hong Kong, the Japanese were not 
considered leading forward foreign investors in China. Often smaller business groups led the 
way, especially in more accessible sectors like food and textiles, right through into the mid 
1990's, making others like Matsushita admittedly high profile exceptions. The Chinese state 
similarly restricted entry into certain sectors under its control while trading potential domestic 
market access for investment and technology elsewhere. An increasing spread of accessible 
sectors, attracting more stable investment flows, with more advanced technology transfers 
appears necessary for still greater JAEs development, especially as WTO entry approaches. 
However this research observed a number of difficult constraints in this respect. Indeed, it 
highlights basic differences in how the Chinese and the Japanese judge the present situation 
alone, as regards the investment environment and chances of it being improved for example. It 
has been suggested that this environment discourages further investment while also holding 
existing venture performance back. Yet this alone can hardly explain Japan's investment rising 
record, even though the Chinese often accept environmental problems as if normal, and do not 
treat them with similar urgency. Overshadowing all this were the wider effects and consequences 
of the Asian crisis to come however. Since over 80% of all China's incoming FDI then 
originated from other Asian economies, particularly Hong Kong, where the Japanese have 
alternative investment interests, and since these economies are also major markets for Chinese 
products, there were major questions over where this left China even before WTO entry (World 
235 
Chapter Ten 
Investment Report, 1998). Speculation about China's original role, and subsequent response to 
that crisis continues, and also embraces Japan, which has different development problems from 
most. 
6.3. JAE Management Strategy 
To repeat, this may only develop within the opportunities and constraints identified above, since 
the Chinese state can still be represented within the JAE workplace for example. Otherwise the 
main development possibilities can be summarised thus: 
From: 
Mixed Motives 
Inexperienced Partnering 
Mature Products 
Downgradeable Technology 
Marketing Blockages 
Collective Workforce 
Conflict Potential 
Transferable Management 
Exit Restriction 
Towards: 
Complementary Motives 
Informed Partnering 
Rising Products 
Developable Technology 
Marketing Knowledge 
Enterprise Culture 
Conflict Management 
Management Handover 
Exit Options 
For these JAEs original founding motives were found to be mixed. In some respects they could 
well have been pathfinders for other potential ventures ahead. In that respect their success would 
seem apparent from continuing Japanese investment since. To make the most of their 
opportunities respective motives should increasingly complement each other. Otherwise the 
realisation of complementarity between China and Japan at large will remain problematic. For 
that reason the process of partner selection, when still sought, could now become better informed 
along with additional ownership options. Considering the lack of mutual knowledge before, 
partners are now potentially better informed, with a range of other examples and precedents to 
follow, not necessarily as complex as the Matsushita case previously described. Indeed, the 
currently increasing number of foreign wholly owned ventures across China suggests that, in 
some cases, partnering is no longer the only, or indeed the best, possible option for Japanese 
business interests. The number of wholly owned JAEs in this study suggests this trend stat1ed 
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some time ago, although there are still questions about the effects of ownership change upon 
venture performance (Lu, op cit). 
6.4. Differences and Conflict Management 
Primary conflicts for JVs are often structural by nature; other secondary conflicts are that 
concerning political, cultural, social and personality issues. Each appears in the process of joint 
venture regarding: motive, partner selection, control and conflict, performance and investment 
environment. To many such conflicts in JAEs, there is the possibility of: 1) avoiding the 
structural conflict by establishing more Japanese wholly owned ventures or 2) skilled 
management and well-exercised conflict-control actions. 
Other developments partly depend upon current and future JAEs better accessing, not just 
mature, but new and rising product lines, of which there were only ever limited indications. 
Although some Chinese found technological development difficult to judge the addition of newer 
and rising product lines would pose challenges. Their design, development and manufacture 
could well require accessing more local Chinese research as well as basic component capability 
through Japanese and/or other outside linkages. In addition some Chinese concerns about 
limitations upon their wider market knowledge deserve further consideration, since where this 
requires more mutual team based activity, that could also mean overcoming any barriers 
associated being either a Japanese or a Chinese national within the workplace itself. 
That would bring the further development of a mutualized enterprise culture into clearer focus. 
While this research has emphasised the potential scope for differences and conflict originally 
brought into JAEs by virtue of their surrounding context it could be made more manageable 
through better conflict resolution. 'Learning from the Japanese' (Ma, 1997) may therefore prove 
a transitional phase before more JAE management is not just "handed over" but firmly realised 
within China generally. From the rather limited Japanese on-site presence observed in this 
research, that 'hand over' has already begun, although there may still be limits to how far it will 
go, particularly amongst more high technology based ventures (Taylor, op cit). The resort to 
wholly owned ventures might be one constructive solution to this problem. New exit options 
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may well be sought under changing circumstances, including the option to exit from joint 
venture to other arrangements, rather than simply closing ventures down, although few studies 
apart from Fan and Chi (op cit) explicitly refer to closures as such. 
6.5. Progressing Further Research 
The 1990s saw wide-ranging economic changes in and between Japan and China. More such 
changes can be, and officially are, expected in future. Further research should therefore become 
aligned to these changes while proceeding from what has already been established now. Neither 
an Asian crisis nor recovery was evident when this particular research study began. Other recent 
research has nevertheless taken these both into consideration even though Japan and China were 
not necessarily directly affected themselves. 
These further studies offer some support for certain key findings advanced here. China has now 
been the single most favoured destination for Japanese FDI since the mid 1990s, even taking any 
wider Asian crisis and recovery into consideration. Their mutual trade has again reached record 
levels (JETRO, 2000a). The overall picture arising from this particular research study was 
likewise one of steady, though not spectacular progress and growth among Japanese 
manufacturing involvement, these being relatively new, green-field ventures that respective 
managers considered were largely profitable or break even level performers few would 
contemplate exiting from. Lu (op cit) likewise found these to be largely, though not exclusively, 
manufacturing rather than trading/service based joint ventures at or near profitable performance 
for the year 1997. Subsequent studies further underlined continuing Japanese intentions to 
expand and/or intensify such ventures right through into the middle and long term future. With 
few reportedly considering exiting from such before (Isobe, Makina, and Montgomery, 2000). 
Proportionately more such respondents emphasized reinvestment rather than green-field ventures 
in that regard, although JETRO's own later questionnaire survey of manufacturers (JETRO. 
2000b) reported not only increasing or recovering sales and performance levels, but confirmation 
that China would remain the single most preferred destination for Japanese FDI as well. 
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One particularly important trend which became apparent through this study, has been the rise of 
wholly owned rather than just joint venturing within China. Some reports suggest that in 2000, as 
many as 93 of the 213 foreign funded enterprises established in Beijing were foreign wholly 
owned ventures (People's Daily, 5/21200 I). To some extent this could have occurred because the 
increasing capital intensity of these ventures required that foreign interests become better 
protected than before. It is also possible that one-time Chinese partners cannot leverage the 
required capital themselves, while some may even contemplate selling their interest in joint 
ventures to alleviate such capital constraints, or come to other arrangements with foreign partners 
that allow them greater management control. 
Further research should not just keep pace with these overall developments however. In addition, 
it needs to explore and explain continuing movements along those particular dimensions 
identified before. This may well necessitate researchers employing more than just sample survey 
based methodologies, and, as Taylor ( op cit) has demonstrated, adding more qualitative depth of 
understanding as well. Sino-Japanese business would then become more comparable over time, 
and also with other preferred subjects, for international business and management research in 
general, which would indeed mark China finally returning to the world economic - and also 
academic - stage. 
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Appendix I 
Statistics for the Questionnaire Survey of 
JAEs in Four Cities of China 
This questionnaire has been divided into four sections: Origin, Founding, Operations and 
Environment. The first section provides general information about Japanese and Chinese parent 
companies and their investment motivation and partner selection. 
The second section provides information about the establishment and administration of Japanese 
Affiliated Enterprises (.TAE) in China. 
The third section covers the control and conflict, performance and results of J AE in China. 
The fourth section covers the politics, economics, technology, society and culture applied in 
competitive environment to influences to the JAE in China. · 
ENTERPRISE NAME:---------------
ADDRESS: __________________ __ 
Responses 0/o 
YOUR POSITION: * General manager: 29 36% 
*Vice general manager: 26 32% 
*Other: 22 27% 
*Not known 4 5% 
YOUR NATIONALITY: *Chinese: 70 86% 
*Japanese: 10 12% 
*Other: 1 1% 
How long have you been working 
A) in any enterprise: * 1 -10 years: 22 27% 
* 1 I -20 years: 2I 26% 
* Over 20 years: 32 40% 
*Not known: 6 7% 
B) in the current enterprise: * I - 5 years: 68 84% 
* 6-10 years: 7 9% 
* Over 10 years: 0 
*Not known: 6 7% 
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SECTION ONE: ORIG[N 
1. Name of Chinese parent company: 
2. Name of Japanese parent company: 
3. Type of Chinese parent company: 
* State company: 48 59% 
* Collective company: 12 15% 
*Township company: 6 7% 
* Private company: 0 
*Other: 2 2% 
*Not known 13 16% 
4. Type of Japanese parent company: 
* Trading house: 28 35% 
*Bank: 1 1% 
* Manufacturing company: 60 74% 
*Other: 7 9% 
5. Number of Chinese parent company employees: 
* 1 -250: 11 14% 
* 251 - 500: 14 17% 
* 501 - 1000: 8 10% 
* 1001 - 2000: 10 12% 
*Over 2000: 20 25% 
*Not known: 18 22% 
6. Number of Japanese parent company employees: 
* 1 -250: 24 30% 
* 251 -500: 8 10% 
* 501 - 1000: 9 11% 
* 1001 -2000: 5 6% 
*Over 2000: 21 26% 
*Not known: 14 17% 
7. How many other enterprises does the Japanese parent company invest in China? 
*Only one: 34 42'Yo 
* 2- 5: 38 47% 
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* 6 - 10: 
*Over 10: 
*Not known 
7 9% 
I 1% 
1% 
8. How would you assess the importance of the following factors to Japanese company for 
investing in China? (Please tick number) 
(Very important= 3, Important= 2, Not important= 1) 
Market attraction: * 3: 36 
* 2: 29 80% 
* 1: 3 3% 
Raw material coats: * 3: 11 
* 2: 30 51% 
* 1: 13 16% 
Labour costs: * 3: 35 
* 2: 31 81% 
* 1: 4 5% 
State policy: * 3: 16 
* 2: 38 67% 
* 1: 5 6% 
International competition: * 3: 3 
* 2: 18 26% 
* 1: 15 19% 
International strategy: * 3: 16 
* 2: 24 49% 
* 1: 8 10% 
A voidance of trade friction: * 3: 1 
* 2: 5 7% 
* 1: 25 31% 
Other: * 3: 4 
* 2: 3 9% 
*1: 2 2% 
9. Why did the Chinese choose their Japanese partner? (Please tick the most applicable) 
Financial I economic strength: 19 23% 
Technology and equipment: 51 63% 
Management skill: 36 44% 
Access to key materials: 3 4% 
Marketing: "" 41% _)_) 
Possession of patent right & trade mark: 11 14% 
Strong reputation in business sector: 28 35% 
Other: 9 11% 
Not known: 11 14% 
242 
Appendix I 
I 0. Did your parent company establish initial contact through any of the following? 
Trade exhibition or tech fair: 12 15% 
Hired consultant: 4 5% 
Introduction through Japanese embassy or other trade liaison organization: 21 26% 
Direct Chinese solicitation of your parent company: 8 10% 
Chinese business delegation in Japan: 14 17% 
Other: 29 36% 
Not known: 8 10% 
11. How does the Japanese parent company monitor and analyse the Chinese market? 
(Please tick the most applicable) 
Consultants in Japan: 
Consultants in Hong Kong: 
Consultants in China: 
Japanese-language business publications: 
Chinese-language business publications: 
Representative office in China: 
Trips to China to meet officials I end-users: 
Other: 
Not known: 
SECTION TWO: FOUNDING 
12. Please indicate the type of your enterprise. 
Joint venture: 
Co-operative venture: 
Wholly foreign-owned: 
13. Which percentage of Japanese & Chinese ownership in your enterprise? 
Japanese: * 1 -25%: 
Chinese: 
Other: 
* 26-50%: 
* 51-75%: 
* 76-100%: 
*Not known: 
* 1 -25%: 
* 26-50%: 
* 51-80%: 
*Not known: 
* I -25[Yo: 
* 26-50%: 
18 22% 
6 7% 
42 52% 
5 6% 
4 5% 
21 26% 
36 44% 
12 15% 
3 4% 
60 74% 
7 9% 
14 17% 
8 10% 
37 46% 
18 22% 
17 21% 
1 1% 
4 5% 
46 57% 
16 20% 
I 1% 
.., 4% .) 
2 2% 
243 
Appendix I 
14. Length of co-operation agreement in your enterprise? 
* 1 -10 years: 14 17% 
* 11-20 years: 50 62% 
* 21-30 years: 5 6% 
* Over 30 years: 12 15% 
15. What form does both Chinese and Japanese investment take (please tick the most 
applicable)? 
Cash: Chinese: 
Japanese: 
Building: Chinese: 
Japanese: 
Machinery and equipment: Chinese: 
Japanese: 
Production material: Chinese: 
Japanese: 
Labour: Chinese: 
Japanese: 
Industrial property right: Chinese: 
Japanese: 
Know-how: Chinese: 
Japanese: 
Site use right: Chinese: 
Japanese: 
Other: Chinese: 
Japanese: 
16. Total number of enterprise employees: 
* 1 - 50: 
* 51 - 100: 
*101-200: 
* 201 - 500: 
*Over 500: 
*Not known: 
Number of Japanese staff in the enterprise: 
* 1 - 5: 
* 5 - 10: 
*Over 10: 
* No Japanese: 
*Not known: 
46 57% 
73 90% 
36 44% 
8 10% 
19 23% 
36 44% 
10 12% 
12 15% 
20 25% 
2 2% 
4 5% 
6 7% 
2 2% 
24 30% 
27 33% 
4 5% 
0 
2 2% 
25 31% 
10 12% 
16 20% 
17 21% 
11 14% 
2 2% 
48 59% 
7 9% 
6 7% 
16 20% 
4 5% 
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17. Did your enterprise go into operation? 
Yes, into operation 1 - 5 years: 63 78% 
6- 10 years: 16 20% 
No: 2 2% 
SECTION THREE: OPERATION 
18. What is your enterprise's operational mode? 
Manufacturing: 73 90% 
Processing: 13 16% 
Repairing: 4 5% 
Other: 8 10% 
19. What are the main departments and who control it in your enterprise? 
Personnel department: *Chinese: 70 86% 
*Japanese: 9 11% 
*Other: 0 
Finance department: *Chinese: 64 79% 
*Japanese: 21 26% 
*Other: 0 
General affairs: *Chinese: 59 73% 
*Japanese: 7 9% 
*Other: 0 
Technology & equipment department: *Chinese: 28 35% 
*Japanese: 44 54% 
*Other: 1 1% 
Manufacturing department: *Chinese: 44 54% 
*Japanese: 40 49% 
*Other: 1 1% 
Marketing department: *Chinese: 50 62% 
*Japanese: 35 43% 
*Other: 0 
Secretariat: *Chinese: 49 60% 
* Japanese: 5 6% 
*Other: 1 1% 
Other: * Chinese: 9 11% 
*Japanese: 3 4% 
*Other: 0 
20. Who are normally Chairman of the Board and President? (please tick one from each A 
and B) 
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A. 
Chairman is Chinese: 
Chairman is Japanese: 
B. 
President is Chinese: 
President is Japanese: 
53 65% 
28 35% 
36 44% 
45 56% 
21. Please indicate which ofthe following main policies of your enterprise is determined by: 
(Enterprise itself= E, Japanese parent enterprise= JPE, Chinese parent enterprise= CPE) 
A. Annual budget: 
* E: 
* JPE: 
* CPE: 
* E & JPE: 
* E&CPE: 
* JPE&CPE: 
* E & JPE & CPE: 
*Not known: 
B. Output & profit targets 
* E: 
* JPE: 
* CPE: 
* E &JPE: 
* E&CPE: 
* JPE & CPE: 
* E & JPE & CPE: 
*Not known: 
C. Production plans 
* E: 
* JPE: 
* CPE: 
* E & JPE: 
* E & CPE: 
* JPE & CPE: 
* E & JPE & CPE: 
*Not known: 
D. Product pricing 
* E: 
55 68% 
5 6% 
1 1% 
5 6% 
3 4% 
4 5% 
11 14% 
1 1% 
46 57% 
6 7% 
2 2% 
9 11% 
3 4% 
4 5% 
13 16% 
1 1% 
52 64% 
6 7% 
1 1% 
14 17% 
2 2% 
1 1% 
6 7% 
1% 
44 54% 
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* JPE: 
* CPE: 
* E & JPE: 
* E & CPE: 
* JPE & CPE: 
* E & JPE & CPE: 
*Not known: 
E. Staffing level 
* E: 
* JPE: 
* CPE: 
* E & JPE: 
* E&CPE: 
* JPE & CPE: 
* E&JPE&CPE: 
*Not known: 
22. Does your enterprise reach full production stage? 
Yes, this stage reached * 1 - 5 years ago: 
* 6- 10 years ago: 
* Over 10 years ago: 
No, will reach this stage * After 1 - 3 years: 
* After 4- 6 years: 
Not known: 
10 12% 
3 4% 
17 21% 
1 1% 
1 1% 
5 6% 
2 2% 
58 72% 
4 5% 
4 5% 
4 5% 
2 2% 
2 2% 
9 11% 
1 1% 
52 64% 
5 6% 
0 
19 23% 
0 
5 6% 
23. What is the source of your enterprise revolving fund? (Please tick the most applicable) 
* Japanese parent company: 40 49% 
*Japanese bank loan: 6 7% 
* Chinese parent company: 14 17% 
* Chinese bank loan: 39 48% 
* The loan of foreign bank in China: 10 12% 
* The loan of other country bank: 0 
*Other: 18 22% 
*Not known: 6 7% 
24. If your enterprise has imported technology from Japan, please indicate the type 
(Please tick the most applicable): 
* Machinery operating: 
* Machinery maintenance: 
46 57% 
23 26% 
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* Production: 
* Production design: 
* Research & development: 
*Other: 
*Not known: 
25. Did your enterprise import any special Japanese management methods? 
Yes: 
If yes, please tick as many as applicable: 
* Japanese salary system: 
* Quality control circles: 
*"SS" (Arrange, Rectify, 
Eliminate, Clear, Educate): 
* Enterprise internal welfare system: 
* Enterprise length of service system: 
*Other: 
No: 
Not known: 
63 78% 
28 35% 
13 16% 
2 2% 
6 7% 
68 84% 
16 20% 
40 49% 
57 70% 
29 36% 
24 30% 
8 10% 
9 11% 
4 5% 
26. What training method does your enterprise use for employees (please tick whichever 
applies): 
* On-the-job training: 
* Outside training: 
* On-the-job & outside training: 
* Training in Japan: 
*Other: 
27. Has your enterprise sent employees to Japan for training? 
Yes: 
* If yes, please indicate the number of employees sent to Japan: 
* 1-30: 
* 31-60: 
*over 60: 
* If yes, please indicate that how long were they sent for: 
* Under one month: 
* 1-3 months: 
* 4-6 months: 
* Over half year: 
No: 
66 81% 
11 
9 
63 
2 
63 
47 
9 
6 
14 
25 
1 I 
16 
19 
14% 
11% 
78% 
2% 
78% 
58% 
11% 
7% 
17% 
31% 
14% 
20% 
24% 
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28. Has your enterprise advertised products or services in China? 
Yes: 
If yes, 
A. Please indicate in what media: 
* Journals: 
*Newspapers: 
*Radio: 
* Television: 
* Billboards: 
* Direct mail: 
* Sponsoring an event: 
*Other: 
B. What has been the response to your enterprise's China advertising: 
* Absolutely no response: 
* Some inquiries, but no sales: 
* Moderate sales generated: 
* Significant increase in sales: 
No: 
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52 64% 
24 30% 
36 44% 
14 17% 
21 26% 
10 12% 
14 17% 
15 19% 
20 25% 
0 
5 6% 
35 43% 
11 14% 
29 35.8% 
29. What is your enterprise's marketing region? (Please enter approximate proportion) 
In Chinese domestic market: 
In Japanese domestic market: 
In markets other 
than China & Japan: 
* I -25%: 
* 26-50%: 
* 51-75%: 
* 76-100%: 
* 1 -25%: 
* 26-50%: 
* 51-75%: 
* 76-100%: 
* I -25%: 
* 26-50%: 
*Over 50%: 
30. In the Chinese domestic market are your products sold by: 
* Japanese parent company: 
* Chinese parent company: 
* Your enterprise: 
* Other Chinese company: 
18 22% 
11 14% 
8 10% 
25 31% 
9 11% 
11 14% 
9 11% 
24 30% 
23 28% 
14 17% 
3 4% 
4 5% 
4 5% 
66 81% 
I 1% 
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*Other: 0 
3I. In markets other than China are your products sold by 
* Japanese parent company: 54 67% 
* Chinese parent company: ..., 4% .) 
* Your enterprise: 26 32% 
* Other Chinese company: 1 1% 
* Other Japanese company: 5 6% 
*Other: 0 
32. What factors are crucial to competitive advantage in the Chinese market, as compared 
with other Asian markets? 
(No advantage= 1, Some advantage= 2, Crucial advantage= 3) 
China Other Asian markets 
Low base price: * 1: 8 10% ..., 4% .) 
* 2: 28 35% 18 22% 
* 3: 8 10% 10 12% 
High quality: *1: 0 0 
* 2: 8 10% 4 5% 
* 3: 57 70% 39 48% 
Service back-up: * 1: 2 2% 0 
* 2: 12 15% 11 14% 
* 3: 27 33% 6 7% 
Warranty: * 1: 7 9% 2 2% 
* 2: 2 2% 6 7% 
* 3: 10 12% 3 4% 
Mass advertising: * 1: 0 3 4% 
* 2: 6 7% 4 5% 
* 3: 4 5% 1 1% 
Teclmology sharing: * 1: 1 1% 1 1% 
* 2: 6 7% 4 5% 
* 3: 7 9% 1 1% 
Low installation costs: * 1: 2 2% 1% 
* 2: 11 14% ..., 4% .) 
* 3: 5 6% ..., 4% .) 
Attractive payment terms: *I: 2 2% 1% 
* 2: I2 15% 4 5% 
* 3: I 1% I I% 
Top product design: *I: 1% 0 
* 2: I3 I6% 9 11% 
* ..., . 
.). 20 25% 9 11% 
Quantity discount: * 1: 2 2% 2 2% 
* 2: 8 10% 4 5% 
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* 3: 1% 0 
Maintenance-free use: * 1: 2 2% 0 
* 2: 8 10% 5 6% 
* 3: 7 9% 2 2% 
33. When comparing the period of January to June between this and last year, what happened 
to the turnover of your enterprise? (please enter approximate proportion) 
Higher than last year: 
Similar last year: 
Lower than last year: 
Not known: 
* 1 - 5%: 
* 6-10%: 
* 11-50%: 
*Over 50%: 
* 1 -5%: 
*6-10%: 
*Over 10%: 
34. Now, is your enterprise in profit? 
Yes: 
*Under 3%: 
* 3%-8%: 
* 8%- 15%: 
*Over 15%: 
No: 
If no, please indicate the level: 
* Small deficit: 
* Large deficit: 
Balance of receipts and payments: 
Not known: 
35. How do your products compare with Japanese parent company's? 
* Finished products of similar designs: 
* Partly-finished products of similar designs: 
* Similar products but the parent's are of higher standard: 
* Similar products but the parent's are of lower standard: 
* Similar products: 
* Different products: 
*Not known: 
2 2% 
6 7% 
25 31% 
20 25% 
4 5% 
0 
0 
4 5% 
19 23% 
51 63% 
12 15% 
18 22% 
11 14% 
10 12% 
15 19% 
15 19% 
0 
14 17% 
1% 
l 1 14% 
10 12% 
21 26% 
2 2% 
36 44% 
15 19% 
'"' 4% .J 
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SECT[ON FOUR: ENV[RONMENT 
36. What problems have you experienced with your enterprise development? 
* Cash flow difficult: 46 57% 
* Extra expense of transfer account: .., 4% .) 
* Excessive entertainment expenses: 17 21% 
* High cost of goods & materials storage: 12 15% 
* Difficult to get Chinese visas & work permits: .., 4% .) 
* Problems in training local managers & technical staff: 18 22% 
* Inefficiency of local government: 15 19% 
* Problems of developing domestic market: 23 28% 
* Ineffective laws and regulations: 29 36% 
* Lack of local knowledge: 5 6% 
* Poor infrastructure: 12 15% 
* Unstable political situation: 0 
* Low production efficiency: 5 6% 
*Other: 12 15% 
37. Does your enterprise encounter any impedance to importation of Japanese teclmology & 
equipment? (Please tick applicable) 
No: 
Yes: 
* Japanese government restrictions on exportation of new & high technology: 
*Japanese parent company restrictions on provision of new & high technology: 
*Poor co-operation between Chinese & Japanese staff: 
* Chinese government policy: 
* Low educational level of Chinese employees: 
* Chinese employees lack knowledge required: 
* Language barriers: 
*Other: 
Not known: 
51 
27 
.., 
.) 
2 
0 
.., 
.) 
7 
4 
17 
2 
3 
63% 
33% 
4% 
2% 
4% 
9% 
5% 
21% 
2% 
4% 
38. What do you think are the main impedances to the importation of Japanese management 
methods? (please tick as many as applicable) 
No impedance: 
Yes, there are: 
* Differences between Chinese & Japanese politics & social systems: 
* Differences between Chinese & Japanese cultures & traditions: 
* Differences between Chinese & Japanese economic & business systems: 
29 36% 
48 59% 
19 24% 
29 36% 
36 44% 
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* Language barriers on both sides: 
* Poor co-operation between Chinese & Japanese staff: 
* Low educational level of Chinese employees: 
*Other: 
Not known: 
39. Is your enterprise going to increase investment or not? 
*No: 
*Yes: 
* Probably reduce: 
* Probable withdraw: 
40. Is your enterprise going to increase output & type of products or not? 
Yes: 
No: 
41. Will your enterprise continue to co-operate with its current partner or not? 
Continue to co-operation: 
Look for a new partner: 
Not known: 
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23 28% 
2 2% 
12 15% 
5 6% 
4 5% 
45 56% 
36 44% 
0 
0 
76 94% 
5 6% 
74 91% 
0 
7 9% 
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All respondents were divided into three groups: Chinese, Japanese and both of them together. 
This was then divided into five headings such as: T =total responses; S =responses from small 
size companies (1 - 200 employees); M= medium size companies (201 - 500 employees); L = 
large size companies (over 500 employees); N = Company size not known. The Japanese 
respondents however had no medium size companies, so only 'T, S, L, N" were listed for them. 
Table 1: Status of Respondents 
. I: YOUR POSITION 
c H X N E s E JAPANESE CHINESE & JAPANESE 
T s M L N T s L N T s M L N 
General 2I I7 3 --- I 8 5 2 I 29 22 3 2 2 
Manager 30% 24% 4% --- 1% 80% 50% 20% 10% 36% 27% 4% 2% 2% 
Vice ge. 26 12 7 6 1 --- --- --- --- 26 12 7 6 I 
Manager 37% 17% 10% 8% 1% --- --- --- --- 32% 15% 9% 7% I% 
Other 20 I3 5 1 I 2 1 1 --- 22 14 5 2 I 
28% I8% 7% I% 1% 20% 10% 10% --- 27% 17% 6% 2% 1% 
Not 4 3 1 --- --- --- --- --- --- 4 
.., I .) --- ---
known 6% 4% 1% --- --- --- --- --- --- 5% 4% 1% --- ---
Total 71 45 16 7 3 10 6 3 I 81 51 16 10 4 
100 63% 23% 10% 4% 100 60% 30% 10% 100 63% 20% 12% 5% 
% % 0/o 
Table 2: Work Experience of Respondents 
2: HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN WORKING IN THE ENTERPRISE? 
c H I N E s E JAPANESE CHINESE & JAPANESE 
IT s M L N T s L N IT s M L N 
· In any enterprise 
1 - 10. 18 11 4 2 1 4 I 2 I 22 12 4 4 2 
years 25% 15% 6% 3% 1% 40% IO% 20% 10% 27% I5% 5% 5% 2% 
11 - 20. 19 13 4 1 1 2 2 --- --- 21 15 4 1 1 
years 27% I8% 6% 1% 1% 20% 20% --- --- 26% 19% 5% 1% 1% 
Over 20 28 I7 6 4 I 4 3 1 --- 32 20 6 5 1 
year 39% 24% 8% 6% 1% 40% 30% 10% --- 40% 25% 7% 6% 1% 
Not 6 4 2 --- --- --- --- --- --- 6 4 2 --- ---
known 8% 6% 3% --- --- --- --- --- --- 7°/o 5% 2% --- ---
In the current enterprise 
I - 5. 59 38 13 6 2 9 5 3 I 68 43 13 9 3 
years 83% 54% 18% 8% 3% 90% 50% 30% 10% 84'Yo 53% 16% 11% 4% 
6- 10. 6 3 I I I I I --- --- 7 4 I I I 
years 8% 4% 1% 1% 1% 10% 10% --- --- 9% 5% 1% 1% I 0/ /0 
Not 6 4 2 --- --- --- --- --- --- 6 4 2 --- ---
known 8% 6% 3% --- --- --- --- --- --- 7'Y.. 5% 2% --- ---
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Table 3: Type of Chinese company 
3. TYPE OF CHINESE PARENT COMPANY 
I c H I N E s E I JAPANESE CHINESE & JAPANESE 
T s M L N T s L N IT s M L N 
State 42 25 10 4 2 6 5 I --- 48 30 10 5 2 
company 59% 35% 14% 6% 3% 60% 50% 10% --- 59% 37% 12% 6% 2% 
Collective 12 10 2 --- --- --- --- --- --- 12 10 2 --- ---
company 17% 14% 3% --- --- --- --- --- --- 15% 12% 2% --- ---
Township 6 5 2 --- --- --- --- --- --- 6 5 2 --- ---
company 8% 7% 3% --- --- --- --- --- --- 7% 6% 2% --- ---
Other 2 2 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 2 2 --- --- ---
3% 3% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 2% 2% --- --- ---
Not 9 3 2 3 2 4 1 2 1 13 4 2 5 3 
known 13% 4% 3% 4% 3% 40% 10% 20% 10% 16% 5% 2% 6% 4% 
Table 4: Type of Japanese company 
4. TYPE OF JAPANESE PARENT COMPANY 
c H I N E s E JAPANESE . CHINESE & JAPANESE 
T s M L N T s L N ,T s M L N 
Trading 23 17 4 1 2 5 3 1 1 28 20 4 2 3 
house 32% 24% 6% 1% 3% 50% 30% 10% 10% 35% 25% 5% 2% 4% 
Bank 1 1 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1 1 --- --- ---
1% 1% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1% 1% --- --- ---
Manufac 53 32 13 5 4 7 3 3 1 60 35 13 8 5 
-tu ring 75% 45% 18% 7% 6% 70% 30% 30% 10% 74% 43% 16% 10% 6% 
Other 6 3 1 2 --- 1 --- --- 1 7 3 1 2 1 
8% 4% 1% 3% --- 10% --- --- 10% 9% 4% 1% 2% 1% 
Table 5: Number of Chinese parent company employees 
5. NUMBER OF CHINESE PARENT COMPANY EMPLOYEES 
c H I N E s E 
IT s M L N 
001-250 11 IO I --- ---
I5% 14% 1% --- ---
251-500 14 10 4 --- I 
20% 14% 6% --- 1% 
501- 6 5 I --- ---
1000 
8% 7% 1% --- ---
OvcriOOO 27 15 8 4 I 
38% 21% 11% 6% 1% 
Not 13 6 I 3 2 
known 18% 8% 1% 4% 3% 
JAPANESE 
T s L N 
--- --- --- ---
--- --- --- ---
--- --- --- ---
--- --- --- ---
2 2 --- ---
20% 20% --- ---
3 2 I ---
30% 20% 10% ---
5 2 2 ---
50% 20% 20% ---
CHINESE & JAPANESE 
T s M L N 
11 10 I --- ---
14% I2% 1% --- ---
14 IO 4 --- I 
17% 12% 5% --- 1% 
8 7 I --- ---
lO'Yo 9% 1% --- ---
30 17 8 5 ---
37% 21% 10% 6% ---
18 8 I 5 ---
22% 10% 1% 6% ---
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Table 6: Number of Japanese parent company employees 
6. NUMBER OF JAPANESE PARENT COMPANY EMPLOYEES 
I c H I N E s E 11 JAPANESE I CHINESE & JAPANESE 
T s M L N T s L N T s M L N 
001-250 23 22 I --- --- I I --- --- 24 23 I --- ---
32% 31% 1% --- --- 10% 10% --- --- 30% 28% 1% --- ---
251-500 5 3 I --- I 3 2 --- I 8 5 I --- 3 
7% 4% 1% --- 1% 30% 20% --- 10% 10% 6% 1% --- 4% 
501- 9 4 4 I --- --- --- --- --- 9 4 4 I ---
1000 
13% 6% 6% I% --- --- --- --- --- 11% 5% 5% I% ---
OveriOOO 22 8 7 6 I 4 2 2 --- 26 IO 7 8 I 
3I% II% IO% 8% I% 40% 20% 20% --- 32% I2% 9% 10% 1% 
Not I2 8 3 --- I 2 I 1 --- 14 9 3 1 I 
known 17% 11% 4% --- 1% 20% 10% 10% --- 17% 11% 4% 1% 1% 
Table 7: Number of Japanese parent company investments in China 
7. HOW MANY OTHER ENTERPRISES DOES JAPANESE PARENT COMPANY INVEST IN 
CHINA? 
c H I N E s E I JAPANESE I CHINESE & JAPANESE 
T s M L N T s L N T s M L N 
Only one 30 22 6 --- 2 4 3 I --- 34 25 6 1 2 
42% 31% 8% --- 3% 40% 30% 10% --- 42% 31% 7% 1% 2% 
2- 5 34 19 7 7 2 4 2 I 1 38 21 7 8 3 
48% 27% 10% 10% 3% 40% 20% 10% 10% 47% 26% 9% 10% 4% 
6- 10 5 3 2 --- --- 2 I I --- 7 4 2 I ---
7% 4% 3% --- --- 20% 10% IO% --- 9% 5% 2% 1% ---
Over 10 I --- I --- --- --- --- --- --- 1 --- I --- ---
1% --- 1% --- --- --- --- --- --- 1% --- 1% --- ---
Not I I --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1 I --- --- ---
known 1% 1% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1% 1% --- --- ---
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Table 8: Why did the Japanese choose Chinese companies? 
(Note: 3 = V ery 1mportant, 2 I = mportant, = ot Important I N . 
8. HOW WOULD YOU ASSESS THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FOLLOWING FACTORS TO 
JAPANESE COMPANIES FOR INVESTING IN CHINA? 
c H I N E s :1~ JAPANESE CHINESE & JAPANESE T s M L s L N IT s M L N 
Market 
3 32 20 6 3 2 4 3 I --- 36 23 6 4 2 
2 24 14 8 3 I 5 3 I I 29 17 8 4 2 
56 34 14 6 3 9 6 2 I 65 40 14 8 4 
79% 48% 20% 8% 4% 90% 60% 20% 10% 80% 49% 17% 10% 5% 
1 3 3 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 3 3 --- --- ---
4% 4% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 4% 4% --- --- ---
Material 
3 10 6 4 --- 1 1 1 --- --- 11 7 4 --- 1 
2 25 12 10 2 2 5 3 I I 30 15 10 3 3 
35 18 14 2 3 6 4 I 1 41 22 14 3 4 
49% 25% 20% 3% 4% 60% 40% 10% 10% 51% 27% 17% 4% 5% 
1 12 9 --- 3 --- I 1 --- --- 13 10 --- 3 ---
17% 13% --- 4% 10% 10% --- --- 16% 12% --- 4% ---
Labour 
3 32 19 8 5 1 3 3 --- --- 35 22 8 5 I 
2 26 16 8 2 2 5 2 2 1 31 18 8 4 3 
58 35 16 7 3 8 5 2 1 66 40 16 9 4 
82% 49% 23% 10% 4% 80% 50% 20% 10% 81% 49% 20% 11% 5% 
1 4 3 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 4 3 --- --- ---
6% 4% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 5% 4% --- --- ---
Policy 
3 13 10 3 --- --- 3 2 I --- 16 12 3 I ---
2 34 20 6 7 2 4 2 1 I 38 22 6 8 3 
47 30 9 7 2 7 4 2 I 54 34 9 9 3 
66% 42% 13% 10% 3% 70% 40% 20% 10% 67% 42% 11% 11% 4% 
1 5 3 2 --- --- --- --- --- --- 5 3 2 --- ---
7% 4% 3% --- --- --- --- --- --- 6% 4% 2% --- ---
Competition 
3 I --- I I I 2 I I --- 3 I I 2 I 
2 17 8 4 4 --- I I --- --- 18 9 4 4 ---
18 8 5 5 I 3 2 I --- 21 10 5 6 I 
25% 11% 7% 7% 1% 30% 20% 10% --- 26% 12% 6% 7% 1% 
I 13 10 2 I --- 2 2 --- --- 15 12 2 I ---
18% 14% 3% 1% --- 20% 20% --- --- 19%. 15% 2% 1% ---
Strategy 
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3 13 6 4 I I 3 2 I --- 16 8 4 2 I 
2 22 11 7 4 --- 4 3 I --- 24 14 7 5 --- I 
35 17 11 5 I 7 5 2 --- 40 22 11 7 I 
49% 24% 15% 7% I% 70% 50% 20% --- 49% 27% 14% 9% 1% 
1 8 6 I I --- --- --- --- --- 8 6 I I ---
11% 8% I% 1% --- --- --- --- --- 10% 7% 1% 1% ---
Avoidance 
3 --- --- --- --- --- I --- I --- 1 --- --- I ---
2 4 I 2 I --- I --- I --- 5 I 2 2 ---
4 I 2 I --- 2 --- 2 --- 6 I 2 3 ---
6% I% 3% 1% --- 20% --- 20% --- 7°/o 1% 2% 4% ---
1 22 13 5 4 --- 3 3 --- --- 25 16 5 4 ---
31% 18% 7% 6% --- 30% 30% --- --- 31% 20% 6% 5% ---
Other 
3 4 4 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 4 4 --- --- ---
2 3 2 I --- --- --- --- --- --- 3 2 I --- ---
7 6 I --- --- --- --- --- --- 7 6 1 --- ---
10% 8% I% --- --- --- --- --- --- 9% 7% 1% --- ---
1 2 2 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 2 2 --- --- ---
3% 3% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 2% 2% --- --- ---
Table 9: Why did the Chinese choose Japanese partners? 
9. WHY DID THE CHINESE CHOOSE THEIR JAPANESE PARTNER? 
c H I N E s E .JAPANESE CHINESE & JAPANESE 
T s M L N T s L N T s M L N 
Finance & 16 11 3 2 1 3 2 1 --- 19 13 3 3 1 
economy 23% 15% 4% 3% 1% 30% 20% 10% --- 23% 16% 4% 4% 1% 
Tech. & 46 29 12 4 2 5 3 I --- 51 32 12 5 2 
equipment 65% 41% 17% 6% 3% 50% 30% 10% --- 63% 40% IS% 6% 2% 
Manage- 31 20 6 4 2 5 3 I --- 36 23 6 5 2 
ment skill 44% 28% 8% 6% 3% 50% 30% 10% --- 44% 28% 7% 6% 2% 
Materials 3 2 --- I --- --- --- --- --- 3 2 --- I ---
4% 3% --- I% --- --- --- --- --- 4% 2% --- 1% ---
Marketing 29 18 8 3 --- 4 3 --- --- 33 21 8 ---
41% 25% 11% 4% --- 40% 30% --- --- 41% 26% 10% ---
Patent 9 4 4 2 --- 2 2 --- --- 11 6 4 2 ---
right 13% 6% 6% 3% --- 20% 20% --- --- 14% 7% 5% 2% ---
Strong 24 15 6 --- I 4 2 I --- 28 17 6 I I 
reputation 34% 21% 8% --- 1% 40% 20% 10% --- 35% 21% 7% 1% 1% 
Other 9 9 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 9 9 --- --- ---
13% 13% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 11% 11% --- --- ---
Not 7 2 2 3 2 4 I 2 I 11 3 2 5 3 
known 10% 3% 3% 4% 3% 40% 10% 20% !Oo/c 14% 4% 2% 6% 4% 
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Table 10: Initial business contact 
9. DID YOUR PARENT COMPANY ESTABLISH INITIAL CONTACT THROUGH 
ANY OF THE FOLLOWING? 
c H I N E s E APANESE CHINESE & JAPANESE 
T s M L N [T s L N T s M L N 
Exhibition 12 3 7 3 --- --- --- --- --- 12 3 7 3 ---
Tech. fair 17% 4% IO% 4% --- --- --- --- --- 15% 4% 9% 4% ---
Hired 3 3 --- --- --- I I --- --- 4 4 --- --- ---
consultant 4% 4% --- --- --- 10% 10% --- --- 5% 5% --- --- ---
Embassy, I8 10 6 2 --- 3 2 --- --- 21 12 6 2 ---
liaison 25% I4% 8% 3% --- 30% 20% --- --- 26% IS% 7% 2% ---
Chinese 6 3 2 I --- 2 I 1 --- 8 4 2 2 ---
Solicitation 8% 4% 3% 1% --- 20% 10% 10% --- 10% 5% 2% 2% ---
Delegation 14 9 2 3 --- --- --- --- --- 14 9 2 3 ---
in CN /JP 20% 13% 3% 4% --- --- --- --- --- 17% 11% 2% 4% ---
Other 26 20 5 --- 2 3 2 I 1 29 22 5 I 3 
37% 28% 7% --- 3% 30% 20% 10% 10% 36% 27% 6% 1% 4% 
Not 6 2 2 1 2 2 --- I 8 2 2 2 
known 8% 3% 3% I% 3% 20% --- 10% 10% 2% 2% 2% 
Table 11: How did the Japanese monitor and analyse the Chinese market? 
11. HOW DOES THE JAPANESE PARENT COMPANY MONITOR AND ANALYSE 
THE CHINESE MARKET? 
c H I N E s E I JAPANESE I CHINESE & JAPANESE 
T s M L N T s L N T s M L N 
Consultant 15 10 1 3 --- 3 1 2 --- 18 11 5 ---
in Japan 2I% I4% 1% 4% --- 30% 10% 20% --- 22% I4% 6% ---
Consultant 4 3 1 --- --- 2 2 --- --- 6 5 1 --- ---
inHK 6% 4% 1% --- --- 20% 20% --- --- 7% 6% 1% --- ---
Consultant 34 23 6 2 3 8 5 2 1 42 28 6 4 4 
in China 48% 32% 8% 3% 4% 80% 50% 20% 10% 52% 35% 7% 5% 5% 
Japanese 4 3 I --- --- I I --- --- 5 4 I --- ---
publication 6% 4% I% --- --- IO% 10% --- --- 6% 5% 1% --- ---
Chinese 2 2 --- --- --- 2 2 --- 4 4 --- --- ---
publication 3% 3% --- --- --- 20% 20% --- 5% 5% --- --- ---
Office in 18 10 5 2 I 3 3 --- --- 21 13 5 2 I 
China 25% 14% 7% 3% 1% 30% 30% --- --- 26% 16% 6% 2% 1% 
Meet users 32 16 9 5 2 4 3 I --- 36 19 9 6 2 
& officials 45% 23% 13% 7% 3% 40% 30% 10% --- 44% 23% 11% 7% 2% 
Other 11 8 3 --- --- I --- I --- 12 8 3 I ---
15% 11% 4% --- --- 10% --- 10% --- 15% 10% 4% 1% ---
Not 2 --- I I --- I I --- --- 3 I I I ---
known J(Yo --- 1% 1% --- 10% 10% --- --- 4'1.. 1% 1% 1% ---
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Table 12: Type of enterprise 
12. PLEASE INDICATE THE TYPE OF YOUR ENTERPRISE 
I c H ][ N E s E I JAPANESE CHINESE & JAPANESE 
T s M L N T s L N IT s M L N 
Joint 55 36 12 5 2 5 4 I --- 60 40 12 6 2 
venture 77% 51% 17% 7% 3% 50% 40% 10% --- 74% 49% 15% 7% 2% 
Co-op. 6 5 I --- --- I I --- --- 7 6 I --- ---
venture 8% 7% 1% --- --- 10% 10% --- --- 9% 7% 1% --- ---
Japanese 10 4 2 3 I 4 I 2 I 14 5 2 5 2 
owned 14% 6% 3% 4% 1% 40% 10% 20% 10% 17% 6% 2% 6% 2% 
Table 13: Percentage of ownership 
13. WHICH PERCENTAGE OF JAPANESE & CHINESE OWNERSHIP IN YOUR 
ENTERPRISE 
c H l! N E s E JAPANESE t:HlNESE & JAPANESE 
T s M L .N T s L N T s M L N 
Japanese 
1-25% 8 6 2 --- --- --- --- --- --- 8 6 2 --- ---
11% 8% 3% --- --- --- --- --- --- 10% 7% 2% --- ---
26-50% 34 22 7 3 2 3 3 --- --- 37 25 7 3 ---
48% 31% 10% 4% 3% 30% 30% --- --- 46% 31% 9% 4% ---
51-75% 16 11 3 2 --- 2 1 1 --- 18 12 3 3 ---
23% 15% 4% 3% --- 20% 10% 10% --- 22% 15% 4% 4% ---
76- 12 6 2 3 1 5 2 2 1 17 8 2 5 2 
100% 
17% 8% 3% 4% 1% 50% 20% 20% 10% 21% 10% 2% 6% 2% 
Not 1 --- 1 --- --- --- --- --- --- 1 --- 1 --- ---
known 1% --- 1% --- --- --- --- --- --- 1% --- 1% --- ---
Chinese 
1-25% 4 4 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 4 4 --- --- ---
6% 6% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 5% 5% --- --- ---
26-50% 40 27 8 4 1 6 4 2 --- 46 31 8 5 1 
56% 38% 11% 6% 1% 60% 40% 20% --- 57% 38% 10% 6% 1% 
51-80% 16 11 4 --- 1 --- --- --- --- 16 11 4 1 ---
23% 15% 6% --- 1% --- --- --- --- 20% 14% 5% 1% ---
Not I --- 1 --- --- --- --- --- --- 1 --- I --- ---
known 1% --- 1% --- --- --- --- --- --- 1% --- 1% --- ---
Other 
1-25% 3 3 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 3 3 --- --- ---
4% 4% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 4°/o 4% --- --- ---
26-50% 2 2 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 2 2 --- --- ---
3% 3% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 2'Y.. 2% --- --- ---
260 
Appendix I 
l'able 14: Length of co-operation agreement 
14. LENGTH OF CO-OPERATION AGREEMENT IN YOUR ENTERPRISE 
c H I N E s E JAPANESE CHINESE & JAJP ANJESE 
IT s M L N T s L N T s M L N 
I - I 0 12 9 2 --- I 2 2 --- --- 14 11 2 --- I 
years 17% 13% 3% --- I% 20% 20% --- --- 17'V., 14% 2% --- 1% 
11 - 20. 45 30 10 4 I 5 4 --- I 50 34 10 4 2 
years 63% 42% 14% 6% 1% 50% 40% --- 10% 62% 42% 12% 5% 2% 
21 - 30 4 2 I I --- I --- I --- 5 2 I 2 ---
years 6% 3% 1% 1% --- 10% --- 10% --- 6% 2% 1% 2% ---
Over 30 10 4 2 3 I 2 --- 2 --- 12 4 2 5 1 
years 14% 6% 3% 4% 1% 20% --- 20% --- 15% 5% 2% 6% 1% 
Table 15: Chinese and Japanese investment forms 
15. WHAT FORM DOES BOTH CHINESE & JAPANESE INVESTMENT TAKE? 
I c H I N E s E 11 JAPANESE I CHJINESE & JAPANESE 
T s M L N T s L N T s M L N 
Cash 
Chinese 43 28 11 4 1 3 2 1 --- 46 30 11 5 I 
61% 39% 15% 6% I% 30% 20% 10% --- 57% 37% 14% 6% 1%: 
Japanese 64 39 14 8 2 9 6 2 1 73 45 14 10 3 
90% 55% 20% 1I% 3% 90% 60% 20% 10% 90% 56% 17% 12% 4% 
Building 
Chinese 33 24 6 2 1 3 4 --- --- 36 28 6 2 1 
46% 34% 8% 3% 1% 30% 40% --- --- 44% 35% 7% 2% 1%, 
Japanese 5 3 --- 2 --- 3 1 1 I 8 4 --- 3 1 
7% 4% 
---
3% --- 30% 10% 10% 10% 10% 5% --- 4% I% 
Machinery & equipment 
Chinese 16 12 2 1 1 3 3 --- --- 19 15 2 1 I 
23% 17% 3% 1% 1% 30% 30% --- --- 23% 19% 2% 1% 1% 
Japanese 32 25 3 2 2 4 3 1 --- 36 28 3 3 2 
45% 35% 4% 3% 3% 40% 30% 10% --- 44% 35% 4% 4% 2% 
Production material 
Chinese 10 8 I --- I --- --- --- --- 10 8 I --- I 
14% 11% 1% --- 1% --- --- --- --- 12% 10% 1% --- 1% 
Japanese 10 7 --- 2 I 2 I I --- 12 8 --- 3 I 
14% 10% --- 3% 1% 20% 10% 10% --- 15% 10% --- 4% 1% 
Labour 
Chinese 19 14 2 2 I I I --- --- 20 15 2 2 I 
27% 20% 3% 3% 1% 10% 10% --- --- 25'Yo 19% 2% 2% 1% 
Japanese I --- --- I --- I --- --- I 2 --- --- I I 
261 
Appendix I 
1% --- --- 1% --- 10% --- --- 10% 2% --- --- 1% 1% 
Industrial property right 
Chinese 4 4 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 4 4 --- --- ---
6% 6% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 5% 5% --- --- ---
Japanese 4 I I 2 --- 2 I I --- 6 2 I 3 ---
6% 1% 1% 3% --- 20% 10% 10% --- 7% 2% 1% 4% ---
Know-how 
Chinese 2 2 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 2 2 --- --- ---
3% 3% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 2% 2% --- --- ---
Japanese 21 10 6 4 I 4 3 I --- 25 13 6 5 I 
30% 14% 8% 6% 1% 40% 30% 10% --- 31% 16% 7% 6% 1% 
Site use right 
Chinese 24 17 3 1 I --- --- --- --- 24 17 3 I I 
34% 24% 4% 1% 1% --- --- --- --- 30% 21% 4% 1% 1% 
Japanese 2 --- --- 2 --- 2 1 I --- 4 1 --- 3 ---
3% --- --- 3% --- 20% 10% 10% --- 5% 1% --- 4% ---
Other 
Chinese --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Japanese I 1 --- --- --- 1 --- 1 --- 2 1 --- 1 ---
1% 1% --- --- --- 10% --- 10% --- 2% 1% --- 1% ---
Table 16: Number of enterprise employees 
16. TOTAL NUMBER OF THE ENTERPRISE EMPLOYEES 
c ll :n: N E s E JAPANESE CHINESE & JAPANESE 
IT s M L N T s L N T s M L N 
1-50 17 17 --- --- --- 2 2 --- --- 19 19 --- --- ---
24% 24% --- --- --- 20% 20% --- --- 23% 23% --- --- ---
51-100 14 14 --- --- --- I 1 --- --- 15 15 --- --- ---
20% 20% --- --- --- 10% 10% --- --- 19% 19% --- --- ---
101-200 14 14 --- --- --- 3 3 --- --- 17 17 --- --- ---
20% 20% --- --- --- 30% 30% --- --- 21% 21% --- --- ---
201-500 15 --- 15 --- --- --- --- --- --- 15 --- 15 --- ---
21% --- 21% --- --- --- --- --- --- 19% --- 19% --- ---
Over500 8 --- --- 8 --- 3 --- 3 --- 11 --- --- 11 ---
11% --- --- 11% --- 30% --- 30% --- 14% --- --- 14% ---
Not 3 I --- --- 3 I --- --- I 4 I --- --- 4 
known 4% 1% --- --- 4% 10% --- --- 10% 5% 1% --- --- 5% 
NUMBER OF JAPANESE STAFF IN THE ENTERPRISE 
c H I N E s E JAPANESE CHINESE & JAPANESE 
T s M L N jT s L N IT s M L N 
1 - 5 40 30 8 1 8 6 2 48 36 8 .., --- --- ) ---
56% 42% 11% 1% --- 80% 60% 20% --- 59% 44% 10% 4% ---
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6- 10 6 I 3 2 --- I --- I --- 7 I 3 3 ---
8% 1% 4% 3% --- 10% --- 10% --- 9% 1% 4% 4% ---
Over I 0 6 --- 2 4 --- --- --- --- --- 6 --- 2 4 ---
8% --- 3% 6% --- --- --- --- --- 7% --- 2% 5% ---
No I6 9 I --- --- --- --- --- --- 16 9 I --- ---
Japanese 23% I3% 1% --- --- --- --- --- --- 20% 11% 1% --- ---
Not 3 3 3 --- --- I --- --- I 4 3 3 --- I 
known 4% 4% 4% --- --- 10% --- --- 10% 5% 4% 4% --- 1% 
Table 17: Time into operation 
17. DID YOUR ENTERPRISE GO INTO OPERATION 
CH I N E SE JAPAN E S E=if. CIDNESE & JAPANESE 
T s M L N ,T S L N T s M L N 
Yes, into operation 
I - 5. 56 36 11 6 2 7 4 2 I 63 40 11 8 3 
years 79% 51% 15% 8% 3% 70% 40% 20% 10% 78% 49% 14% IO% 4% 
6- 10. 13 6 5 2 --- 3 2 1 --- 16 8 5 3 ---
years 18% 8% 7% 3% --- 30% 20% 10% --- 20% IO% 6% 4% ---
No 2 2 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 2 2 --- --- ---
3% 3% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 2% 2% --- --- ---
Table 18: Enterprise's operational mode 
18. WHAT IS YOUR ENTERPRISE'S OPERATIONAL MODE? 
c H I N JAPANES CHINESE & JAPANESE 
T s M L N IT s L N IT s M L N 
Manufac- 64 40 14 7 3 9 5 3 1 73 45 14 10 4 
turing 90% 56% 20% 10% 4% 90% 50% 30% IO% 90% 56% I7% 12% 5% 
Processing 12 9 3 --- --- 1 --- --- --- 13 9 3 --- ---
17% 13% 4% --- --- 10% --- --- --- 16% 11% 4% --- ---
Repairing 4 4 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 4 4 --- --- ---
6% 6% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 5% 5% --- --- ---
Other 7 6 --- I --- I I --- I 8 7 --- I I 
10% 8% --- 1% --- 10% 10% --- 10% 10% 9% --- 1% 1% 
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Table 19: Main departments and control 
19. WHAT ARE THE MAIN DEPARTMENTS AND WHO CONTROLS THEM IN YOUR 
ENTERPRISE? 
c H I N E s E JAPANESE CHINESE & JAPANESE 
T s M L N T s L N T s M L N 
Personnel department 
Chinese 63 39 15 7 2 7 4 3 --- 70 43 15 10 2 
89% 55% 21% 10% 3% 70% 40% 30% --- 86% 53% 19% 12% 2% 
Japanese 7 4 I --- 2 2 I --- I 9 5 I --- 3 
10% 6% 1% --- 3% 20% 10% --- 10% 11% 6% 1% --- 4% 
Other --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
---
--- --- --- ---
Financial department 
Chinese 58 38 14 5 2 6 4 2 --- 64 42 14 7 2 
82% 54% 20% 7% 3% 60% 40% 20% --- 79% 52% 17% 9% 2% 
Japanese 18 11 4 2 I 3 I I I 21 12 4 3 2 
25% 15% 6% 3% 1% 30% 10% 10%' 10% 26% 15% 5% 4% 2% 
Other --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
General affairs 
Chinese 53 34 1I 6 2 6 3 2 I 59 37 I1 8 3 
75% 48% 15% 8% 3% 60% 30% 20% 10% 73% 46% 14% 10% 4% 
Japanese 5 2 I I I 2 I I --- 7 3 1 2 I 
7% 3% I% I% 1% 20% 10% 10% --- 9% 4% 1% 2% 1% 
Other --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -- --- --- --- ---
Technology & equipment department 
Chinese 25 17 5 2 I 3 2 I --- 28 I9 5 3 I 
35% 24% 7% 3% 1% 30% 20% 10% --- 35% 23% 6% 4% 1% 
Japanese 36 I8 I I 6 I 8 4 3 I 44 22 11 9 2 
51% 25% 15% 8% 1% 80% 40% 30% 10% 54% 27% 14% 11% 2% 
Other I 1 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1 I --- --- ---
1% 1% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1% 1% --- --- ---
Manufacturing department 
Chinese 40 31 6 2 1 4 3 I --- 44 34 6 3 1 
56% 44% 8% 3% I% 40% 30% 10% --- 54% 42% 7% 4% 1% 
Japanese 35 I6 I I 6 2 5 I 3 I 40 17 11 9 3 
49% 23% 15% 8% 3% 50% 10% 30% 10% 49% 21% 14% 11% 4% 
Other I I --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1 I --- --- ---
1% I% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1% 1% --- --- ---
Marketing department 
Chinese 44 33 6 3 2 6 4 2 --- 50 37 6 5 2 
62% 46% 8% 4% 3% 60% 40% 20% --- 62°1.• 46% 7% 6% 3% 
Japanese 32 15 10 5 2 3 I I I 35 16 10 6 ") _) 
45% 21% 14% 7% 3% 30% 10% 10% 10% 43% 20% 12% 7% 4% 
Other --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Secretariat 
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Chinese 45 27 12 4 2 4 I 2 I 49 28 12 6 3 
63% 38% 17% 6% 3% 40% 10% 20% 10% 60% 35% 15% 7% 4% 
Japanese 4 3 I --- --- I --- I --- 5 3 I I ---
6% 4% 1% --- --- 10% --- 10% --- 61Yo 4% 1% 1% ---
Other I I --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1 I --- --- ---
1% 1% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1% 1% --- --- ---
Other 
Chinese 9 8 --- I --- --- --- --- --- 9 8 --- I ---
13% 11% --- 1% --- --- --- --- --- 11% 10% --- 1% ---
Japanese 3 2 --- I --- --- --- --- --- 3 2 --- I ---
4% 3% --- 1% --- --- --- --- --- 4% 3% --- 1% ---
Other --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
---
--- ---
--- ---
Table 20: The nationality of Chairman of the Board and President 
20. WHO ARE CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD AND PRESIDENT? 
c H I N E s E I JAPAESE I CHINESE & JAPANESE 
T s M L N T s L N T s M L N 
Chairman 47 30 I2 3 2 6 5 I --- 53 35 12 4 2 
Chinese 66% 42% I7% 4% 3% 60% 50% 10% --- 65% 43% 15% 5% 3% 
Chairman 24 16 3 4 I 4 I 2 1 28 17 3 6 2 
Japanese 34% 23% 4% 6% 1% 40% 10% 20% 10% 35% 21% 4% 7% 3% 
President 36 28 6 I I --- --- --- --- 36 28 6 I 1 
Chinese 51% 39% 8% 1% 1% --- --- --- --- 44% 35% 7% I% I% 
President 35 17 9 7 2 IO 6 3 1 45 23 9 10 3 
Japanese 49% 24% 13% 10% 3% 100 60% 30% 10% 56% 28% 11% I2% 4% 
% 
Table 21-A: Main policy determinant (A) 
(E E J JPC ch· nterpnse = 
' 
apanese parent company = 
' 
mese parent company = CPC) 
21. PLEASE INDICATE WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING MAIN POLICIES OF YOUR 
ENTERPRISE IS DETERMINED BY 
c H I N E s E JAPANESE CHINESE & JAPANESE 
T s M L N T s L N T s M L N 
A. Annual budget 
E: 48 32 11 4 I 7 4 3 --- 55 36 11 7 I 
68% 45% 15% 6% 1% 70% 40% 30% --- 68% 44% 14% 9% 1% 
JPC: 4 2 --- 2 --- I --- --- I 5 2 --- 2 I 
6% 3% --- 3% --- 10% --- --- 10% 6% 2% --- 2% 1% 
CPC: I --- I --- --- --- --- --- --- 1 --- I --- ---
1% --- 1% --- --- --- --- --- --- 1%. --- 1% --- ---
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E & JPC: 4 2 I --- I I I --- --- 5 3 I --- I 
6% 3% 1% --- 1% 10% 10% --- --- 6% 4% 1% --- 1% 
E&CPC 3 I I --- I --- --- --- --- 3 I I --- I 
4% 1% 1% --- 1% --- --- --- --- 4% 1% 1% --- 1% 
.IPC&CPC 3 3 --- --- --- I I --- --- 4 4 --- --- ---
4% 4% --- --- --- 10% 10% --- --- 5% 5% --- --- ---
E&JP&CP 10 7 I 2 --- I I --- --- 11 8 I 2 ---
14% 10% I% 3% --- 10% 10% --- --- 14% 10% I% 2% ---
Not I I --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1 I --- --- ---
known 1% 1% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1% 1% --- --- ---
1r bl 21 B M . r d t a e - : am po rcy e ermman t(B) 
B. Output and profit targets (21. continue) 
I c H ][ N E s E I JAPANESE I_ CHINESE & JAPANESE 
T s M L N T s L N IT s M L N 
E: 42 28 8 5 I 4 2 2 --- 46 30 8 7 I 
59% 39% 11% 7% 1% 40% 20% 20% --- 57% 37% 10% 9% 1% 
JPC: 5 3 --- 2 --- 1 --- --- 1 6 3 --- 2 I 
7% 4% --- 3% --- 10% --- --- 10% 7% 4% --- 2% I% 
CPC: 2 I 1 --- --- --- --- --- --- 2 1 1 --- ---
3% 1% 1% --- --- --- --- --- --- 2% 1% 1% --- ---
E & JPC: 7 2 4 --- 1 2 I 1 --- 9 3 4 1 1 
10% 3% 6% --- 1% 20% 10% 10% --- 11% 4% 5% 1% 1% 
E&CPC: 3 2 --- --- 1 --- --- --- --- 3 2 --- --- 1 
4% 3% --- --- 1% --- --- --- --- 4% 2% --- --- 1% 
JPC&CPC 3 3 --- --- --- 1 I --- --- 4 4 --- --- ---
4% 4% --- --- --- 10% 10% --- --- 5% 5% --- --- ---
E&JP&CP 11 8 2 1 --- 2 2 --- --- 13 10 2 1 ---
15% 11% 3% 1% --- 20% 20% --- --- 16% 12% 2% 1% ---
Not I 1 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1 1 --- --- ---
known 1% 1% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1% 1% --- --- ---
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T bl 21 C M . r d t a e - : am po tcy e ermman t(C) 
C. Production plans (21 . continue) 
c H I N E s JAPANESE CHINESE & JAPANESE 
T s M L N IT s L N IT s M L N 
E: 47 29 11 6 I 5 2 2 I 52 31 11 8 2 
66% 41% 15% 8% 1% 50% 20% 20% 10% 64% 38% 14% 10% 2% 
JPC: 5 3 --- 2 --- I --- --- I 6 3 --- 2 I 
7% 4% --- 3% --- 10% --- --- 10% 7% 4% --- 2% 1% 
CPC: I --- --- --- 1 --- --- --- --- 1 --- --- --- I 
1% --- --- --- 1% --- --- --- --- 1% --- --- --- 1% 
E & JPC: 12 7 4 --- 1 2 2 --- --- 14 9 4 --- 1 
17% 10% 6% --- 1% 20% 20% --- --- 17% II% 5% --- 1% 
E &CPC: 2 2 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 2 2 --- --- ---
3% 3% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 2% 2% --- --- ---
JPC&CPC 1 1 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1 1 --- --- ---
1% 1% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1% 1% --- --- ---
E&JP&CP 4 4 --- --- --- 2 2 --- --- 6 6 --- --- ---
6% 6% --- --- --- 20% 20% --- --- 7% 7% --- --- ---
Not 1 1 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1 1 --- --- ---
known 1% I% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1% 1% --- --- ---
Tabne 21-]): Main policy determinant (])l 
!D. Product pricing (21. continue) 
c H I N E s lE JAPANESE CHINESE & JAPANESE 
IT s M L N T s L N IT s M L N 
E: 38 30 4 3 1 6 3 3 --- 44 33 4 6 1 
54% 42% 6% 4% I% 60% 30% 30% --- 54% 41% 5% 7% 1% 
JPC: 9 5 2 2 --- I --- --- I 10 5 2 2 1 
13% 7% 3% 3% --- 10% --- --- 10% 12% 6% 2% 2% I% 
CPC: 2 --- 1 --- 1 1 1 --- --- 3 I 1 --- 1 
3% --- 1% --- 1% 10% 10% --- --- 4% 1% 1% --- 1% 
E & JPC: 17 7 8 1 1 --- --- --- --- 17 7 8 I I 
24% 10% 11% 1% I% --- --- --- --- 21% 9% 10% 1% 1% 
E &CPC: I I --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1 I --- --- ---
1% 1% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1% 1% --- --- ---
JPC&CPC I I --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1 I --- --- ---
1% 1% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1% 1% --- --- ---
E&.IP&CP 3 2 I --- --- 2 2 --- --- 5 4 I --- ---
4% 3% 1% --- --- 20% 20% --- --- 6'~o 5% 1% --- ---
Not 2 I --- I --- --- --- --- --- 2 I --- I ---
known 3% 1% --- 1% --- --- --- --- --- 2% 1% --- 1% ---
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T bl 21 E M . r d t a e - i: am po Icy e ermman t (E) 
E. Increase or reduction of staff (21. continue) 
I c H I N E s E I JAPAN E S ~~CHINESE & JAPANESE 
T s M L N T s L N T s M L N 
E: 52 30 15 6 I 6 3 3 --- 58 33 15 9 I 
73% 42% 21% 8% 1% 60% 30% 30% --- 72% 41% 19% 11% 1% 
JPC: 3 3 --- --- --- I --- --- I 4 3 --- --- I 
4% 4% --- --- --- 10% --- --- 10% 5% 4% --- --- 1% 
CPC: 3 2 --- --- 1 1 I --- --- 4 3 --- --- 1 
4% 3% --- --- 1% 10% 10% --- --- 5% 4% --- --- 1% 
E & JPC: 4 2 --- 1 I --- --- --- --- 4 2 --- I 1 
6% 3% --- 1% 1% --- --- --- --- 5% 2% --- 1% 1% 
E&CPC: 2 ,., --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 2 2 --- --- ---... 
3% 3% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 2% 2% --- --- ---
JPC&CPC 2 2 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 2 2 --- --- ---
3% 3% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 2% 2% --- --- ---
E&JP&CP 7 7 --- --- --- 2 2 --- --- 9 9 --- --- ---
10% 10% --- --- --- 20% 20% --- --- 11% 11% --- --- ---
Not I I --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1 1 --- --- ---
known 1% 1% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1% 1% --- --- ---
Table 22: Time when full production reached 
22. HAS YOUR ENTERPRISE REACH FULL PRODUCTION STAGE? 
c H I N E s E JAPANESE CHINESE & JAPANESE 
T s M L N T s L N IT s M L N 
Yes, reached the full production stage in 
I - 5. 48 31 10 6 1 4 2 I 1 52 33 10 7 2 
years ago 68% 44% 14% 8% 1% 40% 20% 10% 10% 64% 41% 12% 9% 2% 
6- 10. 4 2 2 --- --- 1 1 --- --- 5 3 2 --- ---
years ago 6% 3% 3% --- --- 10% 10% --- --- 6% 4% 2% --- ---
over 1 0 yr. ago --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
years ago Ill --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
No. will reach this stage after 
1-3 years 15 10 2 I 2 4 2 2 --- 19 12 2 3 2 
21% 14% 3% 1% 3% 40% 20% 20% --- 23% 15% 2% 4% 2% 
4-6 years --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Not 4 3 I --- --- I I --- --- 5 4 I --- ---
known 6% 4% 1% --- --- 10% 10% --- --- 6'~. 5% 1% --- ---
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Table 23: Revolving fund sources 
23. WHAT IS THE SOURCE OF YOUR ENTERPRISE REVOLVING FUND? 
c H I N E s E I JAPANESE I CHINESE & JAPANESE 
IT s M L N T s L N T s M L N 
J. parent 36 18 11 6 I 4 I 2 I 40 19 11 8 2 
company 51% 25% 15% 8% 1% 40% 10% 20% 10% 49% 23% 15% 10% 2% 
Japanese 5 3 2 --- --- I --- I --- 6 3 2 --- ---
bank loan 7% 4% 3% --- --- 10% --- 10% --- 7°/o 4% 2% --- ---
C. parent 14 10 3 I --- --- --- --- --- 14 10 3 1 ---
company 20% 14% 4% 1% --- --- --- --- --- 17% 12% 4% 1% ---
Chinese 36 24 9 2 I 3 2 I --- 39 26 9 3 1 
bank loan 51% 34% 13% 3% 1% 30% 20% 10% --- 48% 32% 11% 4% 1% 
Fr. bank 8 6 2 --- --- 2 --- 2 --- 10 6 2 --- ---
loan in C. 11% 8% 3% --- --- 20% --- 20% --- 12% 7% 2% --- ---
Other nation's bank loan-- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Other 16 14 1 1 --- 2 2 --- --- 18 16 I I ---
23% 20% 1% 1% --- 20% 20% --- --- 22% 20% 1% 1% ---
!Not 5 3 --- 1 1 1 1 --- --- 6 4 --- 1 1 
known 7% 4% --- 1% 1% 10% 10% --- --- 7% 5% --- 1% 1% 
Table 24: Imported technology from Japan 
24. IF YOUR ENTERPRISE HAS IMPORTED TECHNOLOGY FROM JAPAN, PLEASE 
INDICATE THE TYPE: 
c H I N E s E JAPANESE CHINESE & JAPANESE 
T s M L N T s L N IT s M L N 
Operating 41 22 12 4 3 5 3 1 I 46 25 12 5 4 
58% 31% 17% 6% 4% 50% 30% 10% 10% 57% 31% 15% 6% 5% 
Main- 20 9 7 4 --- 3 2 1 --- 23 1 I 7 5 ---
tenance 28% 13% 10% 6% --- 30% 20% 10% --- 28% 14% 9% 6% ---
Produc- 55 32 14 6 3 8 4 3 1 63 36 14 9 4 
tion 77% 45% 20% 8% 4% 80% 40% 30% 10% 78% 44% 17% 11% 5% 
Design 21 14 4 3 --- 7 5 2 --- 28 19 4 5 ---
30% 20% 6% 4% --- 70% 50% 20% --- 35% 23% 5% 6% ---
R &D 9 7 1 1 --- 4 3 --- I 13 10 I I I 
13% 10% 1% 1% --- 40% 30% --- 10% 16% 12% 1% 1% 1% 
Other 2 2 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 2 2 --- --- ---
3% 3% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 2°/o 2% --- --- ---
Not 6 4 I I --- --- --- --- --- 6 4 I I ---
known 8% 6% 1% 1% --- --- --- --- --- 71Yc. 5% 1% 1% ---
269 
Appendix I 
'fable 25: Special Japanese management methods imported 
25. DID YOUR ENTERPRISE IMPORT ANY SPECIAL JAPANESE MANAGEMENT 
METHODS? 
c H I N E s E JAPANESE CHINESE & JAPANESE 
T s M L N T s L N T s M L N 
Yes 59 36 14 8 I 10 5 3 I 68 41 13 11 2 
83% 51% 20% 11% 1% 100 50% 30% 10% 84% 51% 16% 14% 2% 
% 
JP. salary 14 10 2 2 --- 2 I I --- 16 11 2 3 ---
system 20% 14% 3% 3% --- 20% 10% 10% --- 20% 14% 2% 4% ---
QC C. 33 17 8 7 I 7 4 2 I 40 21 8 9 2 
46% 24% 11% 10% 1% 70% 40% 20% 10% 49% 26% 10% 11% 2% 
5S 49 30 12 7 --- 8 4 3 I 57 34 12 10 1 
69% 42% 17% 10% --- 80% 40% 30% 10% 70% 42% 15% 12% 1% 
Internal 23 9 9 5 --- 6 3 2 1 29 12 9 7 1 
welfare 32% 13% 13% 7% --- 60% 30% 20% 10% 36% 15% 11% 9% 1% 
Length of 19 12 4 2 I 5 3 2 --- 24 15 4 4 I 
service 27% 17% 6% 3% 1% 50% 30% 20% --- 30% 19% 5% 5% 1% 
Other 7 6 1 --- --- 1 --- 1 --- 8 6 1 1 ---
10% 8% 1% --- --- 10% --- 10% --- 10% 7% 1% I% ---
No 8 6 I --- I --- --- --- --- 9 7 I --- I 
11% 8% I% --- 1% --- --- --- --- 11% 9% I% --- I% 
Not 4 2 I --- I --- --- --- --- 4 2 I --- I 
known 6% 3% 1% --- 1% --- --- --- --- 5% 2% I% --- 1% 
Table 26: Training methods for employees 
26. WHAT TRAINING METHOD DOES YOUR ENTERPRISE USE FOR EMPLOYEES: 
I c H I N E s E 11 JAPANESE I CHINESE & JAPANESE 
T s M L N T s L N T s M L N 
On-the- 56 34 13 6 3 10 6 3 I 66 40 13 9 4 
~ob 
training 79% 48% 18% 8% 4% IOO 60% 30% 10% 81% 49% I6% !I% 5% 
% 
Outside 7 7 --- --- --- 4 2 2 --- 11 9 --- 2 ---
training 10% 10% --- --- --- 40% 20% 20% --- 14% 11% --- 2% ---
OTJ & out 7 5 I I --- 2 I I --- 9 6 I 2 ---
training 10% 7% 1% 1% --- 20% 10% 10% --- 11% 7% 1% 2% ---
Training 54 34 11 7 2 9 5 3 I 63 39 11 10 3 
in Japan 76% 48% 15% 10% 3% 90% 50% 30% 10% 78% 48% 14% 12% 4% 
Other "' 2 --- --- --- --- --- --- 2 2 --- --- ---L ---
3% 3% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 2% 2% --- --- ---
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'fable 27: Employee training in Japan 
27. HAS YOUR ENTERPRISE SENT EMPLOYEES TO .JAPAN FOR TRAINrNG? 
c H I N E s E 
! 
JAPANESE J~HINESE & JAPANESE 
T s M L N T s L N T S M L N 
Yes, 54 34 11 7 2 9 5 3 1 63 39 11 10 3 
76% 48% 15% 10% 3% 90% 50% 30% 10% 78% 48% 14% 12% 4% 
1 - 30. 40 28 10 1 1 7 5 1 I 47 33 10 2 2 
employees 56% 39% 14% 1% 1% 70% 50% 10% 10% 58% 41% 12% 2% 2% 
31 - 60. 8 5 I 2 --- I --- I --- 9 5 I , 
-' 
---
employees 11% 7% 1% 3% --- 10% --- 10% --- 11% 6% 1% 4% ---
Over 60 5 --- --- 4 I I --- I --- 6 --- --- 5 I 
employees 7% --- --- 6% 1% 10% --- 10% --- 7% --- --- 6% 1% 
Under I3 11 I --- 1 I I --- --- 14 I2 I --- I 
a month I8% I5% I% --- I% IO% IO% --- --- 17% 15% 1% --- 1% 
I - 3. 22 8 8 6 --- 3 2 I --- 25 10 8 7 ---
months 31% II% 11% 8% --- 30% 20% 10% --- 31% 12% IO% 9% ---
4-6. 7 4 2 1 --- 4 2 I 1 11 6 2 2 I 
months 10% 6% 3% I% --- 40% 20% 10% IO% o.14 7% 2% 2% I% 
Over 15 13 --- 1 1 1 --- 1 --- 16 13 --- 2 1 
half year 21% 18% --- 1% I% 10% --- 10% --- 20% 16% --- 2% 1% 
No 17 12 4 --- 1 1 1 --- --- 18 I3 4 --- I 
24% 17% 6% --- 1% 10% 10% --- --- 22% 16% 5% --- 1% 
Table 28: Advertising in China 
28. HAS YOUR ENTERPRISE ADVERTISED PRODUCTS OR SERVICES IN CHINA? 
c H I N E s E JAPANESE CHINESE & JAPANESE 
T s M L N T s L N T s M L N 
Yes 46 29 11 5 I 6 4 2 --- 52 33 11 7 I 
65% 41% 15% 7% 1% 60% 40% 20% --- 64% 41% I4% 9% 1% 
Magazine 22 16 2 4 --- 2 I 1 --- 24 17 2 5 ---
31% 23% 3% 6% --- 20% 10% IO% --- 30% 2I% 2% 6% ---
News- 33 2I 8 4 --- 3 2 1 --- 36 23 8 5 ---
paper 46% 30% 11% 6% --- 30% 20% IO% --- 44% 28% 10% 6% ---
Radio 11 6 3 2 --- 3 2 I --- 14 8 3 3 ---
15% 8% 4% 3% --- 30% 20% 10% --- 17% 10% 4% 4% ---
Televi- 18 7 8 3 --- 3 2 1 --- 21 9 8 4 ---
SI Oil 25% 10% 11% 4% --- 30% 20% 10% --- 26'!/o 11% 10% 5% ---
Billboard 8 5 2 I --- 2 I I --- 10 6 2 2 ---
11% 7% 3% 1% --- 20% 10% 10% --- 12% 7% 2% 2% ---
Direct 14 14 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 14 14 --- --- ---
mai I 20% 20% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 17% 17% --- --- ---
Spon- 14 7 3 4 --- I I --- --- IS 8 3 4 ---
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sonng 20% 10% 4% 6% --- 10% 10% --- --- 19°1., 10% 4% 5% ---
Other 17 8 6 2 I 3 2 I --- 20 10 6 3 I 
24% 11% 8% 3% 1% 30% 20% 10% --- 25% 12% 7% 4% 1% 
No response-- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Inquiries 4 2 --- I I I --- I --- 5 2 --- 2 I 
no sales 6% 3% --- 1% 1% 10% --- 10% --- 6'Yo 2% --- 2% 1% 
Sales 32 21 7 I --- 3 I 2 -·-- 35 22 7 3 ---
generate 45% 30% 10% 1% --- 30% 10% 20% --- 43% 27% 9% 4% ---
Increase 9 4 2 3 --- 2 I I --- 11 5 2 4 ---
in sales 13% 6% 3% 4% --- 20% 10% 10% --- 14% 6% 2% 5% ---
No, 25 I6 5 2 2 4 2 I I 29 18 5 3 3 
35% 23% 7% 3% 3% 40% 20% 10% 10% 36% 22% 6% 4% 4% 
Table 29: Enterprise's marketing region 
29. WHAT IS YOUR ENTERPRISE'S MARKETING REGION? 
I c H I N E s E I JAPANESE CHINESE & JAPANESE 
T s M L N T s L N T s M L N 
In Chinese domestic market: total: 77% 
1-25% 15 6 9 --- --- 3 2 1 --- 18 8 9 1 ---
21% 8% 13% --- --- 30% 20% 10% --- 22% 10% 11% 1% ---
26-50% 10 9 1 --- --- 1 1 --- --- 11 10 1 --- ---
14% 13% 1% --- --- 10% 10% --- --- 14% 12% 1% --- ---
51-75% 8 5 1 2 --- --- --- --- --- 8 5 1 2 ---
11% 7% 1% 3% --- --- --- --- --- 10% 6% 1% 2% ---
76-100% 22 17 1 2 2 3 2 1 --- 25 19 1 3 2 
31% 24% 1% 3% 3% 30% 20% 10% --- 31% 23% 1% 4% 2% 
In Japanese domestic market: total: 66% 
1-25% 8 5 1 2 --- 1 --- 1 --- 9 5 1 3 ---
11% 7% 1% 3% --- 10% --- 10% --- 11% 6% 1% 4% ---
26-50% 9 8 1 --- --- 2 1 1 --- 11 9 1 1 ---
13% 11% 1% --- --- 20% 10% 10% --- 14% 11% 1% 1% ---
51-75% 8 2 5 1 --- 1 1 --- --- 9 3 5 1 ---
11% 3% 7% 1% --- 10% 10% --- --- 11% 4% 6% 1% ---
76-100% 20 11 7 1 1 4 2 1 1 24 13 7 2 2 
28% 15% 10% 1% 1% 40% 20% 10% 10% 30% 16% 9% 2% 2% 
In markets other than China & Japan: total: 49% 
1-25% 21 13 5 3 --- 2 I I --- 23 14 5 4 ---
30% 18% 7% 4% --- 20% 10% 10% --- 28% 17% 6% 5% ---
26-50% 12 7 4 I --- 2 I I --- 14 8 4 3 ---
17% 10% 6% 1% --- 20% 10% 10% --- 17% 10% 5% 4% ---
Over50% 3 2 --- I --- --- --- --- --- 3 2 --- I ---
4% 3% --- 1% --- --- --- --- --- 4% 2% --- 1% ---
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Table 30: Sales in Chinese domestic market 
30. IN THE CHINESE DOMESTIC MARKET ARE YOUR PRODUCTS SOLD BY: 
c H I N E s E JAPANESE CHINESE & JAPANESE 
T s M L N T s L N T s M L N 
J.parent 4 2 --- 2 --- --- --- --- --- 4 2 --- 2 ---
company 6% 3% --- 3% --- --- --- --- --- 5% 2% --- 2% ---
C.parent 4 2 I --- I --- --- --- --- 4 2 --- I I 
company 6% 3% 1% --- 1% --- --- --- --- 5% 2% --- 1% 1% 
Your en- 57 38 13 4 2 9 6 3 --- 66 44 13 7 2 
terprise 80% 54% 18% 6% 3% 90% 60% 30% --- 81% 54% 16% 9% 2% 
Other C. I I --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1 I --- --- ---
company 1% 1% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1% 1% --- --- ---
Other --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Table 31: Sales in markets other than China 
31. IN MARKETS OTHER THAN CHINA ARE YOUR PRODUCTS SOLD BY: 
c H I N E s E I JAPANESE I CHINESE & JAPANESE 
T s M L N T s L N T s M L N 
J. parent 46 28 12 4 2 8 4 3 1 54 32 12 7 .., .) 
company 65% 39% 17% 6% 3% 80% 40% 30% 10% 67% 40% 15% 9% 4% 
C.parent 3 2 I --- --- --- --- --- --- 3 2 1 --- ---
company 4% 3% 1% --- --- --- --- --- --- 4% 2% 1% --- ---
Your en- 21 19 I 1 --- 5 3 2 --- 26 22 1 3 ---
terprise 30% 27% 1% 1% --- 50% 30% 20% --- 32% 27% 1% 4% ---
Other C. I I --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1 1 --- --- ---
company 1% 1% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1% 1% --- --- ---
Other J. 3 2 I --- --- 2 I I --- 5 3 I 1 ---
company 4% 3% 1% --- --- 20% 10% 10% --- 6% 4% 1% 1% ---
Other --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
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Table 32-A: Low price and high quality 
(I N d 2 S d 3 C . I d ) = o a vantage, = ome a van age, = ruc1a a vantage 
32. WHAT FACTORS ARE CRUCIAL TO COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE IN THE 
CHINESE MARKET, AS COMPARED WITH OTHER ASIAN MARKETS? 
c H I N E s E JAPANESE CHINESE & JAPANESE 
T s M L N T s L N T s M L N 
Low base price: 
China: I 8 6 I I --- --- --- --- --- 8 6 I I ---
11% 8% 1% 1% --- --- --- --- --- 10% 7% 1% 1% ---
2+3 24 17 2 3 2 5 3 2 --- 29 20 2 5 2 
34% 23% 3% 4% 3% 50% 30% 20% --- 36% 25% 3% 6% 3% 
Asia: I 2 2 --- --- --- 1 --- I --- 3 2 --- I ---
3% 3% --- --- --- 10% --- 10% --- 4% 2% --- 1% ---
2+3 23 15 3 4 I 5 3 I I 28 18 3 5 2 
32% 21% 4% 6% 1% 50% 30% 10% 10% 35% 22% 4% 6% 2% 
High quality: 
China: I --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -- --- ---
2+3 58 38 11 7 2 7 5 2 --- 65 43 11 9 2 
82% 53% 15% 10% 2% 70% 50% 20% --- 80% 53% 14% 11% 2% 
Asia: 1 --- --- --- --- --- -- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
2 +3 37 22 9 5 1 6 4 2 --- 43 26 9 7 I 
52% 31% 12% 7% 1% 60% 40% 20% --- 53% 32% 11% 9% 1% 
Table 32-B: Service back up and warranty 
32continue c H I N E s E JAPANESE CHINESE & JAPANESE 
T s M L N T s L N T s M L N 
Service back-up: 
China: I 1 I --- --- --- 1 --- I --- 2 1 --- 1 ---
1% 1% --- --- --- 10% --- 10% --- 2% 1% --- 1% ---
2+3 34 24 6 4 --- 5 4 I --- 39 28 6 5 ---
48% 34% 8% 6% --- 50% 40% 10% --- 15% 35% 7% 6% ---
Asia: 1 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
2+3 12 9 I 2 --- 5 3 2 --- 17 12 I 4 ---
17% 13% 1% 3% --- 50% 30% 20% --- 21% 15% I% 5% ---
Warranty: 
China: I 6 3 I 2 --- 1 --- I --- 7 3 I 3 ---
8% 4% 1% 3% --- 10% --- 10% --- 9% 4% I% 4% ---
2+3 9 7 2 --- --- 3 3 --- --- 12 10 2 --- ---
13% 10% 3% --- --- 30% 30% --- --- 15% 12% 2% --- ---
Asia: I 2 2 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 2 2 --- --- ---
3% 3% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 21Yo 2% --- --- ---
2+3 5 4 --- I --- 4 3 I --- 9 7 --- 2 ---
7% 6% --- 1% --- 40% 30% 10% --- 11% 9% --- 2% ---
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Table 32-C: Mass advertising and! technology sharing 
32continuc c H I N E s E JAPANESE CHINESE& JAPANESE 
T s M L N T s L N T s M L N 
Mass advertising: 
China: I 6 4 I I --- --- --- --- --- 6 4 I I ---
8% 6% 1% 1% --- --- --- --- --- 7% 5% 1% 1% ---
2+3 7 4 I 2 --- 3 2 I --- 10 6 I 3 ---
10% 6% I% 3% --- 30% 20% 10% --- 12% 7% 1% 4% ---
Asia: I 3 3 --- --- --- --- --- 3 , --- --- .) --- --- ---
4% 4% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 4% 4% --- --- ---
2+3 2 I --- I --- 3 2 I --- 5 3 --- 2 ---
3% 1% --- 1% --- 30% 20% 10% --- 6% 4% --- 2% ---
Technology sharing: 
China: I 1 --- --- I --- --- --- --- --- 1 --- --- I ---
1% --- --- 1% --- --- --- --- --- 1% --- --- 1% ---
2+3 10 6 2 2 --- 3 2 l --- 13 8 2 3 ---
14% 8% 3% 3% --- 30% 20% 10% --- 16% 10% 3% 4% ---
Asia: I I I --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1 I --- --- ---
I% 1% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1% I% --- --- ---
2+3 2 2 --- --- --- 3 2 I --- 5 4 --- I ---
3% 3% --- --- --- 30% 20% 10% --- 6% 5% --- 1% ---
Table 32-D: lLow installation costs and attractive payment terms 
32continu c H I N E s E JAPANESE CHINESE &JAPANESE 
e 
T s M L N T s L N T s M L N 
Low installation costs: 
China: I 2 I --- I --- --- --- --- --- 2 1 --- 1 ---
3% I% --- 1% --- --- --- --- --- 2% 1% --- I% ---
2+3 13 9 2 2 --- 3 2 I --- 16 11 2 3 ---
I8% I3% 3% 3% --- 30% 20% IO% --- 20% 14% 2% 4% ---
Asia: I --- --- --- --- --- I I --- --- 1 I --- --- ---
--- --- --- --- --- 10% IO% --- --- 1% 1% --- --- ---
2+3 3 2 --- I --- 3 2 I --- 6 4 --- 2 ---
4% 3% --- 1% --- 30% 20% IO% --- 7% 5% --- 2% ---
Attractive payment terms: 
China: I I --- --- I --- I I --- --- 2 I --- I ---
1% --- --- 1% --- 10% 10% --- --- 2% 1% --- 1% ---
2+3 10 8 I I --- 3 I 2 --- 13 9 I 3 ---
14% 11% 1% 1% --- 30% 10% 20% --- 16% 11% 1% 4% ---
Asia: I I I --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1 I --- --- ---
1% 1% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1% 1% --- --- ---
2+3 2 2 --- --- --- 3 2 I --- 5 4 --- I ---
3% 3% --- --- --- 30% 20% 10% --- 6% 5% --- I% ---
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Table 32-E: Top product design, quantity discount and maintenance-free use 
3 2 .continue c H I N E s E JAPANESE CHINESE &JAPANESE 
T s M L N IT s L N T s M L N 
Top product design: 
China: I I --- I --- --- --- --- --- --- 1 --- I --- ---
1% --- 1% --- --- --- --- --- --- 1% --- 1% --- ---
2+3 27 15 7 5 --- 6 4 2 --- 33 19 7 7 ---
38% 21% 10% 7% --- 60% 40% 20% --- 41% 23% 9% 9% ---
Asia: I --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
2+3 I4 5 6 3 --- 4 2 2 --- 18 7 6 5 ---
20% 7% 8% 4% --- 40% 20% 20% --- 22% 9% 7% 6% ---
Quantity discount: 
China: I 2 --- --- 2 --- --- --- --- --- 2 --- --- 2 ---
3% --- --- 3% --- --- --- --- --- 2% --- --- 2% ---
2+3 6 5 1 --- --- 3 2 1 --- 9 7 I 1 ---
8% 7% 1% --- --- 30% 20% 10% --- 11% 9% 1% 1% ---
Asia: 1 1 I --- --- --- 1 1 --- --- 2 2 --- --- ---
1% 1% --- --- --- 10% 10% --- --- 2% 2% --- --- ---
2+3 1 1 --- --- --- 3 2 1 --- 4 3 --- 1 ---
1% 1% --- --- --- 30% 20% 10% --- 5% 4% --- 1% ---
Maintenance-free use: 
China: 1 2 --- 1 1 --- --- --- --- --- 2 --- 1 1 ---
3% --- 1% 1% --- --- --- --- --- 2% --- 1% 1% ---
2+3 11 9 --- 2 --- 4 3 1 --- 15 12 --- 3 ---
15% 13% --- 2% --- 40% 30% 10% --- 19% 15% --- 4% ---
Asia: 1 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
2+3 4 3 --- 1 --- 3 2 1 --- 7 5 --- 2 ---
6% 4% --- 1% --- 30% 20% 10% --- 9% 6% --- 2% ---
Table 33: Annual turnover of enterprise 
l. WHEN COMPARING THE PERIOD OF JANUARY TO JUNE BETWEEN THIS AND 
LAST YEAR, WHAT HAPPENED TO THE TURNOVER OF YOUR ENTERPRISE? 
c H I N E s E JAPANESE CHINESE &JAPANESE 
T s M L N T s L N T s M L N 
Higher than last year: 
I- 5% 2 1 I --- --- --- --- --- --- 2 I I --- ---
3% 1% 1% --- --- --- --- --- --- 2% 1% 1% --- ---
6- 10% 6 3 2 I --- --- --- --- --- 6 3 2 I ---
8% 4% 3% 1% --- --- --- --- --- 7%. 4% 2% 1% ---
11-50% 21 14 5 2 --- 4 2 I I 25 16 5 3 I 
30% 20% 7% 3% --- 40% 20% 10% 10% 31%. 20% 6% 4% 1% 
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Over 50% 16 10 3 3 --- 4 2 2 --- 20 12 3 5 ---
23% 14% 4% 4% --- 40% 20% 20% --- 25% 15% 4% 6% ---
Similar 4 3 I --- --- --- --- --- --- 4 3 I --- ---
last year: 6% 4% 1% --- --- --- --- --- --- 5% 4% 1% --- ---
Lower than last year: 
I - 5% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
6- 10% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Over!O% 4 2 I --- I --- --- --- --- 4 2 I --- i' 
6% 3% 1% --- 1% --- --- --- --- 5% 2% 1% --- 1% 
Not 17 12 3 I I 2 2 --- --- 19 14 3 I I, 
known 24% 17% 4% 1% 1% 20% 20% --- --- 23% 17% 4% 1% 1% 
Table 34: Profit of enterprise 
34. NOW, IS YOUR ENTERPRISE IN PROFIT? 
I c H I N E s E 11 JAPANESE I CHINESE &JAPANESE 
T s M L N T s L N T s M L N 
Yes: 45 27 10 6 2 6 3 3 --- 51 30 10 9 2 
63% 38% 14% 8% 2% 60% 30% 30% --- 63% 37% 12% 11% 2% 
Under 3% 10 3 4 2 1 2 I 1 --- 12 4 4 3 1 
14% 4% 6% 3% 1% 20% 10% 10% --- 15% 5% 5% 4% 1% 
3-8% 16 10 3 2 1 2 --- 2 --- 18 10 3 4 1 
23% 14% 4% 3% 1% 20% 
---
20% --- 22% 12% 4% 5% 1% 
8- 15% 9 5 2 2 --- 2 2 --- --- 11 7 2 2 ---
0.13 0.07 0.03 0.03 --- 0.2 0.2 --- --- 0.14 0.09 0.03 0.03 ---
Over 15% 10 9 1 --- --- --- --- --- --- 10 9 1 --- ---
14% 13% 1% --- --- --- --- --- --- 12% 11% 1% --- ---
No: 13 9 3 --- 1 2 2 --- --- 15 1 1 3 --- 1 
18% 13% 4% --- 1% 20% 20% --- --- 19% 14% 4% --- 1% 
Little 13 9 3 --- 1 2 2 --- --- 15 11 3 --- I 
Deficit 18% 13% 4% --- 1o/! 20% 20% --- --- 19% 14% 4% --- 1% 
Big deficit --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Balance 12 9 2 1 --- 2 1 --- 1 14 10 2 1 1 
Receipts 17% 13% 3% 1% --- 20% 10% --- 10% 17% 12% 2% 1% 1% 
Not I 1 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1 I --- --- ---
known 1% 1% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1% 1% --- --- ---
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Table 35: How products compare 
35. HOW DO YOUR PRODUCTS COMPARE WITH JAPANESE PARENT COMPANY'S? 
I c lHl X N E s E 11 JAPANESE I CJHJINESE &JAPANESE 
T s M L N T s L N T s M L N 
Similar 10 6 4 --- --- I --- I --- 11 6 4 I ---
finished 14% 8% 6% --- --- 10% --- 10% --- 14% 7% 5% I% ---
Similar 9 7 I --- I I --- I --- 10 7 I I I 
p.-finished 13% 10% 1% --- 1% 10% --- 10% --- 12% 9% 1% 1% 1% 
Similar 19 12 3 2 2 2 2 --- --- 21 14 3 2 2 
parent 27% 17% 4% 3% 3% 20% 20% --- --- 26% 17% 4% 2% 2% 
high 
Similar 2 2 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 2 2 --- --- ---
parent low 3% 3% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 2% 2% --- --- ---
Similar 29 17 7 5 --- 7 3 3 1 36 20 7 8 I 
41% 24% 10% 7% --- 70% 30% 30% 10% 44% 25% 9% 10% 1% 
Different 13 10 2 1 --- 2 2 --- --- 15 12 2 1 ---
18% 14% 3% 1% --- 20% 20% --- --- 19% 15% 2% 1% ---
Not 3 2 --- --- I --- --- --- --- 3 2 --- --- 1 
known 4% 3% --- --- 1% --- --- --- --- 4% 2% --- --- 1% 
Table 36: ProbHems encountered as the enterprise developed 
36. WHAT PROBLEMS HA YE YOU EXPERIENCED AS YOUR ENTERPRISE 
DEVELOPED? 
c H I N E s E JAPANESE CHINESE & JAP ANJESE 
T s M L N T s L N T s M L N 
Cash 42 22 14 4 2 4 3 I --- 46 25 14 5 2 
flow 59% 31% 20% 6% 3% 40% 30% 10% --- 57% 31% 17% 6% 2% 
Laws& 23 9 7 6 1 6 3 3 --- 29 12 7 9 1 
rules 32% 13% 10% 8% 1% 60% 30% 30% --- 36% 15% 9% 11% 1% 
Domesti 19 13 2 3 I 4 2 2 --- 23 15 2 5 1 
c 
markets 27% 18% 3% 4% 1% 40% 20% 20% --- 28% 19% 2% 6% 1% 
Staff 16 10 5 I --- 2 --- 2 --- 18 10 5 3 ---
training 23% 14% 7% 1% --- 20% --- 20% --- 22% 12% 6% 4% ---
Excessi 16 3 7 6 --- I --- --- I 17 3 7 6 I 
ve 
expenses 23% 4% 10% 8% --- 10% --- --- 10% 21% 4% 9% 7% 1% 
lneffi- 13 3 7 2 I 2 I I --- 15 4 7 3 I 
c1ency 18% 4% 10% 3% 1% 20% 10% 10% --- 19% 5% 9% 4% 1% 
High 10 7 2 I --- 2 I I --- 12 8 2 2 ---
cost 14% 10% 3% 1% --- 20% 10% 10% --- 15'% 10% 2% 2% ---
[ nfras- 8 I 5 2 --- 4 I 2 I 12 2 5 4 I 
tructure 11% 1% 7% 3% --- 40% 10% 20% 10% 15'Yo 3% 6% 5% 1% 
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Other 12 11 I --- --- --- --- --- --- 12 11 I --- ---
17% 15% I% --- --- --- --- --- --- IS'Yo 14% 1% --- ---
Workers' 5 2 2 --- I --- --- --- --- 5 2 2 --- I 
efficien 7% 3% 3% --- 1% --- --- --- --- 6%. 2% 2% --- 1% 
cy 
Lack 4 2 I I --- I --- I --- 5 2 I 2 ---
know led 6% 3% 1% 1% --- 10% --- 10% --- 6% 2% 1% 2% ---
lge 
Visas & I I --- --- --- 2 I I --- 3 2 --- I ---
permits 1% 1% --- --- --- 20% 10% 10% --- 4% 2% --- 1% ---
Extra 2 I I --- --- I --- I --- 3 I I I ---
expense 3% 1% 1% --- --- 10% --- 10% --- 4% 1% I% 1% ---
Political situation--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Table 37: Restriction to Japanese technology & equipment imports 
37. DOES YOUR ENTERPRISE ENCOUNTER ANY IMPEDANCE TO IMPORTATION OF 
JAPANESE TECHNOLOGY & EQUIPMENT? 
I c H I N E s E I JAPANESE . CHINESE & JAPANESE 
T s M L N T s L N T s M L N 
No, 45 31 8 3 3 6 4 2 --- 51 35 8 5 3 
63% 44% II% 4% 4% 60% 40% 20% --- 63% 43% IO% 6% 4% 
Yes, 24 12 7 5 --- 3 --- 2 I 27 12 7 7 1 
34% 17% 10% 7% --- 30% --- 20% 10% 33% 15% 9% 9% I% 
Japaese 3 3 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 3 3 --- --- ---
state 4% 4% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 4% 4% --- --- ---
Japanese 2 --- 1 1 --- --- --- --- --- 2 --- 1 I ---
parent 3% --- 1% 1% --- --- --- --~ --- 2% --- 1% I% ---
Poor co-operation-- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Chinese 2 2 --- --- --- 1 --- I --- 3 2 --- I ---
policy 3% 3% --- --- --- 10% --- 10% --- 4% 2% --- 1% ---
Low 6 3 I 2 --- 1 --- I --- 7 3 I 3 ---
level 8% 4% 1% 3% --- IO% --- 10% --- 9% 4% 1% 4% ---
Chinese 4 3 I --- --- --- --- --- --- 4 3 I --- ---
Fail to 6% 4% 1% --- --- --- --- --- --- 5% 4% 1% --- ---
Langua 15 4 6 5 --- 2 --- I I 17 4 6 6 I 
ge 
21% 6% 8% 7% --- 20% --- 10% 10% 21% 5% 7% 7% 1% 
Other 2 2 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 2 2 --- --- ---
3% 3% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 2% 2% --- --- ---
Not 2 2 --- --- --- I I --- --- 3 3 --- --- ---
known 3% 3% --- --- --- 10% 10% --- --- 4% 4% --- --- ---
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Table 38: Restriction to importation of Japanese management methods 
38. WHAT DO YOU THINK ARE THE MAIN IMPEDANCES TO THE IMPORTATION OF 
JAPANESE MANAGEMENT METHODS? 
c H I N E s E JAPNESE : CHINESE & JAPANESE 
T s M L N T s L N T s M L N 
No, 26 20 3 3 --- 3 3 --- --- 29 23 3 3 ---
37% 28% 4% 4% --- 30% 30% --- --- 36% 28% 4% 4% ---
Yes, 42 22 12 5 3 6 I 4 I 48 23 12 9 4 
59% 31% 17% 7% 4% 60% 10% 40% 10% 59% 28% 15% 11% 5% 
Econom 34 17 10 4 3 2 --- 2 --- 36 17 10 6 3 
y 
business 48% 24% 14% 6% 4% 20% --- 20% --- 44% 21% 12% 7% 4a% 
Culture 25 13 8 3 I 4 I 3 --- 29 14 8 6 I 
tradition 35% 18% 11% 4% 1% 40% 10% 30% --- 36% 17% 10% 7% 1% 
Langua 18 7 5 5 I 5 1 3 I 23 8 5 8 2 
ge 
25% 10% 7% 7% 1% 50% 10% 30% 10% 28% 10% 6% 10% 2% 
Politic & 17 13 3 --- 1 2 --- I 1 19 13 3 I 2 
social 24% 18% 4% --- 1% 20% --- 10% 10% 23% 16% 4% 1% 2% 
Low 11 6 4 1 --- 1 --- I --- 12 6 4 2 ---
level 15% 8% 6% 1% --- 10% --- 10% --- 15% 7% 5% 2% ---
Other 6 5 1 --- --- --- --- --- --- 6 5 I --- ---
8% 7% 1% --- --- --- --- --- --- 7% 6% 1% --- ---
~. 
Poor eo- 2 1 --- --- 1 --- 1 Oao 
' ~ __ :,1 --- --- 2 I --- --- 1 
operatio 3% 1% --- --- 1% --- --- --- --- 2% 1% --- --- 1% 
n 
Not 3 3 --- --- --- 1 I --- --- 4 4 --- --- ---
known 4% 4% --- --- --- 10% 10% --- --- 5% 5% --- --- ---
Table 39: Increase in investment 
39. IS YOUR ENTERPRJSE GOING TO INCREASE INVESTMENT OR NOT? 
c H I NE SE JAPANESE: CHINESE & JAPANESE 
T s M L N T s L N T s M L N 
No, 41 27 9 3 2 4 2 I I 45 29 9 4 3 
58% 38% 13% 4% 3% 40% 20% 10% 10% 56% 36% 11% 5% 4% 
Yes, 30 18 6 5 I 6 3 3 --- 36 21 6 8 I 
42% 25% 8% 7% 1% 60% 30% 30% --- 44'% 26% 7% 10% I% 
Reduce --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Withdra --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
w 
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Table 40: Increase in output and typ_e ofproducts 
40. IS YOUR ENTERPRISE GOING TO INCREASE OUTPUT & TYPE OF PRODUCTS OR 
NOT? 
c H I N E s E JAPANESE CHINESE & JAPANESE 
T s M L N IT s L N T s M L N 
Yes, 66 40 15 8 3 10 5 4 1 76 45 15 12 4 
93% 56% 21% 11% 4% 100 50% 40% 10% 94% 56% 19% 15% 5% 
% 
No, 5 5 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 5 5 --- --- ---
7% 7% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 6% 6% --- --- ---
T bl 41 C a e : t "th t ontmue o co-ope.ra e WI t t cmrren par ner 
41. WILL YOUR ENTERPRISE CONTINUE TO CO-OPERATE WITH ITS CURRENT 
PARTNER OR NOT? 
c H I N E s E JAPANESE CHINESE & JAPANESE 
:T s M L N T s L N T s M L N 
Continue 64 41 14 6 3 10 5 4 1 74 46 14 10 4 
90% 58% 20% 8% 4% 100 50% 40% 10% 91% 57% 17% 12% 5% 
% 
Look partner --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Not 7 4 1 2 --- --- --- --- --- 7 4 1 2 ---
known 10% 6% 1% 3% --- --- --- --- --- 9% 5% 1% 2% ---
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